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Preface 
A synopsis should be a glimpse of what the dissertation is about, i.e. it has the purpose to 
orient and summarize. A synopsis should also reflect and conclude. I have largely shifted 
the orienting function to the two short “how” sections in the preface. When writing the 
main part of the synopsis, I was attracted to reflect, to criticize, and to raise my voice. I 
chose to follow this impetus. Charles Tilly once wrote in the preface of his marvelous, 
little book, “Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons”: 
Why do other people’s books behave like docile marionettes? Mine keep playing 
Pinocchio. They take on characters of their own and resist correction. This one, for 
instance. When I sat down to write it, the book was supposed to end up mild-
mannered, studious, and balanced: an even-handed survey of various ways to 
approach large comparisons of social structures and processes. Somehow it 
materialized as a bit of a bully. It struts around with a confident, pugnacious air. 
Yet behind the bravado hides a lazy, indecisive, pusillanimous weakling, with sticks 
for legs. My little book often makes accusations without naming names , avoids 
fights one might have expected it to welcome, and fails to specify when, where, or 
how alleged misdeeds occurred. Incorrigible! Yet, for all its faults, I love the little 
rapscallion. 
(Tilly 1984, viii) 
I couldn't have said it any better. I am not Charles Tilly but a PhD student, therefore I try 
to be balanced, respectful, and provide references as support for my arguments. There are 
many differences between Tilly’s text and mine—quality, of course, and the topic. My 
little rapscallion is about latent variables and validity.  
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How to read this dissertation 
The volume contains five parts—four papers and a synopsis. Every part can be read and is 
intended to be understandable on its own. This should especially be true of the four 
research papers; choose by interest. The first two papers are about social values, the other 
two are about European identity.Paper 1 “Testing the Invariance of Values in the Benelux 
Countries with the European Social Survey: Accounting for Ordinality”, is on the 
application of latent variable modeling to categorical data and assessing invariance of 
measurement across context—hopefully these clauses make clear that its emphasis is on 
applied statistics. If interested in substantive research on social values, Paper 2, “Two 
theories on the test bench: Internal and external validity of the theories of Ronald 
Inglehart and Shalom Schwartz”, is a better choice. Paper 3, “The Concept of European 
Identity: Overused and Underspecified”, is a critical examination of the concept of 
European identity, its uses, its definitions, and its problems. Therefore, it is a good choice 
if you want to get an overview of the debate on European identity. However, this 
overview might also leave you with confusion because the concept of European identity I 
regard as most tenable is but suggested in Paper 3 and more fully developed in Paper 4. 
Paper 4, “European Identity as a safeguard against xenophobia? A differentiated view 
based on identity content”, explicates what I hold to be a valid theoretical concept of 
European identity and applies this conceptualization in empirical analyses. 
The synopsis should be the starting point if, and only if, you are interested in 
methodology. A bit of curiosity for philosophy of science and some tolerance to 
disillusionment would help as well. The synopsis can be read on its own; especially the 
first part of it. It is a detour to the history of quantitative social science and two of its 
central concepts, latent variables and validity. The second part of the synopsis is about 
social values and European identity as two cases of latent variables. It makes explicit, 
what is—hopefully at least to some part—applied in the four research papers.  
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How this dissertation was written 
The synopsis was written last, which is not unusual. But in some way it did not behave as 
a “normal” synopsis should do, as a summary. Rather it dragged me deep into 
methodology and philosophy. This has two consequences—both of them I see as positive. 
Some of what I have written in the research papers now seems problematic to me; which 
indicates that that I have learned something. The conclusions in the synopsis are more 
critical than in the original papers, although to the best of my knowledge nothing is 
utterly wrong in the papers. However, underlying issue stay latent in the research papers. 
The synopsis brings them to the fore. 
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The worst thing one can do with words is to surrender to them. 
(George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, 1946) 
 
Prologue 
It is easy to name what this synopsis is about; it is about latent variables and validity. The 
terms variable, latent variable, and validity are part of the vernacular of empirical social 
science. Everybody uses them. Everybody knows what they mean. Not so; at least to me. 
I had to find out that I did not know the details, which is—as is well know—where the 
devil is. 
Imagine my dissertation would have been a hike. It is always good to have a map with 
you when going for a hike. Actually, my map was a whole collection of maps, entitled 
“construct validity theory”. It was a bit heavy, but I felt confident to have it with me on 
my journey. In paper 1 and paper 2, dealing with social values, I took a route that is sign-
posted and actually I never had to use the map to find my way. Afterwards, dealing with 
European identity in paper 3 and paper 4, I felt ready to go into the open country, off the 
beaten tracks. I had my “construct validity theory” map with me. It did not take long and I 
wanted to use the map to figure out where to go. I stood in front of a forest. But there was 
no forest on the map. “Maybe a small mistake in the map”, I thought and went on. After a 
while I was at the foot of a mountain; but no mountain on the map. I could not figure out 
where I was. I got lost and panicked, “Am I too stupid to read a map!?” But finally, I was 
sure, “The map is flawed!”  
The mainstream view of construct validity did its job relatively well for what we wanted 
to do in the studies on social values. When turning to work on European identity, I got 
into severe trouble— some meandering had to do with myself, but some erring seemed to 
have to do with the methodological map itself. How hard I tried, I could not make 
standard conceptions of latent variables and validity work for European identity. I always 
had the feeling that I would force my thinking on the social reality. To be clear, good 
research always does some force to social reality; it reduces complexity. But in the case 
of European identity, the gold standards of measurement which I knew by then simply did 
not fit. I would say that there are good reasons why. Writing this introductory chapter was 
a welcome opportunity to put them down.   
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Where we are in the realm of latent variables 
Before starting this endeavor it is wise to locate where we are. We are in the realm of 
latent variables; but where exactly? Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004, 1), in their 
seminal, unified treatment of modern statistics, start out with the observation that latent 
variables are omnipresent. “Omnipresent?” we could ask, “They are latent, i.e. rather 
hidden, aren’t they?” Of course, this is a misreading of Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh; they 
want to say that latent variables are used for a wide range of purposes. But there is 
something to the naïve reading of omnipresence—it triggers the question what the nature 
of latent variables is. We will see later that the answer depend on metaphysics. 
I hope that reading “metaphysics” already triggered a reaction—be it curiosity, doubt, or 
shaking the head. While there are good reasons to classify some metaphysics as 
ridiculous, we will see that we need an account of ontology to answer what a latent 
variable is. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that asks about the fundamental nature 
of the world and being. Its non-metaphysic sibling is epistemology, the branch of 
philosophy that asks about the possibilities, ways, and forms of knowledge. The 
ontology-epistemology pair will turn up again and again. If unfamiliar, a good way to 
follow is to keep in mind that ontology refers to the question “what is real?” and 
epistemology refers to the question “How can we know?”. These two questions also make 
clear immediately that answering epistemological questions presupposes—if implicit—an 
ontological position. Statistics is not as philosophically innocent as it may seem. 
Before moving on, we take “omnipresence” as Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh intended and 
survey the usages of latent variables. This will help to single out which usage I focus on. 
Amongst the most important usages of latent variables are:  
(1) Decomposition of variances and covariances  
(2) Modeling unobserved heterogeneity 
(3) Missing data and counterfactuals 
(4) Hypothetical constructs, latent responses 
Usages (1), (2), and (3) are technical in the sense that they propose latent variables as a 
way to handle problems in the observed data. They are not in the focus of my attention 
(excellent treatments are Bollen 1989, 2002). The fourth usage of latent variables is not 
technical but theoretical. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004), in line with many others, 
use the term “hypothetical construct” to refer to latent variables as concepts and the term 
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“latent response” to refer to (continuous) response variables underlying observed 
(categorical) variables. I will take issue with the term “construct” later. For now, it is only 
important to note that latent variables denote on the one hand technical stuff and on the 
other hand theoretical stuff.  
The focus of the following is on theoretical stuff, i.e. on latent variable as concepts. I will 
not use equations or formal notion; others are better at this. Yet, the claim is to relate 
theoretical reflection to scientific practice, part of which is statistical calculus. In this 
sense the text is more about quantitative methodology than about specific quantitative 
methods. 
The text proceeds in the following steps, some of which may seem unnecessary—they are 
indeed, if you are really into methodology. Speaking of my own experience, there is 
potential for fallacy here. I assumed that I was really into methodology because I knew 
the methods everybody uses, and some more. However, I had to realize that running a 
structural equation model is something different to methodological maturity. As some of 
the following is “not mainstream”, it might well be that you feel comfortable in your 
“mainstream” environment, without having an idea what issues lurk behind the surface. A 
good way to decide whether to read the text from the beginning to the end is to the look at 
the opening example of the next chapter, the three different interpretation of the factor 
model. If it is obvious to you which interpretations go with which ontological and 
epistemic assumptions, go ahead to any chapter you find useful. If not, take the stepwise, 
narrative approach with me. Here is the road map: 
(1) The confusion with latent variables 
I start out with describing my confusion; of course hoping to convince you that there is 
confusion in the scientific field and that we should proceed cautiously. I will first 
approach latent variables in the negative, i.e. in terms what they are not. Afterwards we 
will have a glance at latent variable talk and realize that it has something of a Babylonian 
confusion of terms. In order not to surrender to these words, I introduce a three level 
framework to talk about latent variables. Using this framework, the issues of latent 
variables can be articulated clearly. Especially, we will have a first try at disenchanting 
the term “construct”. “Construct” seems to be at the centre of the problem. “Construct” 
seems to do a trick; to be magical. This is bad metaphysics. 
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(2) A detour to philosophy 
We need some good metaphysics. In order to fully understand what the trick of 
“construct” is, it is necessary to spell out two philosophical positions on what latent 
variables are, constructivism and realism. I will defend a realist position. 
(3) The issue of validity 
We will see that a realist notion of latent variables gets the issue of validity different to 
the tradition of construct validity. At this point, I will bring all the strings together in a 
criticism of construct validity, with a side step to the related issue of measurement. Of 
course, crushing construct validity, leads to the question what to do instead. I will argue 
that being less afraid of theoretical work and being less detached from social reality are 
helpful. 
(4) Turning to the social world 
Therefore, in the fourth part, the synopsis turns to the social world and claims that human 
kinds are different from natural kinds. 
(5) Two case studies: Social values and European identity 
Finally, I will be able to explain why sociological concepts such as European identity are 
a hart nut for quantitative science, and how I tried to crack it. Having read the other 
chapter, I hope the reader will be in a position to judge how badly I failed by my own 
standards. 
1. The confusion with latent variables 
(My) confusion with latent variables 
Let me use an example to show how confused I am. I run a factor analysis on three 
variables x1, x2, x3 which results in one factor X. Now, I try to interpret the result and 
come up with three options: 
 (1) “I have attempted to measure construct X.” 
(2) “I have constructed a hypothetical variable out of x1, x2, x3.” 
(3) “I have summarized the data into a composite made of the shared variance of x1, x2, 
x3.” 
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All three answers sound more or less appropriate to me. One might chip in that the 
answer depends on whether I had run an exploratory or a confirmatory factor analyses. 
This is the right track, though the wrong angle. The angle to start with is theoretical and 
conceptual, i.e. outside of the data (analyses). And maybe, with a more basic topic: The 
semantic relation of the terms variable and latent variable. 
What a latent variable is not  
Latent variables are commonly described in terms of what they are not; they are not 
manifest; they are not observable or not directly observed. This is helpful as long as we 
know, what variables are. Let us pretend not to know and start from two simple 
propositions about variables: 
(1) A variable is something that varies. 
Explanation: This excludes constants. 
(2) A variable can be coded in numbers. 
Explanation: A variable has different categories (states) or its quantity (amount) can vary. 
More precisely, not the variable is coded but the position of object on the variable. 
Age is an example of a variable conventionally treated as manifest. Taking the two 
propositions above, age is the amount of time passed since birth coded in years. This is 
unproblematic. However this sentence accomplishes a lot: 
 (1) Age gets a definition. CONCEPT 
(2) The definition refers to a distinct aspect of reality;  REFERENT 
(3) We can observe this aspect of reality and there exists a 
metric to code the observation. 
MEASUREMENT 
 
All this is meant when we say that we successfully measure a variable (Michell 2013). 
The first two accomplishments concern ontology (What is real?); the third 
accomplishment concern epistemology (How we can know?). 
Latent variables are often portrayed against observed variables—but what often goes 
unnoticed it that both are variables. All variables need a definition, a referent in reality 
(more about this later), and pose the problem of how to measure them. In the next section 
I will argue that much of latent variable talk amounts to a Babylonian confusion that 
obscures rather than clarifies these issues.  
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I have already smuggled in an important issue in the first sentences of this chapter. I said 
that latent variables are “not observable or
In the course of the next sections we will see that the latent variable framework starts out 
from the epistemic issue of accessibility but seems to solve ontological, conceptual and 
measurement issues passing by. Do these functions do us a favor? To judge, we need to 
decipher latent variable talk. 
 not directly observed”. These two propositions 
make a difference. “Observable” vs. “not observable” is a categorical statement on the 
nature of variables. This is an ontological distinction. If correct, there are two kinds of 
variables: Variables we can observe and variables we cannot observe. Of course the 
question then is what latent variables are. Can they be said to exist? The second 
proposition, “not directly observed”, only states that a variable is latent when we did not 
or could not observe it. This is an epistemological explanation why some variables in our 
models are latent and some are manifest. In this view, both observed and latent variables 
can be real or not.  
Latent variable talk 
The quantitative approach entered the stage roughly a hundred years ago with the forceful 
premise to make social science more scientific. Scientific—at these times rather 
unambiguously—meant evidence based, objective, in search of general laws, and 
eventually truth seeking. Latent variable modeling is one of its most prominent offspring. 
Ironically, what began with the intention to make the study of the social and the 
psychological more like the perceived ideal of natural science, resulted in a plethora of 
concepts, in an uneasy amalgam of ideas, and in confusion, which found its smallest 
denominator in the employment of statistical machinery. We all work with some kind of 
statistical models that entail factors, classes, or components, but we rarely admit that we 
are confused. The reading which is most in favor of us is that we are simply used to latent 
variable talk.  
A less favorable reading is that we have surrendered to latent variable talk—maybe up the 
degree that we do not see the issues anymore. Here is a reminder on the confusion in 
latent variable talk. The term “latent variable” is frequently used synonymous with the 
terms “construct”, “factor”, “concept”, “trait”, “unobservable”, and “hypothetical 
construct” to name but a few. These terms that should tell us what a latent variable is, 
have themselves acquired different meanings and connotations. A few examples will 
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suffice (for a critical overview, see Maraun and Gabriel 2013): Is a latent variable 
understood as a factor the same as the factor in a statistical factor model? Is a hypothetical 
construct hypothetical in the sense that it is hypothesized to exist or in the sense that it is 
constructed out of the data. Are latent variables as concepts part of the real world or just 
linguistic symbols? 
This play on words could go and on. The examples I gave, have a common structure: 
They take a term and use it at different levels of abstractions. Take the second example, it 
uses the term “hypothetical construct” first as a theoretical term and then as term that 
describes data manipulation. Following Rigdon (2012, 2013) latent variable talk is about 
three levels of abstraction: concepts, proxies, and observed variables. 
Proposing a framework 
Figure 1 proposes a framework to talk about latent variables. In the three levels of 
abstraction it follows Rigdon (2012, 2013); the naming of the levels and object is 
modified and the concept/referent distinction are added, which is in line with the thinking 
of Rigdon (personal communication, July 23rd
Figure 1 The concept proxy framework 
, 2014). 
 
Figure 1 is about latent variables; the term “latent variable”, however, is absent. 
“Construct” is missing as well. Apparently, I do not appreciate them. I will try to 
 
Proxy 
item 1 item 2 item x . . .  
Level1 
Theory 
Level 2 
Measurement 
Level 3 
Observation (Data) 
Mathematical 
Operations 
Concept
u 
Referent 
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convince the reader that the proposed alternatives do a better job to describe what we do 
when we work with latent variables; and that this framework allows to understand why 
much of latent variable talk rather obscures than clarifies the issues we (should) 
encounter. 
At the most abstract level (level 1) is the theoretical concept. A further distinction at the 
theoretical level is the so-called concept/referent distinction (Maraun and Peters 2005). 
The concept as such defines a class of entities; a concept denotes. The denoted
At the lowest level of abstraction (level 3) is the observational information we have at 
hand. Most commonly, these data are called observed variables. This term is 
unproblematic and I will use it as well, though I prefer to call the data a set of items. 
“Item” underscores that it is on open question whether are not these data entries have the 
properties of a variable and whether or not they relate to a latent variable. 
 entities are 
its referents. This may sound like hairsplitting. I will try an example: Level 1 looks light a 
tree, right? In a nutshell, the concept/referent distinction says that you can’t climb the 
word “tree”. The word “tree” is a concept in language, a symbol. Its referents are out in 
the world; these trunks in your garden you can climb. Why is this important for 
methodology? A simple analogy might touch the point: If you do not know what you are 
looking for (concept), it is hard to find (referent). You cannot find out what you were 
looking for by grabbing something at the wayside and proclaiming “Ah, that’s what I was 
looking for”. In terms of latent variables, the concept/referent distinction means that we 
cannot fix the definition and the meaning of a latent variable by the data alone. Or put 
differently, we are urged to explicitly define our concepts; for there must have been an 
implicit understanding of what we were looking for in the first place when we collected 
data. Stated more plainly, factor analyzing a set of items will not substitute for theoretical 
definition. 
At the intermediate level (level 2) there are the latent variables in their technical sense. 
They are supposed to stand in as proxies for the concepts (more precisely, the referents of 
the concepts).1
                                               
1 As the concept/referent distinction is not widely used in the social sciences, I will in most occasions use 
the term concept and add a qualification when I mean its referent. “Referent” alone might not be too 
unfamiliar. From a methodological standpoint, this distinction is important—its absence opens the door to 
the nominalist fallacy. 
 All proxies are the result of mathematical operations on the items. Factor 
methods yield factors proxies; component based methods yield composite proxies. The 
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promise of latent variable modeling is that specific mathematical operations (e.g., the 
common factor model, the Rasch model) results in the successful representation of 
theoretical concepts. Measurement is a special kind of representation; we will touch upon 
this issue later. 
What is (so problematic about) a construct? 
Construct is one word for two different things. First, it can mean a theoretical term. A 
theoretical term is a linguistic, symbolic entity that serves as a placeholder in theories. 
This is what figure 1 calls a concept. Second, it can mean the properties that we think 
play a role in reality and of which we would like to obtain measures. This is what figure 1 
calls referents. Polysemy may be annoying but is the normal case in language, no problem 
as long as one would clearly recognize which of the two meanings is intended. This is not 
the case with the usage of construct. One regularly sees properties that can be attributed to 
construct in one sense being transported to construct in the other sense (Borsboom et al. 
2009). It seems that the function of the term construct is exactly this blurring of 
distinctions. The blurring of the concept/referent distinction concerns the theoretical level. 
An even more severe “concept equating” (Maraun and Gabriel 2013) takes place across 
the levels of theory and measurement: The term “construct” is used to denote both the 
theoretical concepts at the most abstract level and the proxies at the intermediate level 
(Rigdon 2012).  
This is confusing; and it has the smell of cheating. This is not to say that everybody who 
uses the term “construct” intends to cheat, nor that those who came up with the idea 
intended to cheat. But it is to say that a whole lot of problems are connected to 
“construct”. A first example: The blurring of distinctions triggers the belief that the 
empirical representations are per se equivalent to the theoretical concepts (Maraun and 
Gabriel 2013). Despite the warnings of Cliff (1983) and others about the nominalist 
fallacy—thinking that something is identical with whatever label has been applied to it—
researchers in the factor-analytic tradition have been particularly inclined to assume that 
the common factors derived in their statistical models are equivalent to the conceptual 
variable labels assigned to them. 
We will take up this thread again in the section on validity. The reason for yet another 
adjournment in the story is that my argument rests on an ontological commitment to 
realism about latent variables. I have already made use of a realist perspective when I 
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echoed the warning against the nominalist fallacy and when I made an issue out of the 
concept/referent distinction. A detour to philosophy will present realism and its main 
rival, constructivism, and spell out the reason why only realism about latent variables is 
tenable. The three levels of abstraction—concepts/referents, proxies, items— will serve 
again as an orientation. 
2. A detour to the philosophy of science: What is a latent variable? 
There are a range of formal and empirical definitions of latent variables (Bollen 2002, 
Borsboom et al. 2003). However, statistical theory only tells us how parameters that relate 
the latent variable to the data could be estimated, if the data were generated under the 
model in question. The if in the preceding sentence is decisive. It points out that latent 
variable theory includes assumptions of how the world works. How we structure our 
models should have something to do with how the world works. Latent variable modeling 
is not neutral on ontological issues (Borsboom et al. 2003). In principle, two extreme 
views can be contrasted: latent variables as fiction (constructivism) and latent variables as 
real (realism). Constructivism and realism are themselves heterogeneous schools of 
thought. Though compatible with many constructivist and realist accounts my usage is 
restricted to the object of latent variables, i.e. best described as a constructivism or 
realism about latent variables (for constructivism and realism about the social, see section 
4). 
Constructivism: Latent variables as fiction 
The estimation of latent variable models is, of course, dependent on the input of 
observable information. The output of latent variable models is all there is about latent 
variables. There is no latent variable unless we compute it. In this view, latent variables 
are pure constructions; they are not real. Therefore, latent variables are a numerical 
trick—albeit a potentially useful trick. Latent variables can serve as elegant heuristic 
summaries of a bunch of observed variables and as taxonomic tools to establish 
classifications. But they cannot stand in for theoretical concepts, simply because there are 
no theoretical concepts that are real (more precisely, there are no theoretical concepts that 
have empirical referents). 
Paradoxically, a similar attitude towards latent variables developed within the school of 
logical empiricism (“positivism”), though for different reasons. The early positivists gave 
22 
priority to characteristics that are directly observable. Eventually, they realized the need 
to include in their theories unobserved concepts and came up with operationalism. 
Operationalism holds that the meaning of concept is synonymous with the set of 
operations used to measure it (Bridgman 1927). Operationalism allowed the positivists to 
uphold the primacy of the observable, but turned out to create another problem. If the 
measures define what the latent variable is, there are as many latent variables as sets of 
measures. There is no way to decide which measures and which operations should be 
used, apart from an instrumentalist point of view (Block 1976): Latent variables are a 
means to an end, be it prediction or data reduction. 
Operational definitions cling to the observable; but it is difficult to defend what is an 
observation and thus real and what is a unobservable and thus a construction (In 
philosophical jargon: It grants ontological significance to a sharp distinction between 
observation and theory and claims that only manifest, or observable entities exist, when 
observability is really a matter of degree (Haig 2013). A simple example is the 
magnifying class. Through a magnifying glass you see small things you did not see 
before. It seems plausible to admit that the small things have existed before. Regarding 
latent variables as fiction has some shortcomings and some cumbersome consequences. 
Operationalism differs from philosophies of constructivism in that it (uncritically) accepts 
the realness of observations. For our subject matter, however, this does not make a 
difference. Whereas the operationalist accepts observed variables at level 1, the 
constructionist may or may not do so; both of them, however, do not allow real entities at 
level 3. When there are no real concepts (or more precisely: no real referents of concepts), 
it makes no sense to talk about proxies at level 2. Data constructions is all there is.  
Latent variables as real 
A realist maintains one or all of the following propositions: (1) theories can be true or 
false, (2) Theoretical entities, at least some them, exist, (3) Theoretical entities are 
causally responsible for observed phenomena (Devitt 1991). 
Borsboom et al. (2003) argue that realism is the only ontological position that is 
compatible with latent variable modeling. Both factor models and item response theory 
(IRT) models treat the latent variable as the source of the observed variation in the 
indicators. The latent variable causally explains the observed pattern. Only if the assumed 
concept exists, the latent variable proxy can stand in for it in the model. 
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This argument seems a bit like begging the question because it starts from the observation 
how factor models view the world and not from the observation how the world is and 
which models are appropriate as a result of it. After all, the claim that latent entities have 
to be real to make factor models meaningful, serves a as reminder to the practitioners of 
latent variable modeling. It is not factor analysis that constructs meaningful factors. On 
the contrary, factor analyses are only warranted if the belief is justified that meaningful 
latent entities exist. 
Let us reframe the realist position in terms of the three levels of abstractions. Also in the 
realist account, concepts remain theoretical, but they do refer to latent entities that exist 
(their referents). The latent variables in the statistical models are proxies for these latent 
entities; therefore proxies can be modeled as the common cause of the observed items.  
In favour of realism I 
I feel I should start with what is not my intention: Realism about latent variables is no 
carte blanche for latent variable models of the common-factor type. Rather, realism spells 
out the condition under which common-factor type models are tenable: A latent variable 
has to exist. Computing a latent variable model does not make a latent variable real. If a 
latent variable exists, it is appropriate to compute a model that could works as a proxy for 
it. That said, if a latent variable does not exist, pull the plug.2
That said, I can safely turn to batter the view that latent variables are fictions. However, 
again a qualification: More precisely, I criticize the constructivist usage that wants to 
make realist interpretations. Intentional constructivist usage as pure heuristic device is a 
viable option.  
  
Constructivist philosophy is skeptical about science; albeit very fond of science, 
operationalism left us with a similar result. If the meaning of the concept is defined by the 
set of items that should measure it, every different set of item gives rise to a new concept. 
Already back in the 1980s Duncan (1984, 227) lamented the thousands of scales that 
                                               
2 Of course, in reality we do not know for sure if a latent variable exists or not. But again, this is no carte 
blanche to claim any latent variable. A successful claim of a latent variable must give a plausible account 
how this variable operates in the world. This is more demanding than it may seem; psychologists, for 
example, ponder over the realness of “intelligence” since the days of Charles Spearman (Borsboom 2005; 
Gould 1996). 
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sociologists had produced and their attitude that all would measure something and their 
attitude that they all would measure something different.  
We should add that if you really regard latent variables as fictions, measurement is an 
oxymoron — you cannot measure something that is not real. Clearly, the early 
operationalists were not fully aware of the consequences. Sadly, the notion of operational 
definition still persists. 
Much of the confusion around constructs and latent variables stems from an uneasy 
amalgam of realist intentions and constructivist practices. Construct validation theory is 
no exception. In its simplest form the notion of validity has something with the issue 
whether a test measures what it should measure. We will see that the aspect of 
measurement is not at the forefront of the current mainstream of construct validity theory. 
However, try to think about validity without thinking about measurement. I bet it won’t 
work. When we agree that measurement is an issue, it does not make sense to adhere to 
constructivist practice and to pretend to measure something, let alone to claim valid 
measurement. Unfortunately, something like this seems to go on in construct validity 
theory. 
3. The issue of validity  
How many “validities”? 
Standard textbooks on research methods (e.g., Crano and Brewer 2002, Schnell et al. 
2008) give the impression that there were several types of validity. It is more useful to 
frame these approaches as different strategies of validation. Validity is a single property; 
validation is the activity to look for validity evidence. 
Table 2 shows different approaches to validation. It is apparent that the main tool for 
quantitative validation studies is correlational analysis (which includes factor analysis). 
This is a rough classification, and though the terms are still in use, it is outdated. Tow 
developments of the last decades deserve more attention: the unified view and the realist 
view. 
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Table 2 Types of validity evidence 
type evidence how to 
content Measures represent the theoretical domain of 
interest 
reasoning; intersubjective 
agreement on meaning 
criterion Association of the measures under scrutiny 
with other, well-respected measures 
Original: criterion = measure of the very same 
concept 
Later: criteria = different concepts, “concurrent 
validity”, “divergent validity”, “predictive 
validity”. 
correlate, correlate, 
correlate 
construct The relations of construct X with other 
constructs should conform to the theoretical 
expectations 
(the idea of the nomological network) 
deduce 
and then correlate, correlate, 
correlate 
 
The unified view: Messick 
In the legacy of Cronbach and Meehl (1955), a unified view on validity developed that 
subsumed all approaches to validation under the umbrella of construct validity (for 
detailed historical accounts see, Sireci 2009, Newton 2012).  
Other labels for this approach are “mainstream” and “consensus”—the reason being that 
it was encoded in an important guidance document, the Standards for Educational and 
Psychological Testing, published jointly by the American Educational Research 
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Council on 
Measurement in Education (1999, 2nd edition).3
Messick, a key author in the unified view, holds that “validity is an integrated evaluative 
judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the 
adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions based on test scores or other 
modes of assessment” (Messick 1989, 13, italics in the original). Let us go slowly through 
the definition. Messick proposes that validity is a judgment not a property. To be judged 
is the use of the test, inferences and actions, not the test itself. Validity evidences are all 
empirical observations and theoretical rationales that speak about the adequacy and 
 
                                               
3 A revised, 3th edition is expected to be published in 2015. 
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appropriateness of test use. This definition is broad enough, to give semantic concerns 
and correlation strategies its say in validation research. The emphasis is, however on 
pragmatic the pragmatic aspect of validity, i.e. what is to be done with the test scores and 
how testing is done (Kane 2006; Zumbo 2009). This includes usage, explanation of the 
testing process, and ethical issues.  
For its all-encompassing nature the unified view has been criticized as a “laundry list” of 
validity evidence—in Messick’s account it is not clear what is sufficient for validity and 
where, except everywhere, to look for it. This disorients researchers who keep on 
computing correlations (Hood 2008). Everything that is in the unified view of validity is 
important—intended use, consequences, ethics—but is it reasonable to pack all into 
validity? 
The realist view: Borsboom 
The answer of Borboom and colleagues would be: No, it is not reasonable to put all 
desirable things into the definition of validity. In their view, the unified view at best hides 
the key ingredient, at worst it is lacking: Successful measurement. While the mainstream 
view of construct validity, treats validity as an evaluation of test use or test interpretation, 
Borsboom insists that validity is a property of the test (Borsboom et al. 2009). In one 
sense, Borsboom is close to the classical view of validity, before the reign of construct 
validity, which holds that validity is the degree to which “a test measures what it is 
supposed to measure” (Garrett, 1937, 324). Validity is an attribute of a measurement 
instrument that tells whether the measurement instrument is sensitive to the variation in 
the targeted attribute. Borsboom et al. (2004, 1061) propose “a simple conception of test 
validity: A test is valid for measuring an attribute if (a) the attribute exists and (b) 
variations in the attribute causally produce variation in the measurement outcomes.” 
But they add what they call latent variable theory (Borsboom et al. 2003). Besides 
statistical models, latent variable theory contains a realist ontology. If validity is about 
measurement, there has to be something to measure in the first place. Latent variables 
need to exist, to judge how well a test measures them. If the test scores shall represent the 
position on a latent variable, the measures need to reflect the latent variable. Following 
Borsboom the best candidate for this reflection is causality. Latent variable theory 
assumes that latent variables causally produce the answers to the items. In this view, 
reflective models are a good candidate for measurement, formative models are not. 
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Reflective models, such as factor and item response theory (IRT) models treat indicators 
as the effects of latent variables. Formative models put it the other way round: Indicators 
cause the latent variable (Bollen and Bauldry 2011, Bollen and Lennox 1991). In a realist 
perspective, formative models are composites of observed variables but not measures of 
latent variables (Lee et al. 2013).  
In favor of realism II 
A realist view on validity is not only clearer than the unified view but logically more 
stringent. The claim that a concept exists is a necessary condition for measurement to be 
possible—there has to be something to measure. Disregarding cases where wrong theories 
lead to correct conclusions, validity understood as successful measurement is a necessary 
condition for appropriate test use. It seems odd to investigate test use in the sense of 
construct validity without a prior examination of ontology and measurement.  
Validity, then, is a function of truth and not of evidence (Borsboom et al. 2009). Yes, 
truth. Truth is one of the terms—among them probably existence and reality as well—
social scientists have learned to avoid. If they are really afraid of them, they should stop 
talking of their latent variable models as measurement models. Validity, as the claim that 
a latent variable exists and causally produces variation in the observed items, is a claim 
about how reality is—In other words, a claim about truth. Truth claims, however, neither 
mean that science reveals the truth nor that science can discover the truth. Truth claims 
make it possible that science aims at truth, however badly we fail. Maybe a well liked 
statement about statistical models can do an illustrative job: “All models are wrong”— 
this is correct as an observation of modeling practice; not so as a general proposition. The 
whole notion of misspecification requires that a true model exists and that we judge how 
close our model comes to it (Borsboom 2005, 66). A side note to get some grips on our 
philosophical siblings: What I have just said is that the assumption “All models are 
wrong” is warranted in epistemological terms (All models I have seen are wrong) but not 
in ontological terms (No true model can exist.).) 
Traditional construct validation seems to get the process backwards: Apply a test and then 
determine if you are measuring what you intend to measure. Though it offers plenty of 
suggestions how to do this, it seems not what we want to. Rather we ought to use 
knowledge of the concept and knowledge of the causal properties of the referents of the 
concept, to construct a measurement instrument. The challenge, of course, is to get the 
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knowledge of the concept. At least it should be clear, that statistical models cannot 
generate this knowledge. Either we are lucky and there is an elaborated theory of the 
concept, or we have to engage in theoretical work. Theorizing may be yet term that causes 
distress. Theories, we have learned are a good thing, but our job is to deduce from them 
and not to make them. Where do theories come from? To see how we could get so 
perplexed by this question, I will—once again—turn to the story of construct validity. 
Construct validity—“an idea born dead”? 
In a realist perspective, only models that assume the latent variable to be the common 
cause of the observed items qualify as measurement. The reverse, of course, is not true. 
Setting up a factor model, does neither make a latent variable real nor does it ensure 
successful measurement. Though put a bit too simplistic, this is what plagues the domain 
of construct validity. Critics have not been cautious when pointing at the deficiencies of 
construct validity and psychometrics in gerneral. There is some polemic at play when 
Michell (2000, 2008) denounces the practice of psychometricians to be pathological and 
Maraun (2007) speaks of latent variable models as “myths and confusions”. We will turn 
to the history of methodology to understand how good intentions—to make social 
sciences more scientific—could bring about a state of affairs that triggers such offensive 
remarks. 
Borsboom et al. (2009, 137) proclaimed the “end of construct validity”, convinced that 
“the idea of construct validity was born dead”. If so, it showed a remarkable strive to 
come alive and stay vibrant. Researchers routinely speak of the validity of their 
constructs; no textbook on research methods can do without a reference to construct 
validity. Of course, Borsboom et al. know this; what they mean is that the idea of 
construct validity was flawed from the very beginning. And, one may add, that it got even 
more problematic in its adolescence when the idea left philosophy of science and settled 
down in the milieu of applied science.  
Enough metaphors, Let us jump into the story at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
heydays of logical positivism, a time when psychologists and sociologists wanted to make 
their fields more scientific (for more details see, Duncan 1984, Maraun 2007, Michell 
2013). Logical positivism gives priority to directly observable phenomena, theoretical 
concepts can only be constructed out of observed phenomena. This implies that the 
meaning of the resulting constructs can only be due to its observed constituencies. Some 
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decades later, rebranding the program to “logical empiricism” Carnap (1936, 1937) still 
prioritized that constructs get their meaning from observable terms (via what he termed 
correspondence rules), but acknowledged that the meaning of constructs can never fully 
be reduced to observables (“surplus meaning”). Hempel (1952) described the relations as 
a “complex spatial network”. In Hempel’s analogy, theoretical concepts are the knots, 
definitions and hypotheses are threads connecting them and the entire network is thought 
of as anchored to observed concepts by strings, which correspond to rules of 
interpretation. We are now close to what became the standard view of social research. We 
only need make one more observation. Psychologists these days embraced positivism; but 
were interested in abstract phenomena, such as intelligence. Their way out was to employ 
“operational definitions” of concepts, which, following Bridgeman (1927), say that a 
construct is equal to the operations used to measure it. Operationalism confuses what 
should be measures with how it is measured (Michell 2009) and leads to an absurd 
proliferation of concepts; every new set of measures gives rise to a new concept. In this 
climate Cronbachs and Meehls famous work on the “nomological network” and 
“construct validity” can be seen as an attempt to rescue psychology from operationalism. 
Cronbach and Meehl insisted that “the meaning of theoretical constructs is set forth by 
stating the laws in which they occur” (1955, p. 294). There view of construct validity 
depends on laws that connect constructs with other constructs. The crucial point is that 
psychology and for that matter sociology had no laws, only alleged connections between 
constructs, and correlation coefficients between variables (Cronbach and Meehl allowed 
correlations and factor loadings to substitute for a network of laws, hoping that scientists 
would eventually be able to precisely define their constructs “when all of the laws 
involving it” were discovered (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955, 294)). This was 60 years ago. 
Waiting for the laws to come, we went one with constructs as empty “promissory 
notes”(Messick, 1989, 23) for theoretical concepts. In the interim, operational definitions 
sufficed for the pragmatic purpose of anchoring concepts to observable criteria. What 
intended as promissory proved here to stay; the understanding of concepts is deferred 
indefinitely.”However, ignorance regarding the meaning of constructs is a significant 
obstacle if one wants to claim that tests measure them” (Michell 2013, 15).Yet, validity is 
exactly the premise that a test measures a concept. The notion of construct seems not very 
helpful to issues of validity; and for that matter we can also touch on another, related 
problem. 
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The problem of quantitative measurement 
It is no coincidence that the definition of measurement most widely cited in the social 
sciences is operational. Stevens (1946) defined measurement as the assignment of 
numbers to objects according to rule. Again, this states how to measure but not what to 
measure. With some polemic Michel (2013) explains that only quantifiable properties can 
be measured. Measurement in the strict sense demands that the measured property has a 
continuous quantitative structure, i.e. in Stevens terminology is on an interval or scale). 
What we know as nominal or ordinal scales is not measurement in this sense—to use 
different terms, it is representation or assessment (Maraun and Peters 2005). However, it 
is important to note, that such categorical information is valuable, the normal case in 
social sciences, and maybe sufficient (Guttman 1971). But it is not measurement in the 
sense we can measure distances with a meter stick. 
The crucial point is that the notion of construct and construct validity was used to 
wrongly pretend that the social sciences know how to measure. Though the coded 
observations are categorical, the latent construct does the trick: It is metric by definition 
(at least in factor model). Construct validation brings the trick to perfection. Test scores—
whether factor scores or some other index does not matter here— are quantitative. If test 
scores and their relations are defining the construct, the construct must be quantitative. 
Using the three levels of abstraction, we once again see how construct (validation) theory 
obscures the level of the concept and the level of the proxie. A factor model makes the 
proxy quantitative, but not the concept.  
So what?  
I have argued in favor of a realist conception of latent variables and of validity as 
successful measurement. These two are linked. Messick (1989, 26) concisely expressed 
this point, “One must be an ontological realist in order to be an epistemological 
fallibilist”. You can only be wrong about things that can be right. Taking a constructivist 
route leads somewhere else: Validity then cannot be about measurement. For if there is no 
real latent variable, there is no true position on the latent variable, and you can never be 
wrong about it. Working with fictions you can only judge their usefulness, which is of 
course dependant on your intentions and on the task at hand. 
Compared to the correlational dogma, realist psychometricians have been lean on 
practical advice (Hood 2008). Let us employ the three levels of abstraction one last time.  
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Figure 2 validity gaps 
 
In a realist framework there are two gaps to worry about: Gap1 between concepts and 
proxies, Gap2 between proxies and observed items. Construct validity theory deals 
exclusively with Gap 2 between proxies and data because they collapse proxies and 
concepts into constructs. Validation in this sense means fitting a measurement model to 
the data. Such a model posits that latent variables are the causes of observed answers; 
model fit and the strengths of measurement parameters signal the degree of validity. The 
crux is, this strategy works fine, if and only if validity Gap 2 is already closed. One issue 
is that the researcher has to find the right measurement model; is it a factor model, an 
item response theory (IRT) model, IRT of the Rasch type, IRT of the Mokken type? It is a 
myths—though a persistent one—that model fit alone could help with this. There will 
always be several models that fit the data equally well, a fact known as the problem of 
equivalent models (Lee and Hershberger 1990, MacCallum et al. 1993). Especially in 
factor analyses the predicate “confirmatory” seems to invite wishful thinking. The 
warning of Cliff is not outdated still: “Even in what is called ‘confirmatory’ factor 
analysis, it is not the nature of the factors which is confirmed: the only thing which is 
confirmed is that the observed covariance matrix is not inconsistent with a certain pattern 
of parameters. It does not tell us what those parameters mean, and experience has shown 
that our belief that we do know what they mean is often ill-founded” (Cliff 1983, 122). 
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Little example? The well-known theory of personality which is marketed as “Big Five” 
might as well be “The classical Six”. The theory was “validated” (or developed) with 
exploratory factor analysis which reduced the data the five dimensions. Statisticians know 
that a factor model with k continuous latent variables is equivalent to a latent class model 
with k+1 classes (Bartholomew 1987) Had the researchers used latent class analyses, we 
would now talk about The Big Six types of personality instead of The Big Five 
personality dimensions (Borsboom et al. 2003). Psychometrics alone cannot help in this 
case. What psychometrics can do, is translate. Psychometrics can translate assumptions 
on the nature of a concept and assumptions how the concept is related to observed data 
into model constraints. In principle, psychometrics is well equipped to close Validity Gap 
2 (Borsboom 2006), if it has enough knowledge at hand. Conceptual knowledge, 
however, does not appear from nowhere. 
Validity Gap 2 is exactly concerned with the relation of theoretical concepts and latent 
variable proxies. I think it is this gap that deserves equal attention. This means theoretical 
work. Among many researchers in the hypothetico-deductive tradition, theory is 
something others do. In fact Popper fueled this view when we wrote that “The act of 
conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me to neither call for logical analysis nor to be 
susceptible to it” Popper (1959, 31). The hypothetico-deductive approach to theory 
misconceives theory formulation as pure construction. Following Michell (2013) viable 
theory production is first and foremost reasoning from
I would like to conclude this section on validity with a small example of looking at a 
phenomenon. Observing newspapers and feuilleton, I saw that one and the same 
commentator change his opinion on European integration several times. At the same time, 
I learned that a realist interpretation of a factor model fits well with so-called traits. 
According to Messick (1989, 15) a trait is “a relatively stable characteristic of a person—
an attribute, enduring process, or disposition—which is consistently manifested to some 
degree when relevant, despite considerable variation in the range of settings and 
circumstances”. This observation made me question whether a factor model could 
measure European identity—measure? 
 phenomena. To reason from 
phenomena, with the intention to formulate a theory that explains, requires first of all 
looking at the phenomena. 
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4. Turning to the social world 
I agree with the realist conception of latent variables as proposed by Borsboom and 
colleagues. Again, some hiking metaphor: Borsbooms vantage point was psychometric 
modeling and he arrived at the worldview that is entailed by the latent variable model. 
Though Borsboom is critical enough of dubious practices of latent variable modeling, his 
approach is a bit like begging the question. He starts out with the factor model and asks 
which kind of reality must exist to justify the factor model. I will start out with a realist 
notion of social reality, and see if I arrive at the factor model. 
Different kinds 
What I have written so far applies to stones, without doubt. Stones are the objects and 
gravitational force is the latent variable that makes them fall down. The methodological 
literature in the social sciences is full of examples from the natural sciences—nothing 
wrong about that; as long as one does not equate humans with stones and love with 
gravity. There are some differences: Stones do not care about the theories we have about 
them; humans do (indifferent vs. interactive). Gravity is the same regardless how often 
the stone falls, love not (constant vs. evolving). A stone need not learn how to fall, 
humans need to construct their personality (natural vs. constructing). 
Now, it has happened—I used the word “construct”. However, “real” and “construction” 
are not meant as antipodes here. As a statement about the nature of latent variables “real” 
and “constructed” exclude each other, turning to the social world they are entangled.  
There are things of different kinds in our world (Hacking 1999). Natural kinds are in the 
world without any human involvement. Human kinds are created by humans; this is true 
of everything in the social world, be it norms, roles, identities, whatever. Human kinds 
can be created and are newly created. Hacking illustrates this point with considering 
Sartre’s famous narration of how a French garçon de café attempts to fulfill the role of 
being a garçon de café.4 This role took shape in the late 19th
                                               
4 Sartre describes the as follows: “His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. 
He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly, his voice, 
his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the costumer” (Sartre 1956, 59; quoted in, 
Hacking, 2002, 108-109). 
 century; before it was not 
existent. This means that being such a garçon de café was not on option for a person in 
France just a few hundred years ago; it was simply not on the map of possibilities. 
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Hacking says that by making up human kinds, we also make up people. The person 
working the tavern could not be garçon de café without the human kind “garçon de café”. 
There are, of course more serious examples of making up people, e.g. mental illness (see 
Hacking 1999, 100ff.). The crucial point about human kinds is twofold. The available 
human kinds constitute my options to act and to identify. Once human kinds are used to 
classify people—as social science does—this changes not only the reality of the classified 
but the classified people will also change the meaning of the categorization. Hacking 
(2002) has called this the looping-effect of human kinds. This may sound strangely 
idealistic, as if coining a term would change reality. As Hacking himself says, a unique 
story probably needs to be told 
about each human kind. Not all constructions are as contingent as the role of a garçon de 
café. Socal values, for example, are a necessary construction (Schwartz 1992). 
In the same vein, Giddens (1984, 1987) sees social science as an endeavor of “double 
hermeneutics”, “a mutual interpretative interplay between social science and those whose 
activities compose its subject matter” (Giddens 1984, xxxii). In the social sciences there 
is no way to keep the conceptual apparatus of the scientist away from the observed social 
reality; they circulate in and out of the social world they are coined to analyze. 
Unlike a stone, social reality is socially constructed. Does it mean that social reality is 
less real? No, but it follows—and is evident—that social reality is dynamic. A realism 
adequate to the social word, therefore is a constructive realism (Dux 2000). On a 
methodological level, the question of the realness of latent variables prevails, albeit with a 
qualification: They are not intended to grasp a distant natural reality, but to re-construct 
the worldly constructions. 
Social science as re-construction 
A prerequisite of re-construction is to observe social reality. To find a data proxy for a 
social construction, we first need to understand the social construction itself. Key 
parameters in this undertaking are: 
(1) contextuality 
(2) disclosure 
(3) necessity vs. interest 
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The first criterion is descriptive, the second is reasoning from description. The third 
criterion is most difficult as it depends on knowledge. Contextuality means that social 
constructions can change over time and vary across contexts. The more rapidly a concept 
changes over time, the more sensitive we need to be to keep track of the change in the 
way we set up our data proxies. The more we observe that a concept is bound to a specific 
social context, the more context bound our data proxies must be. Disclosure is an 
implication of contextuality. It highlights that social constructions may or may not be 
salient across situations. To put it in concrete terms, measurement models assume the 
latent variable to be the cause of the answer to the item. To work out, the latent variable 
needs to be salient during the response process. Answering a questionnaire is a specific 
situation. If the latent variable qua social construction is bound to another situation, it 
may not be salient in the interview situation. The goal is to trigger the latent variable in 
the situation of data collection. Questionnaires try to bring the latent variable into the 
situation by a triggering item formulation. For some social constructions, however, 
surveys might not be capable of achieving disclosure and other modes of data collections 
might be in order. 
Necessity vs. interest tries to highlight that there is continuum of social constructions from 
absolutely necessary to purely interest based. This is a tricky issue—though an issue 
social scientist cannot avoid. Traditionally the issue has been framed as the value problem 
or the postulate of value freedom. The discussion stays controversial. But it has became 
clear, that striving for objectivity does not lead to a value free social science (Becker 
1967, Gouldner 1963); be it for the very reason that the social sciences are a “subject-
subject-relation” (Giddens 1984: xxxii). Taking advantage of the increase in knowledge 
in historical sociology, anthropology, and biology (for an intergrated theory, see Dux 
2000), I propose a differentiated view. The reconstruction of phylogenesis (i.e. the 
development of mankind) and of ontogenesis (i.e. the development of every individual) 
allows to figure out which social constructions seem to develop out of necessity and 
which social constructions seem to serve particular interests. Developing a basic sense of 
morale, for example, is an anthropological necessity for every human, in order to survive 
in a social world he is completely dependent on. Developing a concept of the nation as a 
real community of faith is not. The living proof is Benedict Anderson who holds that 
nations are imagined communities (Anderson 1983). Obviously, Anderson did not follow 
the social construction of the nation as an ethnic group but decided to de-construct it. On 
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which grounds could he do that? I have state that all in social reality is constructed—so 
why applaud to the de-construction of a specific aspect? Anderson exposed that the 
prevailing construction of the nation as an ethnic group employed a naturalism that is not 
true. Nationalism treats ethnicity as a natural kind; Anderson as the social kind which it 
is. Facing interest-based claims that show up as quasi-natural kinds, the social scientist 
can and should take a position. This is science as enlightment. 
A social scientist should also know that it is not done with de-construction. Showing that 
community is imagined does not make it imaginative (Jenkins 1996, 2008); it only puts 
nations to its proper place as social constructions. Yet, this is valuable, in that it opens 
discussion. It is valuable because the social scientist knows that there can be and that 
there are different conceptions of the nation. The debate over the nation is, of course, 
normative. Nothing speaks against engaging in a normative discourse, as long as the 
scientist abides to his own scientific findings, i.e. does not himself an unwarranted 
naturalism. I have tried to add my two cents to de-construct the idea of a European demos 
proposed a non-naturalist foundation of European integration as social integration (Datler 
2012). 
In many cases it will be debatable if a social construction is interest based or 
anthropologically necessary. As I said necessity vs. interest is a continuum; but it does 
provide a suggestion which evidence to look for when scientist have to decide on which 
side they are on. 
5. Two case studies: social values and European identity 
Social values and European identity are two rather different human kinds. These two 
cases need different approaches to validation. In describing both social values and 
European identity in terms of contextuality, disclosure, and necessity vs. interest; I hope 
to make a point that can be useful for other human kinds.  
CASE I: social values 
In developing the case of social values I will largely follow the theory of basic human 
values (Schwartz 1992, 1994). When I take issue with his position, this will be on logical 
or on methodological grounds. In general, I will not pretend to be what he is, an expert in 
value research. I will be concerned with the value priorities of individuals, not with 
Schwartz’s theory of the cultural value system (see, Schwartz 2006).  
37 
Schwartz calls his theory “a theory of basic human values”. It is a strong theory with 
precise assumptions: There is definite structure of values. This structure is universal, i.e. 
to be found around to world. He is able to arrive at this strong theory in an openly 
functionalist argumentation that draws on the structural-functionalist theory of Parsons 
(1991 [orig. 1951]). Functionalism holds that what you want to postulate must fulfill 
certain functions. The critical issue is, “for which purpose?” (even more critical is the 
question “Functional for whom?”). According to Schwartz, value priorities are responses 
to three universal requirements of human existence: biological needs, requisites for 
coordinated social interaction, and demands of group survival and functioning. As these 
requirements are universal, the underlying values are universal. Funtionalism has not an 
easy stand in correct sociological theory (for a critique see, e.g. Giddens), one of the main 
objections is that a functional argument is not definite and always favors the status quo. 
The very same function could also be fulfilled by another social arrangement. Schwartz 
seems relatively well equipped to counter such a critique for two reasons. First, he allows 
opposite value orientations that fulfil the same function. Second, he elaborated his theory 
in studies in different regions of the world. I would only like to tentatively raise one issue: 
Schwartz always arranges his values in circle, i.e. in two dimensional space (see figure 1, 
Paper 1). To establish and validate this structure, he used multi-dimensional scaling plots. 
These plots are two-dimensional per definition. I mention this issue because both studies 
we conducted found a correlational structure of the values that is not circular. There are 
several studies that take issue with the universal circumplex structure of the values 
(Steinmetz et al. 2012, Perrinjaquet et al . 2007). 
A problem-though maybe an unavoidable one—is that at the moment both theory and 
measurement models are revised (Schwartz et al. 2012). While it is welcome to see theory 
and measurement theory evolve, it seems that the arguments sometimes result in 
stalement between theory and empirical findings—for instance, is something wrong with 
the theory of circumplexity or are the measures not able to grasp it? An illustrative case is 
the search for the number of distinct values. In the first, widely used version of the theory 
there were ten values. Another boost of value studies came with the inclusion of Schwartz 
value items in the ESS (European Social Survey); but the ESS scale was a shortened 
version of the original scale. Using factor models (instead of multidimensional scaling as 
Schwartz 1992) researchers could only find five to eight values (Davidov et al. 2008). In 
the latest version there are 19 values (Schwartz et al 2012, Cieciuch et al. 2014). I am not 
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sure whether the number of values is the most important issue and whether statistical 
finger exercises as third(!)-order-factor-models are helpful. If we take circumplexity 
serious; it seems that any number of values is ok—it is just as slicing a cake into pieces. 
A very real issue, on the contrary, is the assumption of circumplexity as such. Opposing 
values should be negatively related; the available measures, however, do not behave this 
way. There are strong correlations between similar values. But there are no negative 
correlations between opposing values. 
This criticism should not be misunderstood. It is easy to criticize the Schwartz theory, 
because it is theory in the best sense, it is well specified and therefore falsifiable. In Paper 
1we concentrated on the theoretical claim of the universality of the values. Especially 
when a theory proposes universal concepts, comparisons across contexts are of interest. 
Valid comparisons requires equal measures, otherwise differences could either be 
substantive or methodological artifacts. This idea has become known as the requirement 
of measurement invariance or measurement equivalence (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 
Davidov et al. 2014). Invariance means that the same latent variable must relate to the 
same set of observations in the same way in each group. Statistically, this means that the 
mathematical function that relates latent variables to the observations must be the same in 
each of the groups involved in the comparison (Meredith 1993). The issue we addressed 
is this: The mathematical function of a factor model assumes that the observed variables 
are continuous, while the items are ordered categorical. This could be an additional 
source of model misfit and blur the judgment of invariance. Drawing on pioneering work 
on categorical data and factorial invariance (Millsap and Yun-Tein 2004), we reassessed 
the invariance of the value measures across the ESS samples of Luxembourgh, Belgium, 
and The Netherlands; which Davidov and Schmidt (2007) held already done with a factor 
model that assumes continuous indicators. The results are largely in line across the two 
studies, suggesting that the ordered categorical nature of the data did not impact the 
invariance judgment. This result does of courses not generalize to other likert-type scales; 
the study should rather be read as an example of how to implement an invariance study 
when ordinality is an issue. However, it should not be concealed that for ordinal factor 
models, the behavior of fit indices is less well researched and rules of thumb for 
invariance assessment are not available. The most promising approaches, however, are 
not about comparing fit indices; they suggest judging the effect of violations of invariance 
on the parameters of interest (Oberski 2014). 
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Paper 2 compares the Schwartz theory with one of its most prominent rivals, the Inglehart 
theory. Again, the comparison is restricted to values at the individual level. At the 
individual level general values orientations promise to be causal explanations of more 
concrete attitudes and behavior. Our approach is in line with the framework of construct 
validity. In a first step, internal validity, i.e. the quality of the measurement instruments, is 
assessed. In a second step, external validity, i.e. the relationships of values with supposed 
antecedents and supposed consequences, is assessed. It is apparent that the Schwartz 
value theory explicitly pays attention to the measurement of values conceptualized as 
underlying causes, i.e. a realist stance on latent variables. Values are regarded as the 
causes of observed answers to evaluative statements. Inglehart, though he employed the 
common factor model, seems to construct values as summary dimensions of very 
different ingredients. Among the constituencies of his value variables are attitudes, 
beliefs, and behavior—some of which are regarded as measures of other concepts such as 
national identity. Therefore, in terms of internal validity understood as measurement 
Schwartz fares better.  
The more tricky part of the comparison concerns external validity. The theory of 
construct validity suggests assessing the validity of a latent variable by deriving 
hypotheses on relations with other variables from the theory in which the latent variable is 
embedded. Though it proofed difficult in some cases, we came up with a system of 
hypotheses for the same set of external variables for both value conceptions. The outcome 
of the empirical investigation, however, is inconclusive—some hits for Schwartz, some 
hits for Inglehart, some errors for Schwartz, some errors for Inglehart. “Maybe it is too 
early to discard on theory or the other”, this is how we framed the result in a preliminary 
version of the paper. Though this sentence did not make into the final version, the paper 
still has the remark that both theories are in a developmental stage. If I dare make a 
prognosis: The theories will develop but the situation will not change considerably. It is a 
firm wish to get unequivocal results when comparing the predictive power of two 
theories; in the social sciences it remains a phantasm to apply Occam’s Razor und to 
decide between competing theories. There are too many unknowns in the equation: the 
measures and measurement models of the value variables, the measures and measurement 
models of the external variables, the judgment of statistical significance and substantive 
importance, to name but a few. Every step is prone to error and open for argument. An 
example: Inglehart values did better than Schwartz values in the explanation of political 
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activism. But the item “signing a petition” is part of the Inglehart values measure. In a 
similar fashion, one could take issue with every single result. A comparison of Schwartz 
and Inglehart theories that has something to say about validitiy should be more concerned 
with theoretical and methodological issues than with regression coefficients. Maybe it is 
too early to compute regression coefficients for validation purposes; maybe it is the 
wrong way all together. One of the issues is, whether values are conceived of and 
measured as underlying causes or as heuristic summaries.  
CASE II: European identity 
The case of European identity is different compared to the case of values. For values, 
theories with an affinity to latent variables and issues of validity are available. For 
European identity an abundance of theories are available; but the mass of them pays little 
attention to variables and measurement. Often it is not their intention to treat European 
identity as a variable. Parallel to this strong philosophical and normative scholarship, 
empirical studies such as the Eurobarometer tried to produce numbers that are useful. 
Among survey researcher there evolved a consensus to take questions on the 
identification with Europe as measures of the European identity. However, this approach 
never was without its critics (Díez Medrano 2010, Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). 
In the literature there are is only a single study that models European identity as a latent 
variable (Fuß 2006). One reason may be the lack of data sources with multiple indicators, 
but I suspect another reason. Buried in the files, I have a factor analytic study on the 
invariance of four measures of identification with Europe. The results in terms of 
invariance are meager. I could imagine that there are more of these studies in other 
drawers. More computing did not bring me closer to know why; so I stopped. I had to 
begin with theory. 
Paper 3 starts out with the claim that the concept of European identity is overused but 
underspecified. European identity is not only used a lot but that European identity is used 
for very different purposes. European identity is an example par excellence of the looping 
effect of human kinds (Hacking 1996). In the political and philosophical discourse it is 
used to put forward normative claims, i.e. claims on what Europe should be. It can stand 
for post-national constitutional patriotism (e.g., Habermas 1998) or cosmopolitan 
orientation (e.g., Beck and Grande 2004); but is also used to promote Christianity 
(Frattini 2010). At the same time, same social scientists try to “measure” European 
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identity with questions on the degree of identification with Europe. Measure of 
identification with Europe, however, do not tap the contents of European identity. Exactly 
this lack of contents makes the resulting numbers susceptible to any
In terms of the contextuality, European identity is very context dependant concept. In 
terms of disclosure, it is rather doubtful, if all aspects of European identity can be 
triggered in an interview. Identity is intrinsically social and more likely to be triggered in 
so-called inter-group situations (Jenkins 1996). European identity is clearly an interest-
based social construction, there is no necessity for a European identity, but it could be 
useful for the European integration project. A useful conception of European identity, we 
concluded, must take into account the content of an identity Abdelal et al. (2009). 
 normative (ab)use. 
This is not social science as reconstruction, this is social science as the fig leaf of identity 
politics. 
Paper 4 both works out the suggestion to take into account European identity content 
more systematically and puts it into practice. The approach acknowledges that we can 
measure the degree of identification with Europe, but to grasp why someone identifies 
with Europe we need to know what Europe means to her. Therefore, identity content is 
the key feature when we want to understand European identity and its relation to other 
social phenomena. In a nutshell, this is the theoretical conception. Defining European 
identity by its meaning has severe methodological implications. We need to empirically 
grasp the meaning. The meaning is socially constructed. Therefore, a valid account of 
European identity is an exercise in re-construction. We re-construct something that has 
been constructed in the first place. The constructions of Europe we find in social reality 
are the referents of our latent variable proxies. They are constructed; but real. They are 
real, but constructed. The realness of the constructions implies that social sciences can 
identify them. Thier constructedness implies that they are not fixed but changeable and 
contextual. I hesitate to use the term “measurement” in this context, because measurement 
suggest that there is something stable and enduring. Measurement also suggests that we 
could find a measurement instrument that would work for all time. I prefer the term re-
construction to highlight that social science is always a bit behind and has to catch up 
with the social reality of European identity. This means to that we should not strive for 
equivalent factor models that measure European identity across time and social contexts. I 
propose to combine two parts: (1) an indicator of identification with Europe and (2) a 
latent class model of identity content. The identification part can be seen as measurement 
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and as the component of the method that is fixed, i.e. used again and again in the same 
way. Here multiple indicators would make sense to increase precision. The content part is 
typological and needs to be re-adjusted again and again, depending on the actual 
constructions of European identity in social reality.  
Conclusions: Social Science as Re-construction and Quantitative Methods 
The approach of construct validity needs highly developed theories to work out. Indeed 
for the studies on the Schwartz theory of basic human values, it was possible to use 
strategies of construct validation, which work fine as long as theory and data modeling 
agree. But at certain points—the excitement over the number of values qua factors, for 
instance—the general issue of “construct” glimpse through: An equating of theoretical 
concepts and empirical proxies.  
Comparing the theories of Schwartz and Inglehart along the lines of construct validity 
showed the limitations of the approach. The theories in the social sciences have not 
conformed to a nomological network in the past and they most likely will never do so. At 
least it is tedious to wait for better theories to come and to work on even more fancy 
statistical models in the meantime. 
Latent variable models as measurement models need two things: (1) highly specific 
theories (2) a world of latent variables with causal force. If, and only if, these two 
conditions are fulfilled, they are a tenable approach to measurement. The discussion of 
social values and European identity has shown that there are different human kinds. Not 
all aspects of social reality can be re-constructed as latent variable measurement models. 
It has to be elaborated rather than assumed that a latent variable measurement fits social 
reality. If it does not fit, this is neither the end of the world nor necessarily the end of 
quantitative social science. It is only the end of the myths of measurement.  
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Epilogue 
Kenneth Bollen, one of the great masters of latent variable modeling, once said: 
It is impossible to date the first use of latent variables. The idea that observable 
phenomena are influenced by underlying and unobserved causes is at least as old 
as religion, where unseen forces affect real world events. 
         (Bollen 2002, 606)  
This passage is unfortunate, because from Bollen’s work it is apparent that he is into 
rather technical stuff and avoids metaphysics. But some latent variable followers indeed 
behave as if latent variable modeling were the Holy Grail. But not all regard magic as 
desirable. Some even see latent variable modeling as a hex:  
Thurstone stole fire from the gods. (As a punishment they chained him to factor 
analysis.) 
         (Lumsden 1980, 7) 
In any case, there are strong emotions at play. I would suggest that we first use the fire 
and burn the myths about construct and then give back the fire to the gods. Afterwards 
nothing speaks against using latent variable modeling again, though it will be a less 
magical experience. 
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Abstract 
In this chapter we test the comparability of the measurement of human values (Schwartz, 
1992) in the second round (2004-5) of the European Social Survey (ESS) across three 
countries, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, while accounting for the fact that the data 
are ordinal (categorical but ordered, i.e., nonmetric). A previous study (Davidov and Schmidt, 
2007) established metric invariance for seven values across these three countries but scalar 
invariance only for three values: self-direction, stimulation, and the unified values 
universalism-benevolence. However, the previous study applied multiple-group confirmatory 
factor analysis (MGCFA) and assumed the use of normally distributed, continuous data. 
Values are measured in the ESS on a 6-point scale, and responses are not normally 
distributed. In this chapter we address the criticism of Lubke and Muthén (2004) that MGCFA 
is not appropriate for testing invariance of Likert-type scales. We use a model for ordinal 
(ordered-categorical) indicators to test for measurement invariance. The general conclusions 
are consistent across these two methods. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The increasing importance of comparative studies across countries and over time has 
encouraged the collection of survey data in diverse contexts and time points in recent decades 
(e.g., the European Social Survey, the International Social Survey Program, the European 
Value Study, or the World Value Survey). These surveys share the goals of collecting 
comparable responses from large, national representative samples and of gathering data at 
multiple points in time to permit the study of differences and similarities among cultures and 
change over time. The methodological literature has emphasized, however, that comparisons 
between groups and/or time points are not legitimate without first assessing whether the 
concepts used (e.g., human values) are indeed comparable across countries or over time (e.g., 
Billiet, 2003; Cheung and Rensvold, 2002; De Beuckelaer, 2005; Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg, 2002; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000).  
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Several techniques have been developed to assess the comparability of concepts. Two of the 
most common techniques are multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA: Bollen, 
1989; Jöreskog, 1971) and means and covariance structure analysis (MACS: Sörbom, 1974, 
1978). These techniques can test for configural, metric, and scalar invariance (see, e.g., the 
chapters by Lee et al., Oreg et al., Read et al., Billiet and Meuleman, and Steinmetz in this 
volume). Configural invariance indicates that the same indicators measure the same 
theoretical constructs across groups or time points. Metric invariance is more restrictive; it 
indicates that respondents interpret the intervals on the response scale in a similar way across 
groups. Metric invariance with continuous latent variables indicators means that the loadings 
of the indicators on the factors are equal across groups and/or time points. This implies that 
the constructs tap the same content across the groups. The most restrictive level of invariance 
with continuous latent variables indicators, scalar invariance, requires that the intercepts of 
each item be the same across groups and/or time points. This means that respondents in 
different contexts use the same scale origin. As other chapters in this book explain (e.g., 
Billiet and Meuleman; De Beuckelaer; Oreg et al.; Steinmetz), metric invariance permits the 
comparison of correlates across countries and/or time. Scalar invariance also permits the 
comparison of latent variable means. The scalar invariance model constrains the means of the 
latent variables to zero in one group (referred to as the reference group) and estimates them in 
the other groups. 
A differentiation can also be made between full and partial invariance. A partial metric 
invariance model constrains the factor loadings of at least two indicators of a construct to be 
equal across groups. A partial scalar invariance model constrains the factor loadings and 
intercepts of at least two indicators to be equal across groups (Byrne et al., 1989; Steenkamp 
and Baumgartner, 1998). If the factor loadings of all indicators are constrained to be equal 
across groups, we term the model full metric invariance. If the intercepts and factor loadings 
of all indicators are constrained to be equal across groups, one terms the model full scalar 
invariance. 
MGCFA is designed for continuous and normally distributed data. Nevertheless, it is often 
applied to Likert-type scales where researchers typically assume continuity and a normal 
distribution underlying the scales used. However, Lubke and Muthén (2004) have criticized 
the analysis of Likert-type scales under the assumption of multivariate normality. If Likert-
type data is analyzed assuming that multivariate normality holds, different factor structures 
may be found in different groups even if these factor structures are actually invariant across 
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groups (however, they find that the estimates of latent mean differences are rather robust). 
They propose, instead, fitting a model for ordinal indicators.  
The structural equation modeling software programs LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996) 
and Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2007) use two different strategies to identify a model which 
is fitted to ordinal data. They both include threshold parameters and polychoric correlations 
between the measurements. The major difference between the two programs is that the 
LISREL program assumes that the thresholds are equal across groups whereas the Mplus 
program allows the actual testing of whether this is so. Based on this difference we have 
chosen to apply the Mplus approach to the data presented in this chapter. 
Several simulation studies have shown that MGCFA works well when testing for cross-
cultural invariance even when the data are ordinal rather than continuous or normally 
distributed (Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Billiet, 2002; Welkenhuysen-Gybels, 2004; De 
Beuckelaer’s chapter in this volume).1
The following section first describes the theory of human values that we will assess. Then we 
provide a description of the method that is utilized for measuring values in the ESS. In the 
empirical part of the chapter, the results of measurement invariance testing using MGCFA 
under the assumption of normality reported by Davidov and Schmidt (2007) are summarized. 
This is followed by a presentation of the procedure for testing invariance designed for ordinal 
indicators and the results of applying this method to the same data. We conclude with 
summarizing remarks and considerations. 
 The current chapter is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first to compare the results of an invariance test using MGCFA for ordinal data with the 
outcomes of an MGCFA that assumes continuous indicators using actual survey data on basic 
human values available from the European Social Survey (ESS). 
2. Theory 
Values have played an increasingly important role in the social sciences in recent decades. 
However, the absence of a widely accepted theory for conceptualizing values and of valid 
scales to measure them have limited researchers’ ability to conduct empirical studies using the 
                                               
1 These studies report simulations which examine whether assuming normality and continuity of measurement 
scales when using ordinal categorical scales yields different conclusions in a cross-cultural invariance test. 
Comparisons of several estimation methods based on different assumptions for other types of models have also 
been conducted. They generally conclude that the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors 
are rather robust for small violations of normality (see e.g., Coenders, Satorra and Saris, 1997; and Coenders and 
Saris, 1995). 
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value concept. This changed with the introduction of the Schwartz (1992) value theory. This 
theory specifies 10 basic values that form four higher-order value dimensions that people 
around the world apparently recognize (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2005). Starting with its first 
round in 2002-3, the ESS included an instrument to measure the 10 values in the theory. 
The theory defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that 
serve as guiding principles in people's lives. It proposes 10 motivationally distinct human 
values: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
tradition, conformity, and security. Table 1 presents the motivational goal that each value 
expresses. For example, the core motivational goal of power values is social status and 
prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. 
Table 1: Definitions of the motivational types of values in terms of their core goal 
POWER Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources 
ACHIEVEMENT Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards 
HEDONISM Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself 
STIMULATION Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life 
SELF-DIRECTION Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring 
UNIVERSALISM Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature  
BENEVOLENCE Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact 
TRADITION Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self  
CONFORMITY :Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms 
SECURITY Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self 
* Adopted from Sagiv and Schwartz (1995). 
The theory also postulates dynamic relations of interdependence among the values. Values are 
compatible if the motivational goals they express can be pursued simultaneously (e.g., 
conformity and tradition). Such values will correlate positively with each other. Values are 
incompatible if pursuing the motivational goal of one value conflicts with pursuing the goal of 
the other (e.g., security and stimulation). Such values will correlate negatively. Values are 
neither compatible nor incompatible if pursuing the motivational goal of one does not affect 
the other (e.g., benevolence and self-direction). Such values will typically show 
nonsignificant correlations. 
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Figure 1 portrays the full set of dynamic relations among the 10 values. Values with 
compatible motivational goals are close to each within the circle, those with incompatible 
goals are further apart. For example, the values power and universalism are far apart from 
each other within the circle. This reflects the theoretical idea that pursuing the goals of 
universalism values tends to oppose pursuing the goals of power values. Devoting oneself to 
the welfare of all people is largely incompatible with seeking control and dominance for 
oneself over other people and resources. In contrast, universalism and benevolence are 
adjacent to each other in Figure 1 because their goals are compatible: It is possible to devote 
oneself to the welfare of all and also to seek to enhance the welfare of those with whom one is 
close. 
Figure 1: The dynamic relations between the values 
 
The theory distinguishes 10 value factors, but one may not always be able to discriminate all 10 
values empirically. This may occur, for example, if there are practical measurement restrictions 
such as very few items to measure each value and poor discriminant validity between values 
with related motivational goals (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Knoppen and Saris, 2009). Instead, 
pairs of adjacent values (e.g., universalism and benevolence) may be captured as a single value 
(e.g., a unified universalism-benevolence value).  
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The compatibilities and oppositions among the values may be summarized using the higher 
order factors and dimensions shown in Figure 1. One dimension contrasts self-enhancement and 
self-transcendence values. This dimension contrasts power and achievement values (that 
emphasize one’s pursuit of success and dominance) to universalism and benevolence values 
(that involve concern for the welfare and interests of other people). The second dimension 
contrasts openness to change and conservation values. It opposes self-direction and stimulation 
values (that emphasize independence and readiness for new experiences) to conservation values 
(that emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change) (for a more detailed discussion 
see, e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1994).  
3. The ESS Measurement of the Ten Basic Human Values 
A shortened version of the original 40-item portrait value questionnaire (PVQ) to measure 
values (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, and Owens, 2001; Schwartz, 2005) was 
developed for the ESS. Due to time and budgetary constraints, the ESS instrument includes 
only 21 questions to measure the 10 values. Two items were chosen for each value (three for 
universalism) with the objective of providing maximum coverage of the conceptual breadth of 
the value rather than to maximize internal indicator reliability and high discriminant validity.  
The ESS scale describes 21 different people, gender-matched with the respondent. Each 
description portrays a person in terms of what is important to him or her, thereby pointing to 
one of the 10 values. For example: “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to 
him. He likes to do things in his own original way” describes a person for whom self-direction 
is important. Regarding each description of a person, respondents are asked to answer: “How 
much like you is this person?” Responses are recorded on a Likert-type rating scale ranging 
from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me). Respondents’ own values are inferred 
from their self-reported similarity to people described implicitly in terms of particular values. 
Table 2 presents the 10 values as they appear in the ESS scale. Two items measure each value 
with the exception of universalism which is measured by three items because of its very broad 
content.  
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Table 2: The ESS Human Values Scale in the 2nd
Value 
 round (male version) 
Item # (Numbered and Labeled as in the ESS Questionnaire) 
Self-direction 
(SD) 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things 
in his own original way (ipcrtiv). 
11. It is important for him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be 
free to plan and not depend on others (impfree). 
Universalism 
(UN) 
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He 
believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life (ipeqopt).  
8. It is important for him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he 
disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them (ipudrst).  
19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to him (impenv).  
Benevolence 
(BE) 
12. It is very important for him to help the people around him. He wants to care for 
their well-being (iphlppl). 
18. It is important for him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to 
people close to him (iplylfr).  
Tradition (TR) 9. It is important for him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to 
himself (ipmodst). 
20. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his 
religion or his family (imptrad). 
Conformity 
(CO) 
7. He believes that people should do what they’re told. He thinks people should follow 
rules at all times, even when no one is watching (ipfrule).  
16. It is important for him to always behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong (ipbhprp). 
Security 
(SEC) 
5. It is important for him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might 
endanger his safety (impsafe).  
14. It is important for him that the government insures his safety against all threats. He 
wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens (ipstrgv).  
Power (PO) 2. It is important for him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive 
things (imprich).  
17. It is important for him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he 
says (iprspot).  
Achievement 
(AC) 
4. It is important for him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does 
(ipshabt).  
13. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his 
achievements (ipsuces).  
Hedonism 
(HE) 
10. Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself (ipgdtim).  
21. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important for him to do things that 
give him pleasure (impfun).  
Stimulation 
(ST) 
6. He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is 
important to do lots of different things in life (impdiff).  
15. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life 
(ipadvnt).  
Source: Adapted from Davidov, E. Survey Research Methods, 2(1), 33–46, 2008. 
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4. Empirical Analyses 
Three countries are included in the analysis: Belgium (N = 1,778), Luxemburg (N = 1,635) 
and the Netherlands (N = 1,881) (total N = 5,294). Details on the data collection techniques 
that were used in each country are documented on the website 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. The data used in the analyses were downloaded from 
the website http://ess.nsd.uib.no. 
4.1 Previous Findings 
The first studies to assess invariance of the measurement of values across ESS countries 
applied MGCFA (Davidov, 2008; Davidov and Schmidt, 2007; Davidov, Schmidt and 
Schwartz, 2008). In these studies, seven distinct values, rather than the 10 values postulated 
by the theory, were identified in most of the ESS countries. Three pairs from the original 10 
values had to be unified: power with achievement, conformity with tradition, and 
universalism with benevolence. These pairs of values had very high intercorrelations and 
could not be modeled separately. Two reasons have been proposed for this finding. First, the 
use of 21 instead of the original 40 PVQ questions to measure values does not provide a 
sufficient number of questions to measure each value separately in a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) (Davidov, Schmidt and Schwartz, 2008). Second, high correlations among 
some values attest to a lack of discriminant validity (Knoppen and Saris, 2009), requiring 
them to be unified.  
The three pairs of values that had to be unified are adjacent in the circular theoretical structure 
portrayed in Figure 1. The need to unify them, therefore, does not contradict the theory of the 
circular value structure. In addition, five additional paths (cross loadings) were introduced in the 
MGCFA to improve the solution. Each addition was a path from one of the unified value factors 
to a distant value indicator: (1) from the universalism-benevolence factor to the item 
‘important to be rich’, (2) from the universalism-benevolence factor to the item ‘important to 
have adventures’, (3) from the conformity-tradition factor to the item ‘important to get respect 
from others’, (4) from the power-achievement factor to the item ‘important to be modest’, and 
(5) from the conformity-tradition factor to the item ‘important to be rich’ (Davidov, Schmidt 
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and Schwartz, 2008). 2
Figure 2: The CFA model 
 Figure 2 depicts the best fitting model from this study that was 
calculated using the structural equation modeling software Amos (Arbuckle, 2005). 
 
All values are allowed to correlate with each other. The large circles represent the values. For example, HE 
represents the value hedonism, and UNBE represents the unified value universalism-benevolence. The small 
circles represent measurement errors. The rectangles stand for the indicators measuring the values. For item and 
value abbreviations see Table 2. 
                                               
2 The negative cross loadings indicate that the association (covariance) between the opposing latent value 
constructs did not capture all of the opposition for these items. The positive cross loadings indicate that these 
associations overestimated the opposition for two items. The need for these cross loadings may be due to the 
reduction from 10 original values to seven. Without introducing them, the model fit was not acceptable. From a 
measurement point of view, cross loadings are not elegant. Cross loadings contaminate correlations between 
factors, a problem if one is interested in the correlations. However, our main interest was not to evaluate the 
strengths of relationships between values but to examine whether measurement properties, such as factor 
loadings and intercepts, are invariant across countries.  
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Davidov and Schmidt (2007) tested for invariance of the value measurements across three 
countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They used the model just described 
(that differentiates between seven values) in their application of MGCFA to data from the 
second round of the ESS. In their analysis they assumed continuity and normality of the value 
scales. They reported that configural and metric invariance was found across the three 
countries for the seven values. However, analysis of the data did not support scalar invariance 
for all seven values. Rather, only stimulation values, self-direction values, and the unified 
universalism-benevolence value displayed scalar invariance. Thus, latent mean comparisons 
between the three countries are legitimate only for these three values (Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner, 1998).  
In the present analysis we assess the invariance of the value scales when fitting the model for 
ordinal indicators using MGCFA. To do this, we employ the same value data for Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands available from the second round of the ESS. Finally, we 
compare the results of this test with the findings of Davidov and Schmidt (2007). 
4.2. Testing for Invariance While Accounting for Ordinality of the Data 
Muthén, du Toit, and Spisic (1997) and Muthén and Muthén (1998, pp. 357–358) propose a 
theoretically more appropriate method for ordinal (ordered-categorical) scales. The proposed 
method fits a CFA model to polychoric correlations using robust weighted least squares 
(robust WLS) (see also Flora and Curran, 2004). This approach is based on the work of 
Satorra and colleagues (Chou, Bentler and Satorra, 1991; Satorra, 1992; Satorra and Bentler, 
1990). This estimator is available in the software program Mplus. In the present analysis we 
use Mplus version 3.0 (Muthén and Muthén, 2007) to assess the invariance of the value 
measurements, following procedural guidelines suggested by Millsap and Yun-Tein (2004) 
and Temme (2006). 
Figure 3 displays the path diagram of a single factor CFA for the ordinal case compared to the 
continuous case. In contrast to continuous indicators, CFA (and MGCFA) for ordinal data 
(such as Likert-type scales) assumes that the observed items (y’s in Figure 3) are not directly 
influenced by their corresponding latent factor but indirectly via a continuous latent response 
variable (y*
  
 in Figure 3) (Temme 2006). The main difference resulting from this specification 
is that we have to estimate item-specific threshold parameters (ν in Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: CFA with ordinal indicators compared to CFA with continuous indicators 
 
These threshold parameters (ν in Figure 3) partition the continuous normally-distributed latent 
response variable into several categories. With six response categories for each item in our 
case there are five thresholds. 3
In testing for invariance with continuous MGCFA, the distinction between metric invariance 
and scalar invariance is well established. In the continuous case it is only the factor loadings 
that determine the slopes of the item response curves. The intercepts only influence the 
starting points of the item response curves but not their slopes. Therefore, it is sufficient to 
constrain the factor loadings to be equal to guarantee metric invariance and to compare 
structural associations of the latent variables across groups. Latent mean comparison requires 
equality of intercepts (scalar invariance) in addition.  
 If the value for the continuous latent response variable 
exceeds a threshold, the observed value of the item changes to the next category. The ordinal 
CFA model, just like the continuous CFA model, contains factor loadings (λ in Figure 3) and 
intercepts (τ in Figure 3). Whereas in the continuous case factor loadings and intercepts are 
parameters of the observed indicators, in the ordinal case factor loadings and intercepts are 
parameters of the latent response variable (for further details, see Muthén and Asparouhov, 
2002; Millsap and Yun-Tein, 2004). 
                                               
3 A threshold captures transitions from one category to another. Thus, if there are K response categories for an 
indicator, there are K-1 threshold parameters for the latent response variable. 
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In the ordinal CFA (see Figure 3), in contrast, the item probability curves (i.e., the scores of 
the ordinal indicators) are jointly influenced by the factor loadings (λ’s), the intercepts (τ’s), 
and the thresholds (ν’s). Thus, guaranteeing only that factor loadings are equal across groups 
is not enough to ensure that the item response curves are comparable in the ordinal case. 
Comparison of group means is still not permissible. Establishing measurement invariance in 
the ordinal case requires constraining factor loadings, thresholds, and intercepts 
simultaneously. Thus, a distinction between metric and scalar invariance is not substantively 
meaningful in the ordinal case because there is only one step in the measurement invariance 
test, the step which constrains all parameters to be equal. 
Identifying the measurement invariance model for the ordinal case requires a somewhat 
different set of constraints than those required in the continuous case (Millsap and Yun-Tein, 
2004; Temme, 2006). The reason is that it is not possible to estimate the thresholds and the 
intercept at the same time. The programs LISREL and MPLUS employ different strategies to 
deal with this issue. 
The LISREL program (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996) constrains all the threshold parameters to 
be equal across groups. This allows testing the equality of the intercepts and factor loadings. 
However, there is no reason to believe that thresholds are equal. The equality of thresholds is 
an empirical question that can only be answered in an empirical test. The Mplus program 
(Muthén and Muthén, 2007) permits testing the equality of threshold parameters but 
constrains, as a default, all the intercepts to be zero (for identification purposes). Estimating 
the thresholds and constraining the intercepts is more informative than the other way around. 
In fact, the intercept parameter is equal to a constant shift in all the thresholds of an indicator.4
The minimum number of constraints required to identify the model in the ordinal case 
depends on the number of categories of the observed variables and the model structure. Two 
model structures can be considered, a congeneric model and a noncongeneric model (Millsap 
 
If intercepts are found to be different across groups, one does not know whether this is due to 
differences in the full set of thresholds across groups or whether only some of the thresholds 
differ across groups. By contrast, testing for the equality of thresholds may allow certain 
thresholds to differ across groups. Thus, the flexibility of Mplus makes it preferable to 
LISREL for testing invariance in the ordinal case (Millsap and Yun-Tein, 2004). 
                                               
4 In principle, the equality constraint of the intercepts may be released in Mplus by introducing a perfectly 
measured factor behind the latent response variable (Muthén and Asparouhov, 2002, p. 15). 
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and Yun-Tein, 2004). In a congeneric model there are no cross loadings, and each item loads 
only on one factor. In a noncongeneric model one or more items may load on more than one 
factor. Accordingly, in the congeneric model one has to set at least one threshold for each 
indicator to be equal across groups. In addition, a second threshold of the reference indicator 
of each latent variable is also constrained to be equal across groups. In the noncongeneric 
model, one has to constrain at least two thresholds to be equal for all indicators. In this model 
all intercepts have also to be constrained to zero. Our model includes five cross loadings and 
is thus noncongeneric. In addition, as in the continuous case, the factor loading of one 
reference indicator has to be set to 1. 
Testing for invariance in the ordinal case implies setting all intercepts and thresholds equal 
across groups. However, it is not possible to test, at the same time, whether intercepts and 
threshold parameters are equal. One can either test for the equality of thresholds assuming that 
all intercepts are equal, or test for the equality of intercepts assuming that all thresholds are 
equal. Testing for the equality of thresholds is more informative than testing for the equality 
of intercepts. Thus, in line with the Mplus default (see Muthén and Asparouhov, 2002), we 
constrained intercepts to zero and all thresholds and factor loadings to be equal across 
groups.5
We adopted a top-down strategy. We started with the most restrictive model which imposes 
equality constraints across groups on the thresholds, intercepts, and factor loadings. Then we 
gradually released some of the equality constraints on the thresholds for the indicators whose 
constructs did not pass the scalar invariance test in the continuous model. To decide whether 
the data support a model, we followed the cut-off criteria suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) 
and Marsh, Hau, and Wen (2004). They suggest a minimum value of 0.90-0.95 for the 
comparative fit index (CFI), a global fit index and a maximum value of 0.05-0.08 for the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) fit measure. To compare models, we used the 
criteria proposed by Chen (2007) who suggested assessing differences between models by 
looking at differences in the fit measures CFI and RMSEA. If both the decrease in the CFI 
and the increase in the RMSEA in a more restrictive model are smaller than 0.01, then the 
 
                                               
5 Two parameterizations are possible for running the model: Theta and Delta (Muthén and Muthén, 2007). The 
Theta parameterization includes residual variances for the continuous latent response variables (see Muthén and 
Muthén, 2007, pp. 485-486). This has the advantage of also permitting a test of the invariance of the residual 
variances (Millsap and Yun-Tein, 2004, Muthén and Asparouhov 2002). We applied both the Theta and Delta 
parameterizations and obtained essentially the same results. See the appendix for the final model. 
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more restrictive model can be considered as acceptable. We do not use the chi-square 
difference test and the p-value to distinguish between models because even small 
misspecifications may lead to model rejection with large sample sizes (Cheung and Rensvold, 
2002). 6
4.3 Results 
 
Table 3 Global fit measures in the different models
 
a 
Table 3 summarizes the global fit measures of the models—chi-square, degrees of freedom 
(df), p value, RMSEA, p of close fit (PCLOSE), and CFI. Column 1 presents the fit measures 
using MGCFA under the assumption of multivariate normality (based on Davidov and 
Schmidt, 2007). We name this model ‘the continuous case’ model. Column 2 presents the fit 
                                               
6 Before testing for measurement invariance, we examined the level of skewness and kurtosis of the values 
across the countries. Skewness (both left and right, depending on the item) was significant for all 21 items in the 
three countries. Kurtosis was significant for 20 items. 
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measures after accounting for ordinality of the outcomes. We name this model ‘the ordinal 
case’ model. 
Table 3 clearly shows that the most restrictive (invariant) model (Model 1), for seven values, 
is rejected by the data in both the continuous and ordinal case. Whereas the RMSEA displays 
satisfactory levels, the CFI does not achieve the minimum criterion for an acceptable fit. 
Model 2 constrains invariance for only the three values that Davidov and Schmidt (2007) 
reported as showing scalar invariance: stimulation (ST), self-direction (SD), and the unified 
value universalism-benevolence (UNBE). The measurement of the four other values 
hedonism (HE), security (SEC), and the unified values conformity-tradition (COTR), and 
power-achievement (POAC) is allowed to vary across countries. As shown, the data 
supported this model both in the continuous and in the ordinal case. In other words, it is 
legitimate to compare the means of these three values across countries.  
One technical point is worth noting: In an ordinal model, the minimum number of necessary 
threshold constraints also depends on the constraints already in place for the factor loadings 
(Millsap and Yun-Tein 2004, p. 490). When we released the threshold constraints on the four 
non-invariant factors but still constrained the factor loadings to be equal across groups, it was 
not necessary anymore to set two thresholds of all indicators to be equal across groups (as 
suggested by Millsap and Yun-Tein 2004). It was sufficient to set two thresholds of only one 
indicator per factor (instead of two thresholds of all indicators) for the four non-invariant 
factors to be equal across groups to identify the model (see Appendix). 
Table 4: Mean differences of the values for Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
(compared with Belgium, the reference group) 
 
Table 4 displays the means of the values in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The mean 
values in Belgium are constrained to zero as Belgium is the reference group (for other 
identification methods to estimate latent means see Little, Slegers and Card, 2006, and the 
chapter of Lee, Little and Preacher in this book). There are several significant differences in 
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the means across countries. In the continuous case (Davidov and Schmidt 2007), people in 
Luxembourg rate stimulation values as more important (.08) than people in the other countries 
do and people in the Netherlands rate universalism-benevolence values as less important (-
.12) than the others do. The remaining value ratings do not differ across the three countries. 
Accounting for ordinality leads to similar conclusions in most cases, but mean differences are 
more pronounced. The higher rating of stimulation in Luxembourg is .16 and the lower rating 
of universalism-benevolence in the Netherlands is -.18. In addition, the rating of universalism-
benevolence is higher in Luxembourg (.09) than in Belgium (.00 as the reference group). 
However, under the assumption of multivariate normality the latter difference was not 
significant.  
From the analyses that account for ordinality we can conclude that self-direction values are 
equally important in all three countries. Stimulation values are equally important in Belgium 
and the Netherlands, but more important in Luxembourg, and the unified value universalism-
benevolence is more important in Luxembourg than in either of the other countries. From a 
substantive point of view, these differences are rather small, reflecting cultural similarities 
across the Benelux countries. However, we cannot compare means for the other four values 
because they do not exhibit the necessary level of invariance across countries. 
5. Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter we tested the comparability of the human values measurement across Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg using data from the second round (2004-5) of the European 
Social Survey (ESS). A previous study (Davidov and Schmidt, 2007) established metric 
invariance across these countries for seven values and scalar invariance for three values, 
stimulation, self-direction and the unified value universalism-benevolence. That study applied 
multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) and assumed a continuous scale with 
normally distributed responses. However, Lubke and Muthén (2004) have argued that 
MGCFA is not appropriate for testing for invariance of Likert-type scales. We addressed this 
criticism by fitting a model for ordinal (ordered-categorical) outcomes to test for invariance.  
Previous studies (Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Billiet, 2002; Welkenhuysen-Gybels, 2004; De 
Beuckelaer and Swinnen’s chapter in this volume) have demonstrated, based on simulation 
studies, that assuming normality and continuity in the case of Likert-type scales generally 
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does not lead to erroneous conclusions and works well for invariance tests across groups. 7
The conclusions with respect to the invariance of the scales were very similar for the model 
that assumed multivariate normality and the one which accounted for ordinality. The model 
for ordinal indicators, like the model assuming multivariate normality and continuity, showed 
that full (or scalar) invariance is present for only three of the seven values – stimulation, self-
direction, and the unified value universalism-benevolence. Thus, both models justified 
comparison across the three countries of the means of these three values. Mean comparisons 
with the two models yielded fairly similar results. Notably, the mean differences were 
somewhat more pronounced with the ordinal model and, moreover, only the ordinal model 
revealed that the mean importance of the unified universalism-benevolence value was 
significantly higher in Luxembourg. In sum, our results are largely in accordance with 
simulation studies and justify using MGCFA for Likert scales in the analysis of cross-cultural 
and longitudinal data. The results also suggest that an ordinal MGCFA for such scales is more 
powerful to compare latent means. 
 
This chapter assessed whether this conclusion holds with actual survey data on human values 
as measured in the ESS.  
  
                                               
7 Though the power of MGCFA is lower than proportional odds modeling (see Welkenhuysen-Gybels and 
Billiet, 2002, p. 216). 
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Appendix 
Mplus syntax for the final model with invariance of three values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
title: MGCFA Values ESS Round 2 - Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands; 
data: file is benelux_values.dat; 
variable: names are ipcrtiv imprich ipeqopt ipshabt impsafe impdiff ipfrule ipudrst 
ipmodst ipgdtim impfree iphlppl ipsuces ipstrgv ipadvnt ipbhprp iprspot iplylfr 
impenv imptrad impfun country; 
categorical are all; 
grouping is country (1=BE 2=LU 3=NL); 
missing = all (7-9); 
Analysis: PARAM = THETA; 
Model: 
SD by impfree* ipcrtiv@1; 
UNBE by ipeqopt* ipudrst@1 impenv iphlppl iplylfr ipadvnt imprich; 
COTR by ipmodst* imptrad* ipfrule@1 ipbhprp iprspot imprich; 
SEC by impsafe@1 ipstrgv; 
POAC by imprich* iprspot* ipshabt@1 ipsuces ipmodst; 
HE by ipgdtim@1 impfun; 
ST by impdiff@1 ipadvnt; 
Model LU: 
[ipfrule$3* ipfrule$4* ipfrule$5*]; 
[ipbhprp$1* ipbhprp$2* ipbhprp$3* ipbhprp$4* ipbhprp$5*]; 
[imptrad$1* imptrad$2* imptrad$3* imptrad$4* imptrad$5*]; 
[ipmodst$1* ipmodst$2* ipmodst$3* ipmodst$4* ipmodst$5*]; 
[ipstrgv$1* ipstrgv$2* ipstrgv$3* ipstrgv$4* ipstrgv$5*]; 
[impsafe$3* impsafe$4* impsafe$5*]; 
[ipshabt$3* ipshabt$4* ipshabt$5*]; 
[ipsuces$1* ipsuces$2* ipsuces$3* ipsuces$4* ipsuces$5*]; 
[iprspot$1* iprspot$2* iprspot$3* iprspot$4* iprspot$5*]; 
[imprich$1* imprich$2* imprich$3* imprich$4* imprich$5*]; 
[ipgdtim$1* ipgdtim$2* ipgdtim$3* ipgdtim$4* ipgdtim$5*]; 
[impfun$3* impfun$4* impfun$5*]; 
Model NL: 
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32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
[ipfrule$3* ipfrule$4* ipfrule$5*]; 
[ipbhprp$1* ipbhprp$2* ipbhprp$3* ipbhprp$4* ipbhprp$5*]; 
[imptrad$1* imptrad$2* imptrad$3* imptrad$4* imptrad$5*]; 
[ipmodst$1* ipmodst$2* ipmodst$3* ipmodst$4* ipmodst$5*]; 
[ipstrgv$1* ipstrgv$2* ipstrgv$3* ipstrgv$4* ipstrgv$5*]; 
[impsafe$3* impsafe$4* impsafe$5*]; 
[ipshabt$3* ipshabt$4* ipshabt$5*]; 
[ipsuces$1* ipsuces$2* ipsuces$3* ipsuces$4* ipsuces$5*]; 
[iprspot$1* iprspot$2* iprspot$3* iprspot$4* iprspot$5*]; 
[imprich$1* imprich$2* imprich$3* imprich$4* imprich$5*]; 
[ipgdtim$1* ipgdtim$2* ipgdtim$3* ipgdtim$4* ipgdtim$5*]; 
[impfun$3* impfun$4* impfun$5*]; 
output: stand; res; 
 
Explanation 
The syntax in Mplus only needs to specify deviations from the Mplus default. The Mplus 
default for MGCFAs with ordinal data is: 
Parameterization: DELTA 
Estimation: WLSMV 
Constraints: first factor loading on each “by” statement set to 1, all intercepts set to 0, all 
factor loadings and thresholds constrained equal across groups 
Lines 1-6 Data source, variable names, definition as categorical 
Line 7 Multiple groups 
Line 8 Indication which categories represent missing values for all variables 
Line 9 Theta parameterization 
Lines 10-17 Model for all groups, “*” specifies that a parameter should be estimated, “@” 
fixes a parameter. “SD by impfree* ipcrtiv@1;” overrides the Mplus default to 
constrain the first factor loading to 1 and takes the second instead. 
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Lines 18-30 threshold parameters for the four factors that are not invariant across groups are 
set free in the group “Luxembourg”. Thresholds that are not mentioned 
explicitly remain constrained across groups automatically (the same applies to 
the factor loadings), 
e.g., “[ipfrule$3* ipfrule$4* ipfrule$5*];” sets the last three thresholds of the 
item ipfrule free and leaves the first two constrained 
Lines 32-43 threshold parameters for the four factors that are not invariant across groups are 
set free in the group “Netherlands”. 
Line 44 Request of standardized estimates and residual statistics in the output. 
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Two theories on the test bench: Internal and external validity of the theories of Ronald 
Inglehart and Shalom Schwartz 
 
 
Abstract 
In the last decades value research has produced a vast number of theoretical concepts. 
However, it is unclear how the different value theories relate to each other. This study makes 
a first step toward a systematic comparison of value theories. It focuses on the individual level 
of the two approaches that are, at present, probably the most prominent in international 
research - the theory of basic human values of Shalom Schwartz and the postmodernization 
theory of Ronald Inglehart. Using data from the World Value Survey and the European Social 
Survey for West Germany we assess both the internal and the external validity of the two 
accounts. The results indicate that both value theories have different strengths and 
weaknesses. Whereas the Inglehart account has lower internal and weaker construct validity, 
the Schwartz account is somewhat less consistent in its predications. Nevertheless, both value 
conceptions are able to explain a substantial share of variation in specific attitudes and 
behavior. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The empirical research of the last decades has produced an impressive number of different 
value orientations. Sometimes values are equated with more or less abstract, positively 
evaluated objects or states: Health, family, work, religion and many other entities are 
therefore called values. Sometimes values are related to basic human needs, like the needs for 
security, affiliation, or love. In the classical tradition values are defined as standards such as 
the values of freedom, equality, justice, or fairness. Apart from these principle disagreements 
about the concept of values, there are differences with regard to specific values. Two authors 
may use the same value name but understand and operationalize the underlying value 
differently or they assign different value names to very similar sets of indicators. 
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Different value researchers do not completely ignore each other but they quote the studies of 
others selectively and usually only in those cases where the findings of the other seem to 
support their own view.1
In order to overcome the present situation, this paper attempts to systematically compare two 
very prominent value theories, the theory of basic human values of Shalom Schwartz and the 
postmodernization theory of Ronald Inglehart (e.g. 1977). Both authors present two-level 
theories, which distinguish between macro-level cultural values and individual-level value 
orientations. It is true, the focus of Inglehart’s (e.g. 1977) research has recently shifted to such 
an extent to the macro-level that the micro-level component of his theory can be overlooked. 
As the postmaterialism theory is only rudimentarily integrated into the new, more 
encompassing approach, one may gain the impression that we actually deal with two theories, 
a micro-level theory of postmaterialism and a macro-level theory of self-expression values. 
This is not the view of Ron Inglehart, however. Even his publications on macro-level cultural 
change persistently emphasize that cultural change is the result of micro-level value change 
(see, e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The 
 Comprehensive studies of the relationships between different value 
approaches are completely lacking. It is almost certain that problems of discriminant validity 
would arise if similar values from different theories were included in one and the same study 
(Jagodzinski 2004). International comparative studies so far do not allow a comprehensive 
assessment of advanced value theories. It is true that the World Value Survey 2005 also 
includes ten items of the Portrait Value Questionnaire of Schwartz in addition to the 
indicators of Inglehart’s value dimensions. However, it can already be anticipated that ten 
items cannot adequately cover the ten broadly defined value orientations of Shalom Schwartz, 
which is discussed in more detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Survey research may be reluctant to 
include the measurement instruments of different value theories into their questionnaires 
partly because they do not want to confront the respondents with batteries of similar questions 
and partly because it would increase the costs of such a survey immensely. Therefore, at the 
moment it cannot be said whether value research violates Occam’s principle and multiplies 
entities, in this case: values, beyond necessity. It is very likely that it does but no one can 
presently prove this. 
                                               
1 Hofstede (2001), in his presentation of individualism/collectivism refers to Triandis as well as to Inglehart’s 
post-materialism. Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) identify autonomy as the common theme of 
individualism (Triandis) and self-direction (Schwartz) and self-expression values, but they do not analyze these 
relationships in detail. 
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analysis of Inglehart and Baker (2000) further shows that cultural values and individual-level 
value orientations are operationalized with the same set of indicators. Due to space 
limitations, we have to confine ourselves exclusively to the key concepts of the individual-
level value orientations in both approaches, which for the sake of brevity will be simply called 
values. 
A comparison of two value theories should, first of all, investigate the internal validity of the 
measurement. Recent methodological studies on the measurement instruments of the ESS 
give important insights into this field, particularly also into problems of measurement 
equivalence, but they investigate only rudimentarily the predictive power of the underlying 
concepts. This is largely consistent with the strategy of Schwartz and his colleagues who 
mainly concentrated on the internal structure and validity of the values and only sparsely 
examined the relations between values and external variables. As long as this part of the 
theory remains less developed, however, the theory is of limited interest for the 
nonexperimental social sciences, which have always seen the main attraction of value theories 
in their promise to explain a broad range of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors by a limited 
number of values. A comparison of value theories can, therefore, not be based on internal 
validity alone (Jagodzinski and Manabe, 2009; Opp and Wippler, 1990). Relationships with 
external variables, which either predict values or are predicted by values, are at least as 
important.  
As both theories relate values to a set of common external variables, the strength and signs of 
these relationships will be the second criterion, which for the sake of brevity is called external 
validity of the theory. A theory is externally valid if all relationships have the theoretically 
predicted signs and the explained variance in all dependent variables is high.2
Besides internal and external validity, the parsimony is used as a third standard of 
comparison. If two value theories have more or less the same explanatory power, the one with 
fewer values is more parsimonious and, therefore, superior to the other. So we have three 
criteria which we apply step by step to the two value theories. Before we do this, we very 
 Though the 
predictive power of the values is in the focus of interest, the paper will also investigate the 
effect of selected exogenous variables on values. 
                                               
2 Clearly, the external validity is estimated under the assumption that the model is correctly specified. As long as 
there is no empirical evidence, however, that low external validity is a result of spurious non-correlations, they 
indicate problems of the examined theory. 
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briefly discuss communalities and differences in the theories of Ronald Inglehart (1977) and 
Shalom Schwartz (1992, 1994). The internal and external validity are examined in Section 3. 
As the study has to rely on two separate surveys, we use the European Social Survey (ESS) 
2004 for measuring the values of Schwartz and the World Value Survey (WVS) 2005 for 
measuring the values of Inglehart. Needless to say, the external validity can only be assessed 
with regard to those external variables which are at least similarly measured in both surveys. 
Results are summarized and discussed in the last Section  
2. The Two Value Theories – Similarities and Differences 
Space limitations do not allow a comprehensive discussion of the two theories. The values of 
both theories will be very briefly described and compared in Subsection 2.1. The basic 
features of the measurement models are examined next (Subsection 2.2). The last Subsection 
discusses the relationship between values and a subset of external variables, which are 
similarly measured in ESS 2004 and WVS 2005. These relationships are summarized in a set 
of hypotheses (Subsection 2.3). 
2.1 The Value Concepts 
a) Schwartz. The value theory of Schwartz proposes ten basic values that are intended to 
include all the main values recognized across cultures in the world (for a new extension to 
more than ten values, see Schwartz and Vecchione, 2011): power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. 
These values and the motivations behind them are presented in Table 1. They are derived 
from three universal requirements of human beings: needs as biological organisms, 
coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups (Schwartz, 1992, 
1994, 2007). Furthermore, Figure 1 displays the relations between the values. Two important 
features may be observed. First, some values oppose each other whereas others are congruent 
with each other. Pursuing tradition and conformity may be congruent. However, pursuing 
tradition values may oppose following self-direction values. Second, the values are grouped 
behind two higher order dimensions. The first higher order dimension contrasts self-
transcendence with self-enhancement values. The second higher order dimension opposes 
openness to change with conservation values. 
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Table 1: Schwartz’ ten basic human value types and the motivations behind them 
Value type Motivational emphasis 
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources 
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself 
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in life 
Self-direction Independent thought and action - choosing, creating and exploring 
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of 
all people and for nature 
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one 
has frequent personal contact 
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms 
Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, or relationships, and of self 
Source: Sagiv and Schwartz (1995: 438) 
Figure 1: The Relations between the Ten Values 
 
 
Universalism 
Benevolence 
Conformity 
Tradition 
Security 
Self-Direction 
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b) Inglehart. Inglehart (1977) relates values to human needs. The first version of his 
approach, the so-called postmaterialism theory, reduced Maslow’s hierarchy to two basic 
needs, which are called materialistic and postmaterialistic. They were conceptualized as poles 
of a unidimensional value continuum. Materialism becomes manifest in a preference for 
material and physical security, postmaterialism in the emphasis on higher needs like freedom, 
participation, self-expression, or beauty. The second version defines this dimension more 
broadly as survival/self-expression dimension and includes interpersonal trust, happiness, and 
a liberal sexual morality as further indicators. Moreover, a second dimension is added which 
contrasts so-called traditional and secular-rational societies. Both dimensions are imbedded in 
a theory of value change, which describes modernization as a two-phase process. While 
traditional are replaced by secular-rational values in the process of industrialization, the self-
expression values become predominant during the transition from the industrial to the 
postindustrial or advanced societies. 
Discussions on the dimensionality of materialism and postmaterialism, particularly 
Flanagan’s (1987) distinction between an economic and an authoritarian-liberal dimension, 
may have had an impact on Inglehart’s revisions (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000), 
but altogether the new values rather look more like inductive generalizations from empirical 
findings rather than theoretically derived concepts.3
c) Similarities. Schwartz specifies ten values, Inglehart four or two – depending on whether 
the poles or the dimensions are counted as values: Nevertheless, there are similarities between 
the concepts. Security (lower right segment of Figure 1) corresponds to survival needs, and 
stimulation and self-direction in the upper segment correspond to self-expression quite well. 
The match between a traditional orientation (Inglehart) and tradition (Schwartz) is obvious. 
Achievement in the lower left segment could be interpreted as a secular-rational orientation 
because it was an essential outcome of the modernization process. The two value dimensions 
of Inglehart can be plausibly located in the value space of Schwartz though the orthogonality 
may not be preserved.  
 
  
                                               
3 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have further elaborated the theoretical model of value change, but left the 
measurement model unchanged. 
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2.2 The Measurement Models 
a) Inglehart. The first version of Inglehart’s theory only included two alternative 
measurement models for the Materialism/Postmaterialism (MPM)-Dimension. The larger 
model consists of twelve items4, the smaller one, the so-called 4-item MPM-index, is derived 
from naming the two top priorities among four political goals. As only two questions – each 
with four priorities – are required, the 4-item MPM-index is extremely parsimonious and 
presumably the most widely used value measurement in international surveys. The discussion 
of the index would fill a whole methodological textbook of insightful criticism and intriguing 
counterarguments. Even the most ardent critics cannot deny, however, that the index fits 
Kluckhohn’s (1951) famous definition of a value remarkably well: It measures conceptions of 
the desirable [features of a society]5
The 4-item MPM-index indeed includes a relatively small number of political preferences. 
The objection that it remains a measure of political preferences cannot be fully denied. The 
measurement instrument of the revised theory covers a much broader range of topics but it 
also has become very heterogeneous, including feelings, emotions, and reported behavior. The 
MPM-index along with questions on happiness, homosexuality, interpersonal trust, and on 
political petitions are used for measuring survival/self-expression values. Religiosity, 
condemnation of abortion, deference to authority, obedience, and identification with the 
nation characterize traditionalists and distinguish them from secular-rational persons. No 
doubts that there are other and probably better measures of the two value dimensions, but 
Inglehart being interested in long-term value change, has decided for the ten indicators in 
Table 2 (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) because they are available in all European Values and 
World Values Surveys since 1981. As a consequence, the secular-rational pole of the value 
continuum is not positively defined by indicators of a rational orientation but only negatively 
determined as the absence of traditional orientations.  
, and it is shown that these conceptions determine 
attitudes and behavior in various domains. 
  
                                               
4 De Graaf et al. (1989) report reasonably high factor loadings of the 12 items, after correction for ipsative 
measurement has been performed. 
5 Respondents have to choose whether higher priority should be given to freedom and participation or to the 
maintenance of order and economic stability 
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Table 2: The Measurement of the Inglehart Values in the WVS 2005 
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values 
1 Importance of 
God 
How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means 
“very important” and 1 means “not at all important. (10-point scale) 
2 Autonomy Index Here is a list of [10] qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. 
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to 
five! (Points in brackets are added or subtracted if the respective item is 
mentioned) …, Independence (+1), …, Determination, perseverance(+1), …, 
a 
Religious faith (-1), Obedience (-1) (5-point scale) 
3 Abortion Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card: (1=never 
justifiable, …, 10=always justifiable) ….., Abortion … (10-point scale) 
a 
4 National Pride How proud are you to be [French]? (1=very proud, .., , 5=not at all proud). a 
 (5-point scale) 
5 Respect for 
Authority 
I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take 
place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether 
you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (1= Good, 
2=Don’t mind, 3=Bad): …, Respect for Authority, … (3-point scale) 
Survival vs. Self-expression Values 
1 Materialism-
Postmaterialism 
Index
People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next 
ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would 
give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider 
the most important? 
b 
1) Maintaining order in the nation 
2) Giving people more say in important government decisions 
3) Fighting rising prices  
4) Protecting freedom of speech 
And which would be the next most important? (Scale derived from the two top 
priorities: 1= Materialists: aims 1) and 3) mentioned; 3= Postmaterialists: aims 2) 
and 4) mentioned; 2= other combinations mentioned. (3-point scale) 
2 Happiness Taking all things together, would you say you are: 1=Very happy, 2=Rather 
happy, 3=Not very happy, 4=Not at all happy. (4-point scale) 
b 
3 Homosexuality Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (1=never 
justifiable, …, 10=always justifiable): …., Homosexuality (10-point scale) 
b 
4 Sign a petition Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of political 
action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you 
have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any 
circumstances do it: ….; Signing a petition. (3-point scale: 1=have done; 2=would 
do; 3=would never do. (3-point scale) 
5 Interpersonal 
Trust 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people? (Code one answer): 1=Most 
people can be trusted, 2=Need to be very careful. (2-point scale) 
a
 Low scores indicate traditional values. 
b
In contrast to Rokeach (1973) or Schwartz (1992), Inglehart avoids the use of generic terms in 
the questions on values for the reason that specific items are better understood by the 
respondents and may be less affected by framing effects. On the other hand, items about 
political preferences are theoretically only indirectly related to values. This is even truer for 
the other value indicators such as questions on self-reported behavior, interpersonal trust, 
authoritarianism, or national identity which often are used as indicators for other theoretical 
constructs like interpersonal trust, authoritarianism and national identity. The factor analytic 
models which Inglehart and others (cf. Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 
 Low scores indicate survival values.  
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2005) apply presuppose a direct effect of the latent values on these indicators which clearly is 
inconsistent with the results of social psychology (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein and 
Aizen, 2010). The effect of a value on behavior, for instance, is mediated among others by the 
evaluation of objects and behavioral intentions, etc. (Fishbein and Aizen, 2010). Furthermore, 
the reasoned action approach (Fishbein and Aizen, 2010) assumes causal relations among 
variables that Inglehart treats as indicators of the value variables, that is, the axiom of local 
independence is violated.6
All in all, the reader gains the impression that the indicators of postmodern values have been 
chosen in such a way as to maximize the relationships with external variables. Inglehart was 
much less concerned about a coherent expansion of the original individual-level value model 
as the new indicator Happiness shows. We know, from previous studies, that happiness does 
not correlate with postmaterialism: “Subjective well-being is a condition, not a value, and not 
correlated with Postmaterialism at the individual level” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 87). We infer that 
the MPM-index and the Happiness item should not be combined as multiple indicators in a 
measurement model for individual-level postmodern values because sufficiently large 
indicator correlations are a minimum requirement of high reliability. From the sentence that 
immediately follows: “But high levels of subjective well-being are a key element in the 
cultural syndrome called Postmodernism.” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 87), we might further conclude 
that Inglehart wants to use different indicators for the macro-level cultural syndromes and the 
individual level values – a decision which as such could not be criticized. Inglehart and Baker 
(2000), however, take exactly the same indicators for measuring macro- and micro-level 
values. Two consequences can already be anticipated before any empirical analysis is carried 
out: The use of both indicators will deteriorate the reliability and internal validity of the 
measurement model and, at the same time, increase the correlation of the survival/self-
expression index with well-being. The latter result has a tautological flavor because it is near-
at-hand that an index including happiness as a component will predict well-being quite well. 
We will return to that problem in a later Section. 
 
  
                                               
6 The MPM Index as a general political attitude has an indirect causal (mediated via intention) effect on “signing 
a petition” (behavior). 
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b) Schwartz. To avoid indirect indicators, Schwartz strictly distinguishes between the 
measurement of values and the measurement of attitudes (Schwartz, 2007). He tries to tackle 
the confounding of values and attitudes by proposing an instrument of broad and basic 
motivations relevant to various attitudes and behaviors in different domains in life (Schwartz, 
2007). This strategy, however, also has its price. Expressions like: “everybody in the world be 
treated equally”, for instance, can be interpreted in the sense of equal starting conditions or in 
a strict egalitarian sense which would include equal pay for all human beings, etc. People may 
agree with the first idea but not with the second. Depending on how the question is framed we 
have to expect different answers.7
  
 These framing effects may not only produce random 
measurement error but also result in halo effects and other kinds of systematic distortions. 
Unfortunately, there has been so far no systematic comparison of Ingelhart’s and Schwartz’ 
measurement instruments using cognitive interviews (Willis, 2005), which would give us 
better insight into the measurement quality of these items. The indicators of Schwartz are 
listed in Table 3. 
                                               
7 It is likely that a respondent will be more positive toward this question if previous questions referred to 
discrimination of minorities and more negative if previous questions referred to equal pay for industrious and 
idle workers.  
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Table 3: The Human Values Scale in the ESS 2004 
Value Item # (according to its order in the ESS questionnaire) and Wording (Male Version) 
Self-
Direction 
(SD) 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his 
own original way (ipcrtiv).  
11. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free to 
plan and not depend on others (impfree). 
Universalism 
(UN) 
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life (ipeqopt).  
 8. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees 
with them, he still wants to understand them (ipudrst).  
 19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is 
important to him (impenv).  
Benevolence 
(BE) 
12. It is very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-
being (iphlppl).  
18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to 
him (iplylfr). 
Tradition 
(TR) 
9. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself 
(ipmodst).  
 20. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or 
his family (imptrad). 
Conformity 
(CO) 
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at 
all times, even when no one is watching (ipfrule).  
 16. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong (ipbhprp).  
Security 
(SEC) 
5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger 
his safety (impsafe).  
 14. It is important to him that the government insures his safety against all threats. He wants the 
state to be strong so it can defend its citizens (ipstrgv).  
Power 
(PO) 
 
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things 
(imprich). 
17. It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says 
(iprspot). 
Achievement 
(AC) 
4. It is important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does (ipshabt). 
13. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements 
(ipsuces). 
Hedonism 
(HE) 
10. Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself (ipgdtim). 
21. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him 
pleasure (impfun).  
Stimulation 
(ST) 
6. He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do 
lots of different things in life (impdiff).  
15. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life (ipadvnt).  
 
2.3 The Hypotheses 
While Schwartz at least implicitly emphasizes value stability, Inglehart presents a dynamic 
theory of value change, though he shares the assumption that individual-level values are by 
and large stable in adulthood. Inglehart was, from the early seventies on, intrigued by the 
observation that the values of younger generations markedly differed from the values of the 
parent generations in the West. It was not a small shift from giving a higher priority to a given 
value to giving a higher priority instead to a neighboring value in the Schwartz circle, say 
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from conformity to security, but rather a shift from one side to the opposite side in Figure 1: 
While the parents still strive more for security and material goods compared to younger 
generations, the younger generations emphasize self-actualization and the abolishment of old 
hierarchical structures more strongly than their parents. The seminal book ‘The Silent 
Revolution’ from 1977 tries to explain the value differences between post-war older 
generations and younger generations as a change from materialistic to postmaterialistic 
values. Inspired by Maslow’s need hierarchy and the principle of relative potency, Inglehart 
systematically elaborated the idea that economic, social, and political security has a 
tremendous impact on human life. People who grew up and lived in a secure environment 
differ in political attitudes and behavior, gender and family orientations, work preferences, 
religious orientations, environmental concern, interpersonal trust, and many other issues from 
those who have to fight for their subsistence and are threatened by turmoil, wars, and 
disorder.  
Along these lines he has developed a rich set of highly differentiated hypotheses – most of 
which appear already in the first version of his theory. It has already been shown by example 
of Happiness, however, that the relationship between postmaterialist and postmodern values is 
not always clear. It is sometimes doubtful whether and how the hypotheses of the former 
theory can be translated into hypotheses for the new values. As long as there is no convincing 
argument to the contrary, however, we infer, from the fact that the MPM-index is seen as a 
key indicator of the new survival/self-expression dimension, that postmodern individualists 
feel, think, and behave like postmaterialists. The relationships between the traditional/secular-
rational value dimension and external variables are even less developed. When not otherwise 
stated, we tentatively infer the respective hypotheses from the basic ideas of the theory. 
As far as the hypotheses of Schwartz are concerned, we strictly will confine ourselves to those 
hypotheses which have been explicitly stated in the literature. Sometimes opposite effects are 
stated for opposite values in Figure 1 - but can we generally assume that opposite values 
display opposite relationships with external variables? Is a positive effect of age on 
conservation, for example, necessarily paralleled by a negative effect of age on openness to 
change, and a positive influence of benevolence on immigration by a negative effect of self-
enhancement on the same attitude? If the value space were truly two-dimensional, this would 
be the case. Two (not perfectly correlated) values would be sufficient, however, for extracting 
the two orthogonal dimensions. All other values could be calculated as a linear combination 
of these two dimensions or of the two values. Accordingly, “opposite values” would be 
linearly dependent, and their effects could not be estimated. Actually the values of Schwartz 
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are located in a space of higher order. The projection into the two-dimensional space 
represents the relationships among the values approximately but is far from perfect. As a 
consequence, we cannot always predict from the relationship of a first value with an external 
variable the sign of the effect of the opposite value (see Costner and Leik, 1964). This 
introduces additional complexities into theory construction and testing as will be seen later 
on. 
Below we present a brief summary of those hypotheses that can be tested with the ESS 2004 
and the WVS 2005 data. This is a fairly severe restriction because both surveys do not include 
many comparable external variables. Most of the items refer to the socio-political domain 
which may slightly bias the results in favor of the postmodernization theory which often is 
called a political theory. As long as Schwartz does not systematically specify the influence of 
values on attitude and behavior, however, the size of the bias remains unknown.  
There is a further qualification: Frequently, the surveys include a general variable such as the 
left-right self-placement scale, but an appropriate test of a theory would require a finer 
distinction, for instance, a differentiation between the economic and the 
libertarian/authoritarian meaning of left and right. If this is not possible, we can only estimate 
the presumably weaker effect on the general left-right scale and in this regard probably 
underestimate the predictive power.  
Bearing these qualifications in mind, we first discuss the relationships of values with the 
exogenous variables age, gender, and education, and then move to factors, which are 
dependent on values. 
2.3.1 The Impact of Social-Structural Variables on Values 
Age and Generation. To Inglehart, generational differences are a function of economic and 
technological change. Younger generations differ from older insofar as they grow up in a 
different environment. Inglehart has never completely excluded life-cycle effects (see, e.g., 
Inglehart, 1981, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), but he interprets age differences in 
the first place as a sign of generational change. Large economic changes, as they occurred in 
the West after World War II, also imply the already mentioned large differences between the 
older materialistic and the younger postmaterialistic generations. The trend could also reverse 
if the advanced society would experience a long-lasting period of economic decline. 
In the later theory of postmodernization, value change occurs on two dimensions: Those who 
grow up in very poor, traditional societies internalize traditional and survival values; those 
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who grow up in affluent, postindustrial societies, place an emphasis on rational-secular and 
self-actualization values in adulthood. In the transition from a traditional to an industrial 
society, generational differences along the traditional/secular-rational axis should be most 
pronounced while in the transition from the latter to the postindustrial society, differences on 
the survival/self-expression dimension should be greater.  
It is not necessary to elaborate entirely the model of generational change because we 
investigate values in a single society at a single point in time. It is sufficient to state the 
implication of the model for the effect of age on the values: As Germany has experienced a 
fast economic development after World War II, younger people should be more rational-
secular than older people, and they should also place more emphasis on self-actualization 
values. Age effects cannot be separated from generation effects in a cross-sectional analysis. 
If the latter should be superimposed by life-cycle effects (Jagodzinski, 1983) the relationship 
would only be strengthened. Accordingly, we expect a negative effect of age on both value 
dimensions. 
Schwartz (2006, 2007) also refers to both cohort effects due to differential socialization 
contexts and individual life-cycle effects. In the derivation of concrete hypotheses for age, 
Schwartz follows the logic of life-cycle effects. Older people become more committed to their 
habits and develop stronger ties to their social networks, resulting in fewer changes and 
challenges, less openness for such changes, and stronger reliance on conservative values 
(Glen, 1974). Therefore, older people are expected to score higher on conservation values 
(tradition, conformity, security) and lower on openness to change values (self-direction, 
stimulation) (Schwartz, 2006, 2007; Meuleman et al., in press). Furthermore, as individuals 
become with age less preoccupied with themselves and more with others, self-transcendence 
is expected to increase and self-enhancement to decrease (Schwartz, 2006; Veroff et al., 
1984).  
Education. If education enhances exposure to new experiences, different people, and 
alternative ways of reasoning, more educated individuals should score higher on self-
enhancement, openness to change, and self-transcendence values, and lower on conservation 
values (Meuleman et al., in press; Schwartz, 2006). According to Inglehart, respondent’s 
education to some extent reflects the indoctrination of values in school, but to a larger extent 
the economic and social conditions during the formative years: Children of highly educated 
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families usually grow up in a secure environment8
Gender. Inglehart explicitly states no value differences between men and women. Schwartz, 
by contrast, follows theories of gender differences in assuming that men attribute higher 
importance to instrumental values such as power or achievement, as well as stimulation, 
hedonism, or self-direction values, and lower importance to benevolence and universalism 
values (Schwartz, 2006, 2007; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 
2009; Meuleman et al., in press).  
. Thus, the higher the education, the more 
likely secular-rational and self-expression values have been internalized (Inglehart, 1990): 
Education, in other words has a negative effect on traditional and survival values.  
2.3.2 The Impact of Values 
Left-Right Self-Placement. Postmaterialists as early as in the seventies placed themselves on 
the left of the left-right continuum, because they aimed at political change, opposed the old, 
middle to right-wing political elites, and held leftist political and social attitudes. Inglehart 
emphasized very early that the meaning of left and right undergoes a change in advanced 
societies, from the economic left-right distinction to a new conflict, which centers around self-
expression values, and becomes manifest in issues of environmental protection, gender roles, 
or political participation. The meaning of the left-right dimension is also dependent on the 
locations of parties in a given country. Thus, if the political parties hold positions along the 
economic left-right dimension, this understanding of left and right will also dominate in the 
public. For the West German public the notions left and right have a mixture of meanings. 
They are still associated with the economic cleavage where a leftist position is egalitarian. 
Emphasis on gender equality, environmental protection, and liberal moral attitudes are also 
seen as left positions. Right by contrast, is not only associated with conservatism, law and 
order, and hierarchy but also with church and religiosity. Accordingly, traditional as well as 
survival values should be positively correlated with a right position on the scale. 
In the framework of Shalom Schwartz, individuals scoring high on universalism and 
benevolence values (self-transcendent dimension); who are open to change, or who focus on 
the welfare of the others are expected to be more strongly related to the political left, whereas 
individuals scoring high on conservation and self-enhancement values are expected to be 
                                               
8 Education of the parents would better reflect the economic conditions in childhood and youth. The explanatory 
power is slightly underestimated if respondent’s education is used as a predictor.  
91 
more strongly related to the political right. These expectations correspond to the meaning of 
left and right in contemporary liberal democracies (Piurko et al., forthcoming; see also 
Schwartz, 2006; Caprara et al., 2006).  
Political Interest. With regard to political interest and political activism the situation is 
slightly more complicated. In many Western countries, party identification and voter turnout 
rates have declined during the last decades so that it seems obvious to expect a decline of 
political interest, too. Inglehart, however, has argued that postmaterialists are more interested 
in politics (Inglehart, 1997, p. 308). Self-actualization indeed requires political engagement in 
democratic societies so that political interest can be expected to increase with self-expression 
values. Whether the same holds for secular-rational values is doubtful. During the postwar 
era, churches in Western Europe supported social and political integration. A good Christian 
had to vote in elections and be interested in politics as well. Accordingly, the relationship 
between secular-rational values and political interest may be much weaker or even be 
reversed.  
Because of the similarity between postmaterialism and universalism and maybe benevolence 
values as well, one could also infer that individuals who place high importance on self-
transcendence values may be more interested and involved in politics. Indeed, politics often 
involves issues that are of key concern for universalistic ideologies such as immigration 
policies, social welfare, or environment. Security, conformity, and self-direction values have 
also turned out to be of central importance in the formation of political values of voters in 
various contexts (see, e.g., Barnea, 2003; Schwartz, 2006; Caprara et al., 2006). 
Political Activism. More than thirty years ago Inglehart predicted a decline of elite-directed 
and an increase of elite-challenging political behavior (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 317-321). The 
former comprises voting and traditional forms of party support, in particular party 
identification; the latter the participation in boycotts and protest demonstrations or so-called 
unconventional protest behavior. The prediction was based on two central variables, cognitive 
mobilization and postmaterialism. The former would increase as a consequence of rising 
formal education and the improvement of political skills, the latter as a consequence of rising 
economic prosperity. Elite-challenging political behavior should still be positively affected by 
education9
                                               
9 An index of cognitive mobilization would certainly be a better predictor than education. 
 and self-expression values or, vice versa, negatively affected by survival values. 
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As elite-challenging political activism remains the least wide-spread among traditional 
people, traditional values should also have a negative effect.  
One may expect universalism and benevolence values, which promote social justice and 
environmental care--important topics in politics--- to predict stronger political activism 
(Schwartz, 2006). Since political activism may be risky and involve excitement and formation 
of independent and maybe deviating opinions, security and conformity are expected to display 
the most negative association with political activism (Schwartz, 2006, 2007). 
Attitudes toward Immigrants. Inglehart (1977, p. 320) discusses early on the link between a 
cosmopolitan orientation, cognitive mobilization, and postmaterialism, whose basic 
mechanism is elaborated more clearly in later publications. Feelings of insecurity are the main 
source of parochialism and xenophobia (Inglehart, 1997). Existential threats foster 
ingroup/outgroup thinking. People seek safety in closely knit networks. Accordingly, 
traditional as well as survival values are negatively related to openness toward immigrants.  
As far as the Schwartz values are concerned several studies (Schwartz, 2006, 2007; Davidov 
et al., 2008b; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012) link universalism and benevolence values to a 
positive, and conservation and conformity to a negative attitude toward immigrants. The 
latter, negative relation can be expected because conservatives tend to perceive immigrants as 
a threat to the preservation of norms, customs, and established religions, or, in short, the 
stability of a society. By contrast, the motivational goals of self-transcendence values 
(especially universalism), such as understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of people and for nature, are promoted by the arrival of immigrants (e.g., Sagiv 
and Schwartz, 1995)  
Life Satisfaction. We have already mentioned the fact that life satisfaction may correlate with 
the self-actualization index for the simple reason that Happiness is a component of the index. 
However, there is also a theoretical reason for expecting a positive relation between self-
expression values and happiness or life satisfaction. Individualists have more influence on the 
definition of their political, social, and private goals and are less directed by others. They, 
therefore, also have better chances of realizing their goals, can attribute the success to 
themselves, and be more proud of their actions. As a consequence, they reach a higher level of 
satisfaction (see Jagodzinski, 2010a for a more comprehensive analysis). By way of contrast, 
survival values should negatively affect life satisfaction. 
In the value system of Schwartz one may consider different views on how values may affect 
life satisfaction. One view suggests that successfully realizing any of one's values may 
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increase one’s well-being. According to this view, when people believe that some values or 
goals they see as important are blocked, their life satisfaction suffers (Schwartz and Melech, 
2000). Other authors suggest that only certain values may have an impact on well-being. 
Jensen and Bergin (1988) and Strupp (1980) identified ‘healthy’ values (self-direction, 
benevolence, universalism, but also achievement and stimulation) and ‘unhealthy’ ones 
(conformity, tradition, security, power) (see Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000). They argue that 
realizing ‘healthy’ values should enhance happiness. Yet the questionnaire does not measure 
the realization of values but only their importance and one cannot infer from the importance 
of values that they are realized. Bilsky and Schwartz (1994) hypothesized that values 
representing growth (self-direction, universalism, benevolence, achievement, and stimulation) 
are emphasized by individuals who successfully realize these values in their lives and display 
higher levels of well-being. In contrast, when these values cannot be realized, individuals tend 
to suffer from lower levels of well-being and increasingly emphasize conformity, security and 
power values (but also tradition) compensating for deprivation (Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994; 
Sagiv and Schwartz, 2000; see also Schwartz et al., 2000). Although hedonism points toward 
personal pleasure as a goal, Sagiv and Schwatz (2000, p. 182) maintain that one cannot derive 
a theoretical relation of the importance of hedonistic values and life satisfaction. Empirically, 
they do not find a significant correlation between hedonistic value orientation and subjective 
well-being. 
Church Attendance. Traditional people do not only hold strong beliefs, but they also 
participate regularly in religious services. Therefore, a positive correlation between religiosity 
and traditional values can be expected. The same holds for survival values because religion 
also gives security and orientation in an insecure environment. Applying the same logic to the 
values of Schwartz, one can expect a positive impact of traditional individuals on the 
frequency of religious participation. Hedonists, by contrast, should attend religious services 
less frequently (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995) because, after all, religion signifies preferring 
transcendental concerns over materialistic ones. Benevolence and conformity also include 
some degree of selflessness and are expected to be positively related to religiosity. Since 
religion is also related to preserving the status quo and increasing certainty in life, one may 
expect religiosity to be positively linked with tradition, conformity, and security values, and 
negatively with stimulation and self-direction values, that reflect openness to change 
(Schwartz and Huismans, 1995). 
Attitudes toward Gender Equality. One of the core elements of self-expression values is the 
emancipation from authority. Human beings are free and equal. Self-expression values are, 
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therefore, positively and survival values negatively correlated with gender equality. 
Traditional values should have a similar negative effect because the differential treatment of 
men and women is firmly anchored in the ideology and religion of traditional societies. 
Following a similar logic, a preference for conservation values in the Schwartz theory is 
expected to predict a rejection of gender equality. A universalistic orientation toward 
humankind and a benevolent orientation to the concrete others (theoretically, men and 
women) promote a positive stance on gender equality. As self-enhancement and stimulation 
emphasize individual freedom and openness to new experiences, they should lead to a 
preference for gender equality as well. Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses. 
Table 4: The Hypotheses 
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Traditional (vs. secular-rational) Values + -   +  - -  + - 
Survival (vs. self-expression)Values + -   + - - - -  - 
             
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE 
Benevolence + + +  - + + + + + + 
Universalism + + +  - + + + +  + 
OPENNESS TO CHANGE 
Self-Direction - +   -    + - + 
Stimulation - +   -    + - + 
Hedonism          - + 
SELF-ENHANCEMENT 
Achievement - + -  +    +  - 
Power - + -  +    -  - 
CONSERVATION 
Security + -   + + - - - + - 
Conformity + -   + + - - - + - 
Tradition + -   + + - - - + - 
Notes: "+" positive relation expected; "- "negative relation expected; empty cells: no relation 
expected/ theoretical relation unspecified. 
Next we turn to the empirical part. In this section we will describe the datasets used and the 
measurement characteristics of both value theories (internal validity) and present the relations 
of values in both theories with external variables (external validity and parsimony). 
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3. Empirical Analyses 
3.1 General Problems and Limitations  
Before the analysis can be carried out, two important decisions have to be made. The first is 
favorable to Inglehart. Jagodzinski has carried out the same factor analysis as Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) with the data of the WVS 2005 and has shown that only the West German factor 
pattern was in line with the former results (see below, section 3.2 a). Therefore, we confine 
our analysis to West Germany (N = 1,851 in the ESS, N = 988 in the WVS).10
The second decision is in favor of Schwartz. Faced with the question of whether to carry out 
the analysis exclusively with the WVS or to test the theory of Shalom Schwartz with the ESS, 
we have opted for the latter alternative for several reasons. Firstly, 21 indicators (ESS) are 
usually better than ten (WVS), because there are at least two indicators available to measure 
each of the ten values (see Bollen, 1989). Had we presented the results for the ten-indicator 
models of the WVS, it is highly likely that objections would have been raised that these few 
indicators do not cover the values of Schwartz adequately. Secondly, 21 indicators measure 
the underlying values more reliably than ten if the indicator correlations are sufficiently high. 
We will show later on that this rule even applies if five generalized values instead of the ten 
basic Schwartz values are specified. Thirdly, we will almost certainly estimate larger effects 
and higher predictive power of the Schwartz values by using the ESS because some of the 
dependent orientations are estimated more reliably.
 
11
                                               
10 The response rate of the German ESS 2004 was 52.6% (ESS2 – 2004, Data Documentation Report, Edition 
3.3). The response rate of the German WVS 2005 was 46.3% (own calculation, based on ”Technical 
Information” available on the WVS website, formula RR1, AAPOR guidelines, see http://www.aapor.org).  
For detailed information on the survey programs and data access, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org and 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
It finally has to be mentioned that 
Inglehart’s value dimensions have to be operationalized as simple additive indices. This 
method does not eliminate the random measurement error completely and tends to 
underestimate the strength of the relationships among latent variables (Bollen, 1989). The 
measurement of the Schwartz values is also not optimal but the number of items in the ESS is 
at least sufficiently large to measure each of the five generalized Schwartz values by at least 
11 It is one of the strategic goals of the ESS to develop reliable and valid measurement instruments for a set of 
relatively homogenous European countries. To the extent that this program is successful, the variables in the ESS 
will have lower random measurement error than variables in a worldwide survey and, as a consequence, yield 
higher standardized effects and higher R-squares (see Bollen, 1989 for the general argument). Accordingly, 
lower measurement error in the dependent variables may positively affect the predictive power estimates for the 
Schwartz values. 
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two indicators. As a consequence, a correction of measurement error can be performed with 
SEM (structural equation model) programs like AMOS which usually results in stronger 
relationships among the latent variables compared with an analysis which only makes use of 
summative indices.12 It has to be added that Inglehart as well as Schwartz and many of their 
colleagues are working on the improvements of the measurement models for the values. 13
3.2 Internal Validity 
 
Both theories are still under construction (see below). The future measurement instruments 
will certainly overcome some limitations of the existing approaches. 
(a) Inglehart 
The use of factor scores or summative indices is quite widespread in comparative research. In 
the former case, factor loadings serve as typical criteria of reliability, in the latter case, 
Cronbach’s alpha. Inglehart and Baker (2000) report factor loadings and calculate factor 
scores. A reliable measurement instrument of stable values should also produce a more or less 
stable factor pattern over time. Jagodzinski (2010b) has, therefore, tried to replicate the factor 
pattern of the micro-level analysis of Inglehart and Baker (2000) with the WVS 2005 data. In 
his reanalysis, he used a very soft criterion of similarity or reproducibility: The factor pattern 
is successfully replicated if (1) the indicators display the same pattern of main loadings as in 
Inglehart and Baker (2000, p. 24), (2) the main loadings are above .4, and (3) always higher in 
magnitude than the cross (side) loadings.14
                                               
12 Suppose that the indicators x and y of two latent variables display a correlation of .4 and that 50 percent of the 
variance in x and y is random measurement error. In this case we will estimate a correlation of .8 among the 
latent variables. 
 For that purpose, principal component analyses 
(PCA) were carried out in all countries and in the pooled data set. Missing data were deleted 
pairwise, and the number of factors was fixed at two. The solution was subjected to a varimax 
rotation. Contrary to the expectations, the factor pattern of Inglehart and Baker did not emerge 
13 Welzel (2010), for instance, tries to solve some of the measurement problems by using formative indicators 
and modified values. A discussion of these models is beyond the scope of the present article but see 
Diamantopoulos et al. (2008) for a critical discussion of the potentials and the limitations of formative 
measurements. In particular, correction for measurement error is not as straightforward in formative 
measurement models as in reflective ones. 
Current methodological studies on the Schwartz values propose a refined measurement with more indicators 
and/or more latent variables (Knoppen and Saris, 2009b; Beierlein et al., 2012). 
14 More rigorous criteria, which are becoming state of the art, were formulated by Meredith (1993). 
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in the pooled dataset or in any country (see Jagodzinski, 2010b for some of the results). In a 
separate analysis of the German data the resulting model for West Germany met the three 
criteria (see the left part of Table 5) while the models for East Germany (middle part of Table 
5) and all-Germany (right part of Table 5) did not. The factors for West Germany are 
estimated in such a way that high positive scores indicate a preference for tradition and for 
survival. For indicating the direction of the value dimension we simplify the notation: instead 
of Traditional/Secular-Rational values we speak of Traditional Values, and instead of 
Survival/ Self-Expression values of Survival Values. 
Table 5: Replication of Inglehart and Baker (2000) with the German Data of WVS 2005, 
Principal Component Analysis, Standardized Factor Loadings 
 West East  Total  
Secular-Rational Values Indicators  TRAD SURV ? ? ? ? 
V192 God is very important .660 -.191 .494 -.452 .507 -.518 
Y003 Obedience over Independence  .488 .273 .494 .009 .536 .029 
V204 Abortion is never justifiable .595 .347 .726 .002 .720 .018 
V209 R is very proud of nationality .476 .060 .380 -.301 .418 -.109 
V78 Respect for authority is good .585 .066 .434 -.012 .464 .079 
Self-Expression Values Indicators       
Y002 R is materialist .273 .497 .469 .333 .431 .399 
V10 R is unhappy -.299 .600 -.019 .619 -.065 .600 
V96 R would never sign a petition .236 .479 .392 .377 .371 .406 
V202 Homosexuality is never justifiable .475 .574 .718 .160 .685 .267 
V23 Need to be careful with people  -.016 .576 .105 .642 .103 .634 
Explained Variance (%) 37.78% 36.18% 37.06% 
 
Notes: Forced 2-factor solution, Varimax rotation; pairwise deletion of missing data, N=953. 
TRAD stands for the traditional/secular-rational and SURV for the survival/self-expression dimension. 
Traditionalists have a high positive score on TRAD and security-oriented people a high positive score on SURV. 
A question mark on the top of the last columns of the table indicates that the labels TRAD and SURV are 
inappropriate; R = respondent; high factor loadings are indicated in bold. 
Although the principal component analysis for West Germany distinguished the two 
theoretical dimensions, this result departs from a simple structure. In particular, the cross- 
loadings of the items on abortion and on homosexuality are substantial.15
                                               
15 From a methodological point of view, principal axis factoring (PAF) is more suitable to discover latent 
dimensions that are measured by observed indicators because PAF, in contrast to PCA, includes the assumption 
of measurement error. We employ PCA to replicate the original study of Inglehart and Baker (2000). 
 The former was 
conceptualized by Inglehart and Baker (2000) as a measure of the traditional/secular-rational 
value orientation, the latter as a measure of the survival/self-expression value orientation. 
However, both indicators are highly correlated among each other, and that is one of the 
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obstacles to the specification of a parsimonious confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model. 
We tried out a larger number of specifications but never arrived at a satisfactory result.16
Inglehart investigated measurement problems of materialism and postmaterialism in the 1970s 
and 1980s (see De Graaf et al., 1989; Inglehart, 1985). It is understandable, though 
regrettable, that the development of postmodernization theory was not paralleled by a similar 
elaboration of suitable measurement instruments for his new value concepts. We follow 
Inglehart in the subsequent analysis and work with similar additive indices and factor scores.  
 
(b) Schwartz 
Schwartz and several other researchers have invested a considerable amount of work in the 
elaboration of the underlying measurement model. It is now widely agreed, however, that 
even the 21 Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) items in the ESS are not sufficient to 
measure all ten values adequately. Whereas studies using the full 40-item version of the PVQ 
(Steinmetz et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2007; Beckers et al., 2012) could identify all ten 
theoretical values in the empirical analysis, studies with the shortened ESS version of the 
PVQ report high correlations between items intended to measure adjacent but different values. 
Knoppen and Saris (2009a) have questioned the face validity of the indicators of 
universalism, tradition, and power and have proposed as a possible strategy to work for the 
time being with those seven values which are reliably measured. In addition, Schwartz et al. 
(in press) have enlarged the model to 19 values in a new cross-national study. Other authors 
have collapsed adjacent values (Bezonsky et al., 2011, Davidov et al., 2008 b, Duriez et al., 
2005, Verkusalo et al., 2009). Davidov et al. (2008a) and Davidov (2008, 2010), for instance, 
identify maximally seven distinct value constructs across most of the ESS countries by using 
all ESS items in a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). They model the 
indicators of three pairs of adjacent values as measuring three new latent variables: the 
indicators of benevolence (BE) and universalism (UN) are now specified as indicators of a 
new latent variable UNBE, those of achievement (AC) and power (PO) as indicators of 
POAC, and those of tradition (TR) and conformity (CO) as indicators of TRCO. With some 
modifications (see Davidov et al., 2008a, pp. 434f.), this model achieves satisfactory fit and 
can be accepted in terms of internal validity. From a broader perspective, these different 
approaches focus on the same values because they use the original indicators of Schwartz and 
                                               
16 Results of the CFA models for the Inglehart items can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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specify the measurement models in such a way that the resulting latent variables remain in 
close vicinity semantically to the corresponding values of Schwartz. The SEM methodology is 
much stricter, however. It is not sufficient to use the same indicators and value names in 
different studies. Rather, metric equivalence requires that also the unstandardized factor 
loadings do not differ (Meredith, 1993); for the minimum condition of partial metric 
invariance at least two unstandardized factor loadings per construct have to be equal (Byrne 
and Van de Vijver, 2010). Different studies typically impose different constraints on the 
measurement model, estimate different unstandardized factor loadings, and therefore also 
generate different values. This is also true of our study. It was not our intention to create a 
new set of values but we could not reproduce the values of former studies. 
It is a property of the circumplex structure that indicators of adjacent values sometimes 
correlate as high with each other as with the other indicator(s) of the same value, and the 
correlation between adjacent values, therefore, is also very high. In the model with seven 
values, self-direction and stimulation as well security and conformity/tradition correlate above 
.80. Using all seven value constructs in a multiple regression results in extraordinary large 
standard errors which indicate problems of multicollinearity.17
To ensure that the value constructs can be used in regression models and to preserve the 
desirable proportions of CFA models with correction for measurement error instead of using 
additive indices, we have to collapse further indicators to therefore create new and broader 
concepts. This strategy is not solely data-driven but distinguishes those four values which 
Schwartz conceptualizes on a higher level: ”Openness to change” (OPEN) – measured in our 
analysis by indicators of self-direction and stimulation, “self-transcendence” (SELF-TRANS) 
- measured by indicators of universalism and benevolence , “conservation” (CONSERV) – 
measured by the indicators of conformity, tradition, and security, and finally “self-
enhancement” (SELF-ENH) – measured by the indicators of power and achievement. While 
Schwartz introduces these values as second-order concepts, we specify them as new first-
order latent variables. From the original values only hedonism (HE) remains and is situated 
between openness to change and self-enhancement. 
 
  
                                               
17 This is one of the reasons why structural equation modeling (SEM) with the 7 values as predictors of external 
variables more often than not produces non-admissible solutions (generally for this problem of multicollinearity 
in SEM see Marsh et al., 2004). 
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Table 6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Standardized Factor Loadings 
 SELF-TRANS CONSERV SELF-ENH HE OPEN 
 WVS ESS WVS ESS WVS ESS WVS ESS WVS ESS 
ipeqopt  .459         
Ipudrst  .615         
Impenv .724 .534         
Iphlppl .674 .648         
Iplylfr  .552         
ipmodst    .444  -.333     
Imptrad .379  .278 .513       
Ipfrule    .542       
Ipbhprp   .516 .696 .316        
Impsafe -.120  .653 .632       
Ipstrgv    .512       
Imprich -.486 -.271   .734 .566     
Iprspot    .218  .434     
Ipshabt      .659     
Ipsuces     .625  .722     
Ipgdtim       1.00* .759   
Impfun        .726   
Impdiff          .680 
Ipadvnt  -.416       .653 .796 
Ipcrtiv .364        .417 .527 
Impfree          .512 
* fixed to 1 for identification 
Notes: ESS 2004, West German sample, pairwise deletion of missing data, N = 1,832; WVS 2005, West German 
sample, pairwise deletion of missing data, N=953; gray fields: ex post modifications (cross-loadings); Bold items 
are included in ESS and WVS, (ipbhprp, ipgdtim, imprich are identical in the two surveys, the other items differ 
in wording), for item wording in the ESS see Table 3; SELF-TRANS = Self-Transcendence, CONSERV = 
Conservation, SELF-ENH = Self-Enhancement, HE = Hedonism, OPEN = Openness to Change;  
Model fit ESS: Chi2 = 961.4 with df = 175, RMSEA = 0.050 (p close = .591), CFI = .912 
Model fit WVS: Chi2 = 160.6, df = 22, CFI = .918, RMSEA = .081, p-close = 0.000 
As the number of values has been reduced in any case, the question may arise of whether the 
ten indicators of the WVS are not sufficient for a suitable measurement model. This had the 
obvious advantage that one and the same data set could be used and independent and 
dependent variables in our tests would be exactly the same. The two measurement models 
presented in Table 6 allow us to answer the question. The standardized loadings of the ten 
WVS indicators are always displayed in the first column below the respective values, the 
loadings of the 21 ESS indicators in the second. Cross loadings which are not consistent with 
the theoretical expectations are shaded gray. A brief comparison tells us that the ESS model 
fits the theoretical expectations much better than the WVS model. While the ten WVS 
indicators display five theoretically unexpected cross loadings, the 21 ESS indicators display 
only four. The WVS indicator “Important to be rich” displays a very high negative loading on 
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SELF-TRANS though one can hardly say that there is a direct impact of self-transition on the 
desire to be rich. Finally, tradition (Imptrad), which should be a key indicator of CONSERV 
in the WVS, actually has a higher loading on SELF-TRANS (.379 vs. .278).18
These results argue strongly in favor of the ESS solution. The correlations among the latent 
variables for this model are displayed in Table 7. To achieve an acceptable fit (Chi
 
2 
Table 7: Correlations of the Latent Factors in the Schwartz Model 
= 961.4 
with df = 175, RMSEA = 0.050, CFI = .912), four cross-loadings have to be allowed. All 
cross-loadings are substantially smaller than the respective target loadings. Three of them are 
negative in sign. In these instances, the indicator is in a sense more distant from the side factor 
than the other indicators of the main factor. The only positive cross-loading that had to be 
allowed relates an indicator designed to measure self-enhancement (in fact, the subdimension 
of power) to the theoretically adjacent dimension of conservation. Apart from these 
deviations, however, the five latent variables are measured fairly well.  
 SELF-TRANS CONSERV SELF-ENH HE OPEN 
SELF-TRANS .221     
CONSERV .382 .531    
SELF-ENH .061 .080 .498   
HE .171 -.156 .531 .727  
OPEN .426 -.223 .620 .778 .410 
Notes: Variances in the diagonal; ESS 2004, West German sample. 
Notice that the average size of the correlations between the five values is much lower than 
those found between the seven value constructs identified by Davidov et al (2008a). 
Therefore, this conceptualization is more suitable for multiple regression models in which 
different values are simultaneously used as predictors. So we arrive at a viable, but certainly 
suboptimal, solution. 
  
                                               
18 Cronbach’s α supports the choice of ESS, too. If the standardized indicators with loadings >.4 in magnitude 
are summed up to an index of the respective values, the ESS value index always surpasses the WVS value index 
in terms of reliability. The alphas are .636 (WVS) vs. .670 (ESS) for SELF-TRANS, .418 (WVS) vs. .596 (ESS) 
for OPENESS, .533 (WVS) vs. .674 (ESS) for SELF-ENH, and .485 (WVS) vs. .694 (ESS) for SELF-TRANS. 
While α=.710 for hedonism in ESS, no alpha can be calculated in the single WVS indicator. It is true, the 
reported figures are in general not very impressive. Yet while the estimates for the ESS scores in most of the 
cases come close to .7, which is often seen as the lower bound for a suitable scale, the α reliabilities of the WVS 
indices always remain below that margin. We do not want to discuss the pros and cons of Cronbach’s α here 
because we will not use sum scores for measuring the values of Schwartz. We take the results as a further 
indication, however, that also the latent variables in SEM models would suffer from reliability problems if the 
ten items of the WVS were used for measuring even only five latent values. 
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3.3 External Validity 
The external validity of both value theories is assessed with regard to their relation to a 
selection of external variables. The selection was guided by two criteria: (1) Theoretical 
relevance for both value theories (see section 2.3). (2) (Almost) equal or similar 
measurements in the WVS and ESS (for item wordings and response scales see Appendix, 
Table A1, and Table A2). 
(a) Inglehart 
Table 8: Relationship of Survival and Traditional Values with External Variables, 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Values as Dependent Variables 
    SOCIODEMO 
 R2   Age Fem Educ 
Sum Scores       
Traditional values (TRAD) .156 
 
 .348 n.s. -.112 
Survival values (SURV) .126  .225 n.s. -.220 
Factor Scores      
Traditional values (TRAD) .120  .319 n.s. -.071 
Survival values (SURV) .092  .177 n.s. -.201 
Values as Independent Variables 
 R2  VALUES  SOCIODEMO 
 TOT ∆ VAL DEMO  TRAD SURV  Age Fem Educ 
Sum Scores           
Left-right scale .104 .059 .045  .213 .101  n.s -.147 -.096 
Political interest .156 .047 .109  .154 -.228  .169 -.158 .236 
Political activism .272 .167 .105  -.104 -.395  n.s. n.s. .144 
Openness to immigration .154 .081 .073  n.s. -.290  n.s. .116 .119 
Life satisfaction .178 .157 .021  .178 -.443  n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Church attendance .328 .210 .118  .523 -.133  .180 .118 .079 
Gender equality .145 .041 .104  -.136 -.134  -.101 .128 .157 
Factor Scores           
Left-right scale .105 .060 .045  .249 .103  n.s. -.149 -.104 
Political interest .140 .031 .109  .078 -.163  .175 -.155 .242 
Political activism .244 .139 .105  -.266 -.318  n.s. n.s. .160 
Openness to immigration .150 .077 .073  -.093 -.286  n.s. .116 .124 
Life satisfaction .249 .228 .021  .178 -.451  n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Church attendance .334 .216 .118  .490 -.041n.s.  .183 .120 .077 
Gender equality .147 .043 .104  -.183 -.142  -.095 .128 .160 
Notes: WVS 2005, West German sample, pairwise deletion of missing values; n.s. = non significant (p > .05); 
method of factor score estimation: regression; SOCIODEMO = sociodemographic variables; Fem = female; 
Educ = education; TOT = total explained variance; ∆ VAL= additional explained variance when values are 
added as independent variables into the model; DEMO = the explained variance when only sociodemographic 
variables are included as independent variables in the model; TRAD= traditional values; SURV = survival 
values. 
Table 8 reports the effects of sociodemographic variables on survival and traditional values in 
the upper part and the effect of these values on external variables when controlling for 
demographic variables in the lower part. As hypothesized, traditional values and survival 
values are related positively to age and negatively to education. In general, using values as 
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predictors of attitudes and behavior confirms the theoretically expected relationships (see 
section 2.3). The only exception is the prediction of openness to immigration. A negative 
effect of both traditional and survival values seemed plausible, but only the effect of survival 
values is significant. 
Although the effects of the Inglehart values are substantial on all external variables, there are 
noticeable differences in the predictive power of the different external variables. Survival 
values and traditional values can explain more than 20% of the variance in church attendance 
and life satisfaction and around 15% of the variance of political activism over and beyond 
sociodemographic variables. At the same time, the effect size is much lower on political 
interest, self placement on the left-right scale, and attitudes toward gender equality with 
around 5% of additional explained variance for each. For openness to immigration, the effect 
size is in the medium range with an 8% change in R2. Using factor scores (compared to 
simple sum scores) does not consistently result in higher explained variance. The R2
(b) Schwartz 
 for life 
satisfaction differs most. The model with unweighted sum scores explains only 18% of the 
variance and the model with factor scores, in contrast, explains more than 25%. 
Taking advantage of the measurement model presented above, all analyses for the Schwartz 
values were conducted in a multivariate model in an SEM framework with latent variables.19
Table 9 reports the effects of sociodemographic variables on Schwartz values in the upper 
part and the effect of these values on external variables when controlling for 
sociodemographic variables in the lower part. The effects of sociodemographic variables on 
self-transcendence and openness to change are in line with the theoretical expectations (see 
section 2.3): Age has a positive effect on self-transcendence and a negative effect on openness 
to change, education leads to the enhancement of both, and women, on average, score higher 
on self-transcendence than men. For hedonism, no effects of sociodemographic background 
variables were expected, but the analysis revealed a negative effect of age and gender on 
hedonism (with men scoring higher on hedonism). Self-enhancement, in line with the 
theoretical expectation, is higher for men, increasing with education and declining with age. 
 
                                               
19 Computations were carried using maximum likelihood estimation in AMOS 18. Detailed information on the 
model specification can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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The hypotheses for conservation are confirmed as well: Age has a positive effect, education a 
negative one. In addition, women tend to be slightly more conservative than men. 
Table 9: Relationship of the Schwartz Values with External Values, Standardized 
Regression Coefficients 
Values as Dependent Variables 
    SOCIODEMO 
 R2   Age Fem Educ 
Self-Transcendence (SELF-
 
.085 
 
 .070 .224 .203 
Conservation (CONSERV) .152  .358 .087 -.152 
Self-Enhancement (SELF-ENH) .171  -.361 -.131 .165 
Hedonism (HE) .123  -.310 -.151 n.s. 
Openness to Change (OPEN) .149  -.360 n.s. .176 
Values as Independent Variables 
 R2  VALUES  SOCIODEMO 
 TOT ∆VAL DEMO  SELF-TRANS 
CON-
SERV 
SELF-
ENH HE OPEN  Age Fem Educ 
Left-right scale .159 .108 .051  -.468 .460 -.177 n.s. .356  .143 -.037 .069 
Political interest .262 .078 .184  .307 -.212 n.s. n.s. n.s.  .211 -.211 .227 
Political activism .200 .118 .082  .366 -.328 n.s. -.086 n.s.  n.s. n.s. .161 
Openness to immigration .222 .130 .092  .494 -.274 n.s. n.s. -.180  -.257 n.s. .093 
Life satisfaction .079 .068 .011  .244 n.s. n.s. .301 -.210  n.s. n.s. .082 
Church attendance .139 .085 .054  -.198 .399 .178 .269 .390  .063 .069 n.s. 
Gender equality .273 .096 .177  .348 -.442 .172 n.s. -.206  -.211 .163 .149 
Notes: ESS 2004 (Edition 3.2, released 02-02-2011), West German sample; pairwise deletion of missing values; 
n.s. = non significant (p > .05); SOCIODEMO = sociodemographic variables, Fem = female; Educ = education; 
TOT = total explained variance; ∆ 
Evaluating the estimated relations of Schwartz values with external variables in light of the 
theoretical hypotheses we developed gives a mixed picture. As expected, self-transcendence 
values lead to a more leftist political orientation, and conservation values lead to a more 
rightist view. The hypothesis that self-enhancement values are a precursor of rightist 
orientation is clearly rejected for the West German sample, in fact the data point to the 
opposite. In addition, an unexpected positive effect of openness to change values on rightist 
views was found. The results for the prediction of “political interest” only partially match the 
theoretical expectations: Whereas the positive effect of self-transcendence is confirmed, the 
hypothesized positive effect of self-enhancement is not found and an unexpected negative 
effect of conservation values on political interest is revealed in the multivariate analyses. With 
respect to political activism, the expected positive effect of self-transcendence values and the 
expected negative effect of conservation values are supported by the data. For openness 
toward immigration, the observed negative effect of conservation values and the positive 
effect of self-transcendence values correspond to the theoretical expectations, whereas the 
analyses revealed an additional negative effect of openness to change values. In the prediction 
VAL= additional explained variance when values are added as independent 
variables into the model; DEMO = the explained variance when only sociodemographic variables are included as 
independent variables in the model. 
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of life satisfaction, only the positive effect of self-transcendence values is confirmed by our 
analysis. The expected negative effect of conservation values is no longer significant in the 
multivariate model, and openness to change values show a negative effect where we expected 
a positive effect. Contrary to the reasoning and the results of previous studies (Bilsky and 
Schwartz, 1994), we do find a relatively strong positive effect of hedonistic value orientation 
on life satisfaction. The hypotheses on church attendance only find partial support as well: 
Respondents high on conservation values go to church more often. But contrary to the 
theoretical expectation, the effect of openness to change values on church attendance is 
positive and the effect of self-transcendence is negative. In addition, we observe negative 
effects of self-enhancement and hedonism values. With respect to attitudes toward gender 
equality, the expected negative effect of conservation values and the positive effect of self-
transcendence values are supported by the data. However, contrary to the hypotheses, the 
effect of openness to change values is negative in a multivariate model. 
Some of these findings seem to unsettle widely-held premises That openness to change is 
associated with a right position, for instance, contradicts a persistent finding in Western 
democracies. It is also a near-at-hand conclusion from the value circle because openness to 
change is located opposite of conservation. Our results call all these considerations and 
findings into question because openness to change has a relatively strong positive impact 
(=.356) on the left-right scale. One might try to theoretically explain this result by 
differentiating between politics and other domains. Openness to change in the private world, it 
might be argued, must not to be mixed up with a preference for political change. Politically 
conservative people can be self-directed and open to change in the private world. To them a 
stable political system is a precondition for being open. The explanation, however, ultimately 
undermines the idea that values are overarching and not domain-specific orientations. Before 
we follow this line of reasoning, however, we better look for alternative, in particular also 
statistical reasons which may have produced the result. We have already pointed out in 
section 2.3 that opposite values need not have opposite effects if the value space actually has 
more than two dimensions. This, however, is the case as the correlations in Table 7 show. 
Nowhere do we detect correlations of -1 for opposite values. The values are also not evenly 
distributed in the two-dimensional space. Three of them – self-enhancement, hedonism, and 
openness – cluster closely together with inter-correlations above .5 while conservation is 
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located farther away from this cluster.20
We are confronted with another type of problem which is known from the discussion of 
suppressor effects: The sign of the effect of X on Y may change when a third variable Z is 
additionally included in the analysis. Openness to change displays the theoretically expected 
negative correlation with the left-right scale – not very strong but significant (r = -.10). In the 
multivariate analysis this negative correlation is decomposed into a direct effect and a larger 
number of indirect relationships. Let us focus for the moment on only one additional variable, 
namely, self-transcendence, and let us further assume that the impact of -.468 on the left-right 
scale in Table 7 were a correlation. The correlation between the two values is .442
 As a consequence, the effects of all five values on the 
dependent variables are identified. Some of the correlations in Table 7 are fairly high but not 
high enough to cause multicollinearity problems. 
21 and the 
indirect relationship between openness to change and the left-right scale via self-
transcendence were -.468x.442 ≈-0.20. The effect of openness to change on the left-right scale 
were about +0.13 (≈ (-.10+.20)/(1-.4422)).22 The indirect effect via self-transcendence would 
have transformed the negative correlation into a positive effect. Actually, the correlation 
between self-transcendence and left-right-self-placement is lower (= -.130) but in principle 
the same logic applies: Not just one but several indirect relations of openness to change with 
the left-right self-placement contribute to a negative relationship – for example, the paths via 
self-enhancement and conservation, leaving the additional paths via the demographic 
variables aside.23
                                               
20 Furthermore, self-enhancement and openness, for example, should correlate more strongly with their 
immediate neighbor, hedonism, than with each other. Actually, self-enhancement correlates higher with 
openness (r = .620) than with hedonism (r = .531). 
 As the sum of all indirect relationships is much below -.10, they have to be 
counterbalanced, so to speak, by a fairly strong positive effect of openness to change on the 
dependent variable in order to reproduce a weak negative correlation. The inclusion of other 
values destroys a theoretically plausible relationship in that it turns a theoretically expected 
21 It is in the model with all exogenous variables marginally higher than in Table 7 (0.426). Self-enhancement 
also displays slightly different correlations with self-transcendence (.083 instead of .061) and with conservation 
(.069 instead of .080). All other correlations differ only at the third digit. OPEN with SELF-TRANS: .426 / .442 
22 In the three-variable case, the standardized regression coefficient is: ßLO =(rOL – rLT*rOT)/(1- rOT2) where rOL 
and rTL are the correlations of the left-right self-placement scale (L) with openness to change (O) and self-
transcendence (T), respectively, and rOT is the correlation between the latter two values.  
23 Openness to change displays a positive correlation with the first two values and a negative with the third (see 
Table 7). Self-transcendence and self-enhancement have a negative effect on the left-right scale and conservation 
has a positive effect (see Table 9).  
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negative correlation into a theoretically unexpected positive effect. The precise conditions can 
be easily stated for models with only two independent variables, while they are somewhat 
more complicated for larger models. Relatively small changes in the correlation coefficients, 
in any case, can result in fairly large changes of the regression effects. And these small 
changes already can occur if indicators are confounded. Two of the indicators of self-
transcendence, for instance, are relatively close to leftist positions in Germany: Equal 
opportunities (ipeqopt) is a major concern of the traditional left and looking after the 
environment (impenv) a major concern of the new left. The measurement may have a slight 
political bias and inflate the correlation between self-transcendence and the left-right scale. As 
a further consequence it can also distort the effect of openness to change.  
There are other theoretically unexpected effects which are less counterintuitive. The negative 
effect of age on hedonism, for example, is consistent with the results of studies on 
generational change which have shown that younger German generations have become more 
materialistic and hedonistic than the preceding so-called postmaterialistic generations. We 
hesitate to interpret these theoretically more plausible findings as conclusive evidence as long 
as the doubts about our structural model persist. We have to wait and see whether our findings 
can be replicated and confirmed by other studies. 
3.4 Summary: Inglehart vs. Schwartz 
On balance there are three dependent variables for which all expected theoretical relations are 
confirmed (political interest, political activism, attitudes toward immigrants), but for the other 
five dependent variables, the equations contain not only unexpected effects but empirical 
findings that clearly contradict the theoretical expectations. A count of confirmed vs. rejected 
hypotheses yields 100% (6 of 6) correct predictions for the relation of Inglehart values and 
sociodemographic variables vs. 80% for the Schwartz values (12 of 15). The theoretically 
expected relationships with independent variables were confirmed for 71% (10 of 14) in the 
Inglehart case and for 57% (20 of 35) in the Schwartz case. Thus, in terms of correct 
predications, postmodernization theory performs better than the theory of basic human values. 
The effects of Schwartz values are substantial for all external variables. The predictive power 
is lowest for life satisfaction (∆R 2 = 7%) and highest for openness to immigration (∆R 2 
The theoretically derived hypotheses for Inglehart values were supported by the data very 
well. In the case of Schwartz values, the results were mixed. Some hypotheses could be 
= 
13%). For all other external variables chosen, Schwartz values can explain around 10% of 
variance above and beyond the sociodemographic variables. 
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confirmed, others were rejected, and still other relationships that were not anticipated became 
apparent in the data. 
The predictive power of the Schwartz values can partly be attributed to theoretically 
unexpected effects and may have been increased by the correction of attenuation which we 
could perform in the covariance structure model. In order to retain an acceptable fit of this 
model we had to create a new set of values – values which are similar to those of other 
studies, because they are based on the same set of indicators, but which are equivalent neither 
with the ten nor with the seven nor with other sets of values which have been identified in 
other studies so far. We also had to accept theoretically unexpected cross-loadings. 
Furthermore, several of our predictor variables had theoretically unexpected effects, this is 
particularly true for openness to change. Had we based our predictions in Table 9 only on 
those values which actually have the theoretically expected effect denoted in Table 4, the R-
squares in Table 9 would almost certainly have decreased considerably. Though it may be 
misleading to qualify R2 
The partial success of postmodernization theory in explaining “church attendance”, “political 
activism”, and “life satisfaction” is related to a different problem. Technically speaking, 
Inglehart includes indicators in the measurement instruments of value orientations which are 
strongly related to or confounded with external variables. If, for example, the item Importance 
of God is used as an indicator of traditional values, it is not surprising at all that the value 
index correlates highly, say, with church attendance. This is sometimes called a tautological 
explanation. We do not use this expression, first because it is not tautological in a strict sense, 
second because the appeal to a tautology in empirical research is often conceived as an insult, 
and third because the problem can be easily explained without bitter remarks: We would 
strongly overestimate the influence of the value orientation if we do not specify a direct or 
indirect relationship
under these conditions as a measure of predictive power, our 
exploratory strategy has at least the advantage that we can also detect those effects of values 
which theoretically were not expected.  
24
                                               
24 In the example of church attendance we may either say that importance of God has a direct impact on church 
attendance because strong believers also participate more often (direct effect), or we may specify church 
attendance and importance of God as indicators of a further latent variable, i.e., religiosity. 
 between the confounded indicator and the respective external variable. 
Typical symptoms of the problem are that a value indicator correlates higher with external 
variables than with other value indicators or that the best value indicator does not consistently 
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display the highest correlation with external variables. The latter problem occurs in the 
Schwartz model, too, but in Inglehart’s measurement model these distortions are much 
stronger. “Happiness” and “signing a petition” are indicators of survival vs. self-expression 
values which in turn should explain life satisfaction and political activism. Happiness and life 
satisfaction, however, can be seen as indicators of well-being and “signing a petition” an 
indicator of political activism. Even though we did not include “signing a petition” into the 
index calculation of political activism, the problem remains that the value indicator is directly 
linked to political activism and not only indirectly via the value. Therefore, some of the 
effects are probably overestimated. Nevertheless, the encompassing theoretical framework 
and the large set of empirically confirmed hypotheses is the strength of Inglehart’s values 
theory. It is the result of a long and fruitful research that has always tried to understand and to 
explain value change as well as cultural change. Schwartz, on the other hand, has invested 
time and energy in the elaboration of a coherent value system and its operationalizations. He 
conceptualizes values as trans-situational goals or general guidelines that impact on more 
specific attitudes. That they can explain attitudes toward various objects has been shown in 
our analysis. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
Theories of values and value change help us to understand differences between individuals 
and cultures. Yet social scientists have identified so many values during the last decades that 
the question arises of whether we really need them all. From this perspective, the two, 
presently, most prominent micro-level value theories have been investigated - the value 
theories proposed by Shalom Schwartz and Ronald Inglehart.  
The World Value Survey 2005 includes all items for measuring the values put forth by 
Inglehart but only ten indicators for the values put forth by Schwartz. We have shown that the 
latter set of items is much too small to measure ten or five broadly defined values reliably. 
The European Social Survey 2004 includes 21 items of Schwartz’ Portrait Value 
Questionnaire and is better suited for that purpose but it contains none of Inglehart’s value 
indicators. Therefore, we had to use two different surveys for our comparisons, the World 
Value Survey 2005 and the European Social Survey ESS 2004. Comparisons of the internal 
and external validity of both theories were only possible across surveys. The analyses of 
Inglehart’s values were performed with the WVS data, the analyses of the Schwartz’ values 
with the ESS data.  
110 
Space constraints as well as the lack of comparable indicators in both datasets did not allow 
the analysis of more than seven external variables which are predicted by both theories. 
Therefore, near at hand is the objection that we did not choose the correct ones thereby 
leading us to not correctly assess the strengths of the theories. It could also be argued that we 
misunderstood the theory and derived false hypotheses. However, and to the best of our 
knowledge, we have focused on external relationships in the present analyses that are either 
well established or at least under discussion.  
Though the corresponding external variables always have a similar meaning in both surveys, 
most of them are operationalized in different ways. The better measurement quality of the 
ESS items as well the application of different statistical models may have may have shifted 
the odds slightly in favor of the theory of Shalom Schwartz. Moreover, our analysis was 
confined to West Germany – the only region in which we could approximately replicate 
Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) factor pattern using the data from the WVS 2005. A final 
objection could be the fact that our models were much too simple as far as the relationships 
with external variables are concerned, in particular, the relationships between a value 
orientation and reported behavior. In the present analysis we followed the common practice in 
which direct effects of values are specified on attitude and behavior. 
There are no doubts that the present study has room for improvement. Nevertheless, our 
analysis provides, by and large, an adequate description of the present state of the two value 
theories. Owing to Ronald Inglehart we have an important theory of value change which helps 
us to understand the ongoing changes in attitudes and behavior in the west and east. His 
theory makes relatively clear predictions about what will happen in countries like China or 
India if the economic growth should continue. During the last decades he has elaborated the 
relationship between values and external variables and, thereby, met the expectations of 
sociologists and political scientists, who are at least as much interested in their predictive 
power as in the values themselves. This also became apparent in the empirical analysis, where 
we could predict the effects in most of the cases correctly. The micro-level effects are 
significant but markedly smaller than the corresponding macro-level effects, and they are 
partially inflated by confounded indicators – indicators which are directly related to external 
variables.  
Inglehart’s theory is persuasive because it is parsimonious and informative; Schwartz’ theory 
is persuasive because its measurement instruments are theoretically derived. The idea of 
Schwartz that there are more than four values conceptualized as the poles of two orthogonal 
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dimensions is probably shared by many other scientists. It is also plausible that some values 
are more closely related to each other than others. It is a challenging task, however, to 
reconcile such a model with the requirements of classical measurement theory, which places 
an emphasis on discriminant validity and prefers pure over confounded indicators with cross-
loadings. Empirical research has made a big step forward during the last years, however, and 
this was also the reason why we could specify an acceptably fitting model with five values, 
which are similar to those in other published models. As a psychologist, Schwartz was much 
more concerned with the internal structure of his value system than Inglehart. Accordingly, it 
is not easy to derive hypotheses about the effects of values on attitudes and behavior from the 
theory of Schwartz. In this respect, the two-dimensional charts with the value circle can be 
misleading. Opposite values, for instance, do not always have opposite effects on external 
variables. Similar to suppressor variables, highly correlated adjacent values can completely 
change the signs of effects so that, as in our analyses, conservation and openness to change 
have the same effect on political orientations. Suppressor variables are usually discussed 
under the perspective that their omission has theoretically unpleasant effects. In our study, 
however, exactly the opposite is the case: The inclusion of adjacent values has turned the 
theoretically plausible negative correlation of openness to change and the left-right scale into 
a positive effect. A general lesson to be learned here is that small biases in the value 
measurement can dramatically change the effects of highly intercorrelated values on external 
variables and that a circular value structure is particular sensitive to this problem. This is one 
of the reasons why quite a few of these hypotheses were disconfirmed. So far the research on 
the relations with external variables seems to be in an exploratory stage.  
Overall, both theories still are in a developmental stage. They both lack desirable 
methodological qualities. For the adherents of the theory of Inglehart it is a prior task to 
present reliable and valid measurement instruments. The traditional/secular-rational 
dimension in particular has not only to be more adequately operationalized but also deeper 
embedded in the theory. As far as the theory of Schwartz is concerned, the theory has to be 
elaborated especially in specifying more precisely the predictions concerning attitudes and 
behavior. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Measurement of the external variables, ESS 2004 
Age And in what year were you born? 
Gender Observation coding 
Education 
What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
1 = Primary or first stage of basic, 2 = lower secondary or second stage of basic, 3 = 
upper secondary, 4 = post secondary, non-tertiary, 5 = first stage of tertiary,  
6 = second stage of tertiary 
LEFT-RIGHT SCALE In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? (polintr) 
POLITICAL 
INTEREST 
How interested would you say you are in politics –are you… 
1 = very interested, 4 = not at all interested? (polintr) 
POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM 
Additive index of 7 dichotomous items: Contacted politician or government official last 
12 months (contplt), Worked in political party or action group last 12 months (wrkprty), 
Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months (wrkorg), Worn or 
displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months (badge), Signed petition last 12 months 
(sgnptit), Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months (pbldmn), Boycotted 
certain products last 12 months (bctprd), 1=yes, 2=no 
OPENNESS TO 
IMMIGRATION 
CFA measurement model, 3 indicators: To what extent do you think [country] should
 
allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country’s] people to come and 
live here? (imsmetn), How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most 
[country] people? (imdfetn), How about people from the poorer countries outside 
Europe? (eimrcnt), 1 = allow many to come and live here – 4 = allow none 
LIFE 
SATISFACTION  
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
(stflife) 1=extremely unsatisfied, 10=extremely satisfied 
CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE 
Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you 
attend religious services nowadays? 1=every day, 7=never 
ATTITUDES 
TOWARD GENDER 
EQUALITY 
Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce (mnrgtjb) 
1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly 
Notes: The variable names in parentheses are those used in the original data set. 
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Table A2 
Measurement of the external variables, WVS 2005 
Age 
Can you tell me your year of birth, please? (V236), This means you are ____ years old. 
(V237) 
Gender Observation coding (V235). 
Education 
What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (V138) 
1 = no formal education, 2 = incomplete primary school, 3 = complete primary school,  
4 = incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 5 = complete secondary 
school: technical/vocational type, 6 = incomplete secondary: university-preparatory 
type, 7 = complete secondary: university-preparatory type, 8 = some university-level 
education, without degree, 9 = university-level education, with degree 
LEFT-RIGHT SCALE In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (V114) 1=left, 10=right 
POLITICAL 
INTEREST 
How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you …  
1 very interested, 2 somewhat interested, 3 not very interested, 4 Not at all interested 
(V95) 
POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM 
Additive index of 2 items: Joining in boycotts (V97), Attending peaceful demonstrations 
(V98), 1=have done, 2=might do, 3=would never do 
OPENNESS TO 
IMMIGRATION 
How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the 
following do you think the government should do? (V124) 
1 Let anyone come who wants to, 2 Let people come as long as there are jobs available, 
3 Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here, 4 Prohibit people 
coming here from other countries 
LIFE 
SATISFACTION  
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using 
this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are 
“completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? 
(V22). 1 Completely dissatisfied, 10 Completely satisfied 
CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE 
Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services 
these days? (V186.)1=more than once a week, 7=never, practically never 
 
GENDER EQUALITY When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women (V44) 1=agree, 2=neither, 3=disagree 
Notes: The variable names in parentheses are those used in the original data set. 
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The Concept of European Identity: Overused and Underspecified? 
 
Introduction 
Strengthening its citizens’ identification with the process of European integration in general 
and with EU institutions and policies in particular has become one of the major challenges for 
the European Union today. The increasing diversification of European societies, a result of 
processes of globalisation and new kinds of differentiation and migration, forces political 
actors at different levels – local, regional, national and EU – to address issues of citizenship 
and identity as a means to counteract social conflict and the fragmentation of societies. 
Identity politics on the European level, i.e. attempts to create a collective identity through a 
redefinition of loyalties and attachments, aims at enhancing a consciousness of being 
European and thus at creating enduring forms of political and social integration.1
To gain information about the impact and extent of the identity building process with regard 
to the EU, the European Commission (EC) has been monitoring the evolution of public 
opinion in the Member States through surveys such as the Eurobarometer series, launched in 
1973.
 
2
                                               
1 Examples of contemporary European ‘identity engineering’ (Eriksen 2002) are for instance the euro-banknotes, 
the European flag, the anthem, 9th May as Europe Day and the motto of the EU ‘United in diversity’. 
 These studies are relevant to the preparation of texts, decision-making and the 
evaluation of European institutions’ achievements. They inform policy makers, academics 
and media about people's expectations and concerns regarding Europe, their political 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (Wallström 2006). There is evidence of a broad consensus 
within the EC regarding the importance of opinion polling in the making of European 
democracy. Institutionalizing its integrative purpose in this sense promotes the emergence of a 
European political identity that could underpin trust in European institutions and policies and 
stimulate citizens’ participation in the European political process. The importance of opinion 
polls and media monitoring has increased as has the tendency of citizens to withdraw from 
traditional politics (Commission of the European Communities 2006). ‘Understanding 
European public opinion’ has therefore become one of the key targets as defined in the White 
2 For details see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
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Paper on a European Communication Policy.3 Recently, some alarming events (continuously 
decreasing acceptance of the EU in the member states, declining turnout at the elections to the 
European Parliament, the rejection of the draft for an EU constitution in France and the 
Netherlands) encouraged ‘bottom-up‘ approaches like the "European Citizens’ Consultations" 
in 2007 and 2009, which aim at “closing the gap between the EU and its citizen by providing 
a platform for pan-European dialogue on the challenges facing the EU”.4
The concept of national and/or supra-national (i.e. collective) identity has also been the 
subject of many scholarly debates; it has been used both as an exogenous and as an 
endogenous dimension within different analytical frameworks. However, the notion of 
European identity as a concept may express several meanings. Some scholars frame European 
identity as a cosmopolitan orientation (Beck and Grande 2004, Delanty 2005), others advocate 
the development of a “post-national constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1998), and still 
others talk about “the cultural values of Europe” (Joas & Wiegandt 2006). In particular, 
previous research has addressed the conceptualisation and determinants of individual national 
or supra-national identifications, and the interrelations between such individual identifications 
and forms of political trust, political participation and exclusionary reactions towards out-
groups e.g. ethnic minorities and immigrants (McLaren 2006; Blank and Schmidt 2003; 
Coenders and Scheepers 2003). 
 
Since identification with the European Union is seen as an essential prerequisite of sustaining 
the EU as a political entity and lending it greater popular support than it is enjoying at present 
and since European identity constitutes a core concept not only in political and scholarly 
debates but also in opinion polls and research programmes such as the Eurobarometer (EB), 
the European Value Survey (EVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), it 
is of particular importance to regularly assess and adapt its conceptualizations and its 
measures. Notwithstanding the high-level of methodological consciousness within the above 
cited international data collection programmes, end-users of these data regularly insist on the 
need for more appropriate indicators for policy and comparative research. Yet, applying the 
concept of European identity presupposes sufficient information on what that identity consists 
                                               
3 The aim of the 2006 EC White Paper was the development of strategies for bridging the gap between the 
institutions of the EU and its citizens and the presentation of a broad range of techniques to better appraise 
European public opinion. 
4 For details see http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu/ 
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of, how it evolves over time and how different groups of Europeans share different aspects of 
European identity. 
This research note aims to present a short synopsis of some recently developed insights about 
deficiencies in existing conceptualizations and measurements of European identity. In the first 
part we briefly discuss several theoretical approaches to European identity. In the second part 
we focus on current measurements of the concept and their potential flaws. Based on the 
analysis of 18 cognitive interviews conducted in Austria in 2003 and 2005 we also outline 
probable sources of measurement error with regard to the indicator of identification with 
Europe applied in the ISSP surveys 1995 and 2003. The paper ends with a short reflection on 
necessary prerequisites in the development of reliable and valid indicators of European 
identity for future research. 
Conceptualizing European Identity 
The idea that the capacity of the EU for ‘identity building’ is important to its effort to go 
beyond its technical/functional character and prove its strength as a social and political 
framework brings up the cognitive and normative dimensions of the ‘identity building’ 
process (Laffan 2004: 79). “A normative lens on ‘identity building’ highlights the potential 
significance of shared values, norms and new roles in the European Union. A cognitive lens 
draws our attention to the importance of symbolic representations of the world” (Laffan 
2004: 78). At the same time, the growing “Europeanization of social relations” (Delanty and 
Rumford 2005: 54) has increased the possibilities for Europeans to construct and re-construct 
multiple local, regional, national and supra-national identifications. Following Tilly’s 
approach of relational realism (2002), identities are social representations of social relations 
and can be defined as “an actor’s experience of a category, tie, role, network, group, or 
organization, coupled with a public representation of that experience; the public 
representation often takes the form of a shared story, a narrative” (Tilly 2002: 80). Abdelal 
et al. (2006) specify four non-mutually-exclusive types of content regarding the meaning of 
collective identity and therefore distinguish not only between a normative and a cognitive 
dimension but also between a relational and a purposive content (cf. Table 1). 
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Table 1: Types of content of collective identities (Abdelal et al. 2006) 
Constitutive norms 
(normative content) Norms or rules that define group membership 
Social purposes 
(purposive content) Goals or purposes shared by an identity group 
Relational comparisons 
(relational content) 
Views and beliefs about other identities or groups, which are shared by an identity 
group 
Cognitive models 
(cognitive content) 
World views or understandings of political and material conditions and interests, which 
are shared by an identity group 
The constitutive norms represent distinct practices associated with the process of identity 
building and the rules of membership in a specific collectivity. They can be formally encoded 
or informally enhanced. The content of a collective identity may be purposive when it is 
associated with certain collective goals, preferences and interests. Eriksen also describes 
identity formation on the EU level as conditional on individual or collective perceptions of 
utility: “... enthusiasm for European integration is greatest in the poorest regions and among 
political elites, which may for different reasons reap the greatest economic and political 
benefits” (2002: 75). The content of a collective identity is relational in the sense that it 
entails comparisons with and references to other collective identities, groups or historic 
periods. The cognitive content refers to world views, i.e. shared epistemological or 
ontological models. Following Abdelal et al. (2006), these contents are socially constructed 
and their meaning is always contested. 
Some scholars suggest that analysis concerning individual identification with the EU should 
focus more on its social and political consequences, e.g. its effects on individual attitudes 
toward diversity and migration and not primarily on the definition of identity. Unfortunately, 
there is no consensus about the direction and the size of the effects of identification with the 
EU or with Europe on attitudes towards so-called others in the literature. Following some of 
the theoretical arguments, we might expect both a positive and a negative effect of 
identification with Europe on attitudes toward out-groups. On the one hand, scholars who 
frame European identity as cosmopolitan orientation (Beck & Grande 2004, Delanty 2005) 
would argue that identification with Europe is intrinsically linked with tolerance and liberal 
democratic attitudes. On the other hand, if we follow the line of reasoning within Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel 1978), we would expect that processes of self-identification, self-
categorization and social comparison may result in in-group bias, i.e. identification with 
Europe would lead to devaluation of individuals, groups, collectivities that are perceived as 
belonging to subjectively defined out-groups. Table 2 summarizes empirical studies that refer 
to identification with Europe as an explanatory variable for attitudes towards out-groups. The 
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results of these studies also point to differential direction of effects: some studies confirm a 
positive relationship between identification with Europe and tolerance towards different out-
groups while others find a negative effect. Licata and Klein (2002) e.g. present evidence that 
identification with Europe decreases the tolerance towards foreign residents. The authors 
explain this finding with the specific subjective definition of foreignness in Belgium, in that 
foreign residents from non-European countries in Belgium are generally perceived as 
belonging to the out-group. In a series of experiments Mummendey, Waldzus and colleagues 
demonstrate that the negative effect of identification with Europe on attitudes towards out-
groups can be explained by in-group projection. When respondents perceive their own 
nationality (e.g. being German) as a requisite for being European (the superordinate category), 
the social distance to so-called others, e.g. Poles, increases. This means, that individual 
identification with Europe leads to devaluation of out-groups when it is constructed from a 
national perspective. 
Table 2: European Identity as a Variable. The relation with attitudes towards out-
groups 
Study Design, Data Independent 
Var. 
Dependent 
Var. 
Control / Manipulated 
Var. 
Effect 
Licata and Klein 
(2002) 
 
Self-administered 
questionnaire, N=313, student 
sample, Belgium 
Identification 
with Europe 
tolerance 
towards 
resident 
foreigners 
National identification, 
political orientation 
- 
Mummendey 
and Waldzus 
(2004) Waldzus 
et al. (2003) 
Waldzus and 
Mummendey 
(2004) 
Several laboratory and web-
based experiments, N=63, 
N=121, N=40 
Dual 
identification: 
Europe and 
nation 
 
Evaluation of 
the out-group 
(other 
European 
nationality) 
Complexity of the 
representation of 
superordinate category, 
similarity of in-group and 
out-group, relative 
prototypicality of the in-
group 
- 
conditional 
on in-group 
projection 
Citrin and Sides 
(2004) 
Eurobarometer 53.0 (2000) Identification 
with Europe 
Attitudes 
towards 
minorities 
Extensive multivariate 
control: national 
identification, age, gender, 
education, income, 
ideology, minority status 
etc. 
+ 
Quintelier and 
Dejaeghere 
(2008) 
Belgian Youth Survey 2006, 
16 year old Belgians, N=4443 
Feeling of 
belonging to 
the EU 
Tolerance Gender, education, contact 
with minorities, 
+ 
Fuß (2006) Regional samples of young 
adults (18-24) in Chemnitz 
and Bielefeld, Germany, 
N=2x400 
European 
Identity 
Attitudes to 
cultural/ 
national 
diversity 
National identity + 
 
Delanty and Rumford (2005: 51) point to the complexity of the identity building process and 
emphasize four salient aspects of identity, which should be considered in any discussion of 
the concept and which also summarize both the arguments made until now and the most up-
to-date findings with regard to identity: 1) identity arises only in relation to social action and 
is processual or constructed, 2) identities have a narrative dimension which pertains its 
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performative and public aspect, i.e. identity can be conceived as a discursive mode of self-
understanding. Thus, the role of language becomes significant for the shaping of identities; 3) 
identities are constructed at the interface between self-images and images of the other and in 
this sense they are based on the creation of difference and commonality; they exist in a 
relational context which under the conditions of modernity entails reflexivity; 4) identities can 
be overlapping (as in hyphenated identities), nested, cross-cutting, mixed (or hybrid) or co-
existent. Following the latter, identifications with the European Union are not necessarily 
incompatible with local, regional, national or ethnic identities (cf. also Eriksen 2002: 76). 
Yet, European identity has been primarily conceptualised and measured in opposition to 
national identity or solely as attachment to the EU, and the existence of multiple attachments 
and their gradual, relational and discursive (performative) character has not yet been 
sufficiently taken into account. As a result, deficiencies in conceptualizing European identity 
will particularly influence the quality of its measurement and consequently the ability to draw 
conclusions about social reality. EB and other relevant surveys such as the European Social 
Survey (ESS), ISSP, EVS etc. might make more substantial contributions to the knowledge 
base of European policy makers, if the validity and cross-cultural equivalence of the 
measurements of European identity are thoroughly developed and continually optimized. 
Measuring European identity and its deficiencies 
The theoretical and empirical approaches discussed so far exemplify that “the notion of 
identity means quite different things to different people, and even when the concept is 
commonly defined, measuring it remains extremely difficult” (Hermann and Brewer 2004: 4). 
Despite the fact that there has been a constant effort to improve the quality and significance of 
European identity indicators, there is considerable evidence suggesting a theory-driven 
reassessment of the methodology that has been used so far. What is missing is a theoretical 
and methodological update for a variety of indicators such as emerging multiple identities, EU 
scepticism and public preferences concerning policy ends. Table A1 in the appendix presents 
the operationalizations of identification with Europe/EU in the studies discussed above. 
Although most of them use multiple indicators they refer to identification with Europe as a 
one-dimensional concept. The differences between the applied measures are rather a matter of 
degree than of conceptual dissimilarity. Many items refer to “feeling”, “feeling attached” or 
“being proud of”, i.e. to emotional attachment. Still others, including the one used in 
Eurobarometer until 2008, ask about “being” or “seeing oneself”, i.e. about self-conception or 
self-categorization as European. A partial exception is the European Citizenship Scale by 
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Quintelier and Dejaeghere (2008), which covers the political dimension of the identification 
with Europe. Other authors occasionally use the term European citizen in their 
operationalizations. 
Nevertheless, in most of the studies the terms Europe, EU and European are used without 
explicitly specified meanings. Given the contested nature of what European identity ought to 
be, this is highly problematic. The relation between identification with Europe/EU and 
exclusionist attitudes will largely depend on whether respondents frame it as cosmopolitan 
and democratic or whether Europe is seen as a fortress against immigration. It must however 
been born in mind that opting for a liberal and democratic Europe may still go hand in hand 
with an endorsement of Europe as a fortress (in the sense that the benefits of the Union should 
stay inside its borders). 
In the following we exemplify some of the problems that might arise, at least in the Austrian 
context, if one applies the 1995/2003 ISSP item (cf. Table A1) as a measurement of 
identification with Europe. Our analysis is based on qualitative material from 18 cognitive 
interviews with Austrian citizens, carried out between 2003 and 2005 (6 in 2003 and 12 in 
2005).5
The focus in the analysis in this paper is on the subjective definitions of the term Europe and 
how respondents construe their European identification while answering the ISSP question: 
 Since the early 1980s, cognitive interviewing has become indispensable in the 
development and testing of survey questionnaires (Willis 2005, Tourangeau 1984). It must be 
said, however, that a reformulation of items based on cognitive pre-tests does not necessarily 
lead to indicators that are more valid (see e.g. Schüßler and Schmidt 2008). Reformulated 
items have to be re-tested as well. In an earlier multi-method study, which aimed at assessing 
the measurement quality of the ISSP items measuring national pride and which used the same 
qualitative material, Latcheva (2009) has shown that respondents adopt different perspectives 
while answering the same questions and that this generates incomparability of answers to the 
extent that respondents with diametrically opposed attitudes opt for the same response 
category. Moreover, it appears that different respondents attribute different meanings to key 
terms (e.g. democracy, history), which in turn results in a significant amount of measurement 
error or in missing data. 
                                               
5 Respondents were selected along the following criteria: gender, age (<=30; 31-55; =>56), education 
(with/without university entrance qualification) and urban vs. rural context. For more details on design and an 
example of an integrated analysis of cognitive interviews and factor analytic techniques, see also Latcheva 2009. 
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“How close do you feel to Europe?” and the probes that follow the original question. For this 
specific item, we applied two cognitive techniques: category selection probing for the original 
ISSP question (e.g. “Why did you select this answer category?”) and special comprehension 
probing (e.g. “What does Europe mean to you?”). A very brief summary of the varying 
perspectives that our respondents adopted when answering these questions is presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Perspectives respondents adopted when answering the questions 
How close do you feel to Europe 
very close to close feeling due to: 
perceptions of common mentality; common ideas; a common social policy; 
the community per se; the diversity of Europe; the nearness of different 
countries, freedom of mobility  
not so close or not close at all feeling due to: 
“What is meant by Europe anyway?”; Europe is just an idea, an abstract 
construction but not a fact; Europe as a political formation; Europe is too 
global and for that reason not able to inspire any emotional attachment;  
Subjective definitions of the term 
‘Europe’  
Europe defined as: 
a continent; Europe=EU; Europe as a Lebenswelt; a beautiful land; home; 
an entity with a common historical and religious background; just a few, 
hardly connected countries; just a vague idea 
Positive feelings towards Europe are based both on what Europe represents as an overall 
entity and on its diversity: on the one hand, the respondents name the common ideas, a 
common social policy and the community as a whole (so referring to Europe in the sense of 
the EU); on the other hand, the answers are related to the diversity of languages, peoples, 
cuisines, landscapes. Not so close or not at all close feelings towards Europe derive from the 
attitude that Europe is seen just as vague idea or as a more or less artificial or constructed, not 
a historically grown entity. The decision in favour of a certain answer category often depends 
on comparison with other countries, continents, groups or points in time. This way of 
reasoning corresponds to the relational content of a collective identity outlined by Abdelal et 
al. (2006, cf. Table 1) and to Tajfel’s (1978) definition of social identity since most of the 
respondents emphasize the positive aspects of specific groups, countries or continents they 
feel close to while slightly devaluating all those categorized as others. Two specific findings 
are of particular importance with regard to the ISSP item “How close do you feel to 
Europe?”: 1) the definition of the term Europe is too broad and unspecific – this produces 
variance in the question’s interpretation (i.e. not a valid variance) and also item-non-response 
(i.e. selection of “can’t choose” as an answer); 2) the term “close to” introduces an emotional 
note that some of our respondents felt is inappropriate with regard to Europe or the EU. This 
diminishes the quality of the answers and the respondents’ motivation to conduct the 
necessary cognitive work. 
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We observed also numerous subjective definitions of Europe, which conceive of Europe as a 
continent, as identical to the EU, as Lebenswelt and an entity, but also as a vague idea or 
skeletal formation, and which are strongly suggestive of the answers to the question of how 
close one feels to Europe. Although some of the respondents explicitly decided to see 
themselves either as European or
Conclusions 
 as Austrian, the measurement of European identification in 
contrast to national identification, i.e. using a dichotomy instead of allowing multiplicity and 
degree of individual attachments, seems at least inappropriate. 
The 18 cognitive protocols suggest that identification with Europe is, as opposed to that with 
a nation, based on rationale, utility and content rather than on emotion. Thus, being a member 
of a specific ethnic or religious group does not preclude being Austrian; and being Austrian 
does not preclude being European etc. Hermann and Brewer (2004) argue that the difficulty to 
measure identity arises from the fact that people belong to several communities 
simultaneously and the relative significance of these attachments can change over time and 
space and according to social context and the issues or the contents addressed in it. Since most 
indicators within the surveys cited in this paper consist of deduced measurements of the 
underlying theoretical concept European identity and since a variety of significant theoretical 
differentiations have been introduced in recent years, it seems appropriate to make this 
progress fruitful for a continuous improvement of the standard indicators and scales that have 
been used to measure European identity so far. 
According to our results we can summarize that new indicators which depict multiple contents 
and relational contexts in the measurement of individual identification with Europe and which 
build on e.g. public preferences with regard to policy ends, membership, benefits, merits, 
values and norms, but not on distilled emotional components (as in the measurement of 
national identification), are to be strongly recommended (cf. also Schmitt 2003: 248). Since 
such a set of indicators is more likely to cover the social representations of Europe or of being 
European, they might yield new, high-quality evidence on the development of European 
identity across the EU and its significance for strengthening individuals’ trust in European 
institutions and the policy making process on the EU level. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Measures of identification with Europe 
Licata and Klein (2002): 9 item scale 
1. “I feel attached to the European ground.” 
2. “I would miss Europe if I had to leave it.” 
3. “My destiny is linked with that of other Europeans.” 
4. “I feel solidarity with all the other Europeans.” 
5. “I am proud to tell my friend that I am European.” 
6. “There is no reason to be proud to be European.” 
7. “Being European is something I rarely think about.” 
8. “I don’t have clear feelings about the fact that I am European.” 
9. “Most of the time I like to think about myself as a European.” 
[1 “totally disagree” - 11 “totally agree”] 
Mummendey and Waldzus (2004), Waldzus et al. (2003), Waldzus and Mummendey (2004): 6 item scale 
1. “I identify with Europeans.’’ 
2. ‘‘I have a negative attitude towards Europe.’’ 
3. ‘‘I consider myself to belong to Europeans.’’ 
4. ‘‘I like being European.’’ 
5. ‘‘I feel like a European.’’ 
6. ‘‘I feel sceptical about a European identity”.’ 
[1 “not at all” - 5 “very much”] 
Quintelier and Dejaeghere (2008): 4 item ’’European Citizenship Scale” 
1. “How much trust do you have in the European Parliament?” 
2. “How far-reaching or important are the decisions of the European Union for your daily life?” 
3. “I consider myself in the first place a European citizen.” 
4. “Thanks to the European Union I feel myself a full citizen of Europe.” 
[Response scale: not documented in Quintelier and Dejaeghere (2008)] 
Fuß (2006): 3 items, Confirmatory Factor Analysis measurement model 
1. “Now I would like to ask about the strength of how you feel about being different sort of nationality? On a scale of 0-4 
how do you feel about being ... “European” 
[0 “no feeling at all” - 4 “very strong feeling” 
2. “How would you rate the importance of the following in terms of who you are, that is, how you feel or think about 
yourself as a person?” ... “being a citizen of the European Union” 
[0 “not at all important - 4 “very important”] 
3. “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their city, town or village, to their region, to their country or to 
Europe. Thinking about your own attachment, and using the scale on this card, please tell me how attached you feel, to”   
... “Europe” 
[0 “not at all attached” - 4 “completely attached”] 
Eurobarometer (EB) 
EB 53.0 (2000), used by Citrin and Sides (2004) 
In the near future, do you see yourself as …? 
[NATIONALITY] only / [NATIONALITY] and European / European and [NATIONALITY] / European only 
New item introduced in EB 69.2 (2008) 
Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are European? 
[“to a great extent” – “somewhat” – “not really”– “not at all”] 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995/2003, Module National Identity I & II 
How close do you feel to …                  “Europe” 
[“very close” – “close” – “not very close” – “not close at all”] 
European Value Study (EVS) 1999/2000 
Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? 
And the next? And which do you belong to least of all? 
 
C Your country as a whole 
D Europe 
A Locality of town where you live 
B Region of county where you live 
E The world as a whole 
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European identity as a safeguard against xenophobia? A differentiated view based on 
identity content 
 
 
Abstract 
Prominent theorists hope that European identity could do without the drawbacks of national 
identity, not the least of which is hostility towards foreigners. However, empirical evidence of 
whether or not European identity is a safeguard against xenophobia is inconclusive. Whereas 
the theoretical claim rests on a specific substantive conception of European identity, i.e., on a 
specific content of European identity, the measures commonly used refer to identification 
with Europe only. Such measures do not tap the content of European identity at all. The paper 
employs a novel strategy to bring identity content into quantitative models: a latent class 
factor model. On the basis of 2009 Eurobarometer data, three dimensions of identity content 
(‘social democracy’, ‘openness & freedom’, and ‘the negative’) are distinguished. The 
relation of identification with Europe and attitudes towards foreigners varies substantially 
once identity content is taken into account. It therefore depends whether or not European 
identity is a safeguard against xenophobia: it depends on the content of European identity. 
 
 
European identity is a prominent concept. A brief glance at recent book titles suggests a stable 
bull market (e.g., Bruter, 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008; 
Fligstein, 2008). European identity is an attractive concept; scholars display their sympathy 
for European integration. National identity is a prominent concept as well, but a much less 
attractive one. 
This paper first clarifies the conceptual status of European identity, starting from a 
comparison with national identity. In particular, I sketch which consequences collective 
identities have for non-members (their side effects), describe why political theory nevertheless 
acknowledges collective identities (the supposed ends), and introduce the claim that European 
identity could do without the drawbacks of national identity (the hopes). In a second step, I 
outline an analytical framework for the empirical study of European identity that emphasizes 
identity content. The third step reconstructs the argument why European identity could be a 
safeguard against xenophobia. Previous research on this issue has yielded contradictory 
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results, which is—as I will argue—probably due to an inappropriate conception and 
measurement of European identity. I propose a novel strategy to capture different types of 
identity content and apply it to Eurobarometer data: a latent class factor model. The resulting 
classification represents different types of European identity content, which allows studying 
the relationship of European identity and attitudes towards foreigners as being conditional on 
the meaning of European identity.  
European and national identity 
European identity and national identity have many things in common. Both are at once 
concepts of practice and concepts of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). In politics, they 
are used to support claims about how societies should be. In science, they are used to study 
how societies are and how they alter. This dual use creates tension—and this is where national 
identity and European identity separate. Whereas scholars of national identity distance 
themselves from nationalism, many scholars who investigate European identity 
simultaneously express their sympathy for European integration (e.g., Delanty and Rumford, 
2005; Habermas, 1998).  
This distinction can be understood in terms of the side effects and the supposed ends of all 
collective identities and the hopes that are associated exclusively with a European identity 
specifically. The danger of side effects is inherent in collective identities. The construction of 
in-groups is
European identity is a screen onto which many project their hopes. Although it may be 
attractive as an object of normative projections, its vagueness renders it not very useful for 
analytical purposes. The next section develops a more qualified conception of European 
 the flip side of the construction of out-groups— to identity ‘us’, ‘we’ need ‘them’ 
(Jenkins, 1996). Ever since the invention of the nation, non-members have suffered (see, e.g., 
Hobsbawm, 1992; Wimmer, 2002). Nevertheless, political theorists are reluctant to expel 
collective identity from their toolkit because they regard it as a prerequisite for democracy. If 
there were no collective identity, there would be no demos, no people. If there were no 
people, democracy—the rule of the people—would not be possible (see, e.g., Weiler, 1999). 
With nationalism discredited by history, the hope is that Europeanism could serve the same 
ends as nationalism, albeit without the latter’s side effects. When scholars speak of a 
cosmopolitan turn (Beck and Grande, 2004) or post-national patriotism (Habermas, 1998), 
they hope that a European identity will not involve the denigration of others but tolerance and 
respect. 
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identity. On this basis, we can then reconstruct the argument why European identity might be 
able to do without the side effects of national identity. 
A conceptual framework for the empirical study of European identity 
‘Identity’ is a controversial concept; some want to get rid of it (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), 
others want to get it right (Tilly, 2003). At least it is a demanding and tricky concept. Let us 
start—without the prefix ‘European’—from a simple vantage point: Identity is the answer to 
the question who we are. Consider two exemplary answers: 
(1) ‘I am an aquarium hobbyist.’  
(2) ‘I am Austrian.’  
The first answer stresses a characteristic of mine; its focus is on the alleged difference 
between me and you. The second answer stresses my membership in an imagined group; its 
focus is on the alleged similarity of me and my fellow Austrians. Roughly along this line, it is 
common to distinguish ‘personal’ identity, which stresses distinctiveness, from ‘social’ or 
‘collective’ identity, which stresses sameness (for an overview, see Fearon, 1999). If taken 
literally, splitting the personal from the social is problematic: on the side of personal identity 
there is a danger to think of a person as highly individualized and unaffected by social 
relations (‘undersocialized’); on the other side lurk collectives endowed with feelings and 
memories that govern the individual (anthropomorphism, ‘oversocialized’). It is more 
appropriate to acknowledge that it is always the individual who experiences identity. A 
collective neither thinks nor feels. Rather, the identity of every individual is made up of 
aspects that make her different and of aspects that he shares with others. Similarity and 
difference rest on the comparison with others and are sensitive to context— imagine an 
aquarist club in Zurich, in which case statements (1) and (2) would reverse functions. Identity 
is always social
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) devise a new inventory of terms to grasp that identity has 
individual aspects (identification) 
 identity (Jenkins, 1996).  
and collective aspects (commonality, connectedness, and 
groupness).1
                                               
1 Brubaker and Cooper (2000) propose other terms as well: self-understanding and social location (as 
dispositional terms, to explain non-instrumental action). Another important aspect of identity is external 
categorization, i.e., others who identify us. This potentially coercive aspect is considered less relevant to 
European identity (for the dialectics of internal and external identification, see Jenkins 1996).  
 Many researchers focus exclusively on identification, for it seems conceptually 
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clearer than the collective facets (see, e.g., Opp, 2005).2
The process of identification has three components. First, it requires a subject who identifies 
with an object (Gerhards, 2000). This is straightforward. But consider the question why a 
person identifies with a group or a social category. We cannot give an answer unless we 
consider what the object means to the subject who identifies with it. In this vein, Abdelal et al. 
(2009) propose to describe identities in terms of content and contestation. Content refers to 
the shared, collective aspect of identity and includes the norms, goals, and beliefs that make 
up the meaning of an identity. What meaning an identity has is neither fixed nor given but 
contested. Therefore, contestation highlights that individuals can disagree over the content of 
an identity. Both content and the degree of contestation invite empirical investigation. 
Analytically, we can separate identification from the collective aspects of identity, but we 
cannot grasp why people identify with an object when we do not know what this object means 
to them. 
 However, a closer look at the process 
of identification will illustrate that we need to take into account the collective aspect of 
identity to make sense of individual identification. 
What applies to identity in general also applies to European identity. European identity is used 
to denote different phenomena at the collective level (e.g., ideas of the European polity) and 
at the individual level (e.g., feelings of attachment to Europe). The individual and the 
collective level—i.e., identification with Europe and the content of European identity—are 
interrelated (e.g., ‘I feel European because I share a certain conception of the European 
polity’, or ‘As I feel European, I’m willing to accept a European political community’). 
But when people identify with Europe, what is the object that they identify with? ‘Europe’ is a 
polyvalent term that denotes geographical regions, refers to history, culture, and to the 
political project of the EU, amongst other things. Actually, there are several potential objects 
for the identification with Europe. This is how complex the social reality of the supposed-to-
be-one-thing ‘European identity’ is. However, one object stands out in several respects: it is 
much less questionable what the EU is as compared to ‘European culture’ or ‘European 
homeland.’ After all, it remains an empirical question whether many people give the EU a 
prominent place in their conception of Europe. 
 
                                               
2 Another reason may be that identification fits well with methodological individualism and attitudinal survey 
research. 
139 
Is European identity a safeguard against xenophobia? 
When theorists such as Habermas and Derrida (2004) talk about European identity, they are 
talking about a European identity with a specific content. Though they offer good reasons 
why this content should be
Surprisingly, identity content is largely absent in studies on European identity and 
xenophobia. Most studies make reference to social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986). However, these studies only employ a very basic notion of SIT—critics have called it 
‘SIT-lite’ (McGarty 2001) or even a misreading of SIT (Reicher 2004). The simplified SIT 
story goes like this: Group membership leads to identification with the ingroup, which in turn 
leads to the devaluation of relevant out-groups. The main reason for this biased comparison is 
members of the ingroup striving for a positive self-conception. Based on SIT-lite, two 
arguments for the tolerance-enhancing effect of European identity are put forward: 
 post-national patriotism or trans-national solidarity and explain 
why the socio-cultural history of Europe makes it ripe for developing such an identity, they 
neither investigate nor claim what is the case. Politically, this means they engage in 
constructing the content of a European identity. Analytically, this means their hope that a 
European identity would safeguard against xenophobia is conditional upon the content of 
European identity. 
(1) Group size: European identity is more encompassing than national identity. Foreigners are 
part of the ingroup (Fuß, 2006; Gaertner et al., 1993; Opp, 2003; Skrobanek, 2004). 
(2) ‘Contagion’: The European ingroup contains EU foreigners. The positive effect is 
‘contagious’ to non-EU foreigners (Dejaeghere and Quintelier, 2008). 
The argument of group size is imprecise; it is not clear whether the effect is only meant to 
hold for EU foreigners or for all foreigners. Contagion posits that the inclusion of EU 
foreigners in the ingroup would transmit to all foreigners. Essentially, both arguments rely on 
the argument of size—Europe is bigger than the nation. 
SIT was developed in lab experiments (e.g., participants saw paintings and were randomly (!) 
assigned to a Klee group or a Kandinsky group). Under these conditions—which became 
famous as the ‘minimal-group paradigm’—group size may be the main factor for intergroup 
processes. How does that translate to the real world? 
Reicher (2004) argues that the minimal-group experiments could equally well be described as 
‘maximum-group experiments’—for the lab condition creates maximally defined social 
identities: Lab identities are arbitrarily created, unambiguous categories, with clear group 
boundaries and fixed identity content. Political identities in the real world, however, are 
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different—they are ambiguous, meaningful, and contested (Huddy, 2001). Therefore, their 
content needs to be considered, especially when it comes to understanding the consequences 
of group identification (Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 77-99). 
Studies on the relation of European identity and attitudes towards outgroups have yielded 
contradictory results. Table 1 gives an overview. 
Table1: The relation of European identity and attitudes towards outgroups 
Study Design, data Independent 
var. 
Dependent var. Control / manipulated var. Effect Effect size: 
regr. coeff. 
stand. 
Citrin and Sides 
(2004) 
Eurobarometer 
53.0  
Identification 
with Europe 
Attitudes towards 
minorities 
Extensive multivariate 
control: national 
identification, education, 
ideology, etc. 
+ .08 
Dejaeghere and 
Quintelier 
(2008) 
Belgian Youth 
Survey, N=4443 
Feeling of 
belonging to 
the EU 
Tolerance Gender, education, contact 
with minorities 
+ .08 
Fuß (2006) Regional samples 
of young adults, 
Germany, 
N=2x400 
European 
identity 
Attitudes toward 
cultural/ 
national diversity 
National identity + .11 
Heyder and 
Schmidt (2005) 
GFM-Survey, 
Germany, , 
N=3000 
Identification 
with Europe 
Attitudes towards 
foreigners 
 
National and regional 
identification 
+ .05*) 
Licata and Klein 
(2002) 
 
Student sample, 
Belgium, N=313 
Identification 
with Europe 
Tolerance towards 
resident foreigners 
National identification, 
political orientation 
- .29 
Mühler and Opp 
(2004) 
Regional 
samples, 
Germany, N = 2x 
≈ 1500 
Identification 
with Europe 
Attitudes towards 
foreigners 
Extensive multivariate 
control: regional/national 
identity, perceived 
discrimination, political 
orientation, etc.  
+ .13 
Skrobanek 
(2004) 
Regional sample 
of young adults, 
Germany, 
N=1457 
European 
identity 
Attitudes towards 
foreigners 
Extensive multivariate 
control: regional/national 
identity, education, values, 
etc. 
+ .13 – .15 
Waldzus et al. 
(2003), 
Mummendey 
and Waldzus 
(2004) 
Laboratory and 
web-based 
experiments, 
N=63, N=121, 
N=40 
Dual 
identification: 
Europe and 
nation 
 
Evaluation of the 
outgroup 
(other European 
nationality) 
Complexity of the 
representation of 
superordinate category, 
similarity of ingroup and 
outgroup, relative 
prototypicality of ingroup 
+ direct 
 
– indirect 
(conditional 
on ingroup 
projection) 
+.11 –.20 
 
–.07 – -.16*) 
 
*) Indirect effect computed from the path coefficients in the publication. The model posits a negative effect of 
identification with Europe on hostility towards foreigners, mediated by patriotism. For reasons of consistency 
table 1 displays the equivalent positive effect on attitudes towards foreigners in table 1. 
**)
Of course different results can be—and in part will be—due to different methods. I suggest 
that another part of the differences can be explained by substantive reasoning. We have three 
 Indirect effects computed from the path coefficients in the publications. The total effect (direct effect + 
indirect effect) is small and positive, as in most other studies. Note that these studies, in contrast to all other 
studies, are experiments that manipulate conditions.  
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facts: (1) ‘Large-scale’ surveys always find positive correlations. (2) These correlations are 
weak. (3) Some ‘smaller’ studies, inconveniently, yield opposite results. Now imagine that 
European identity were not the same thing for different people. Imagine further that different 
European identities would have different relations with attitudes towards outgroups. In larger 
datasets with more representative samples, the results would mirror an average effect. 
Typically, average effects are low. Smaller studies might capture a specific European 
identity—either by chance or by design. The studies of Waldzus, Mummendey, and 
colleagues are key in this respect: whereas most of the affirmative studies survey European 
identity, their experimental design manipulates the characteristics of European identity. They 
demonstrate that, in case of ingroup projection, the relation of identification with Europe and 
attitudes towards outgroups turns negative. Ingroup projection describes a process by which 
individuals project the qualities of their ingroup onto the superordinate category. When 
individuals perceive ‘being German’ (ingroup) as prototypical for ‘being European’ 
(superordinate category), the social distance to ‘being Polish’ (outgroup) is increased 
precisely through the identification with Europe. Put differently, ingroup projection alters the 
content of European identity. Thus, I hypothesize that the relation between identification with 
Europe and attitudes towards foreigners depends on the content of European identity. 
The problem: no content in the measures 
Although some of the studies name their variables ‘European identity,’ these studies across 
the board use similar measures: measures of identification with Europe. All studies treat their 
concepts as uni-dimensional. Table 2 provides typical examples. 
One type of item, including the one used as a standard measure in the EB until 2008, just asks 
about ‘being’ or ‘seeing oneself.’ Items of this kind refer to self-perception. Another type of 
item uses ‘feeling’ or ‘feeling attached.’ Such items refer to emotional attachment. The object 
is denoted by ‘Europe’, but the meaning of ‘Europe’ is not made explicit. The items measure 
the degree of identification with Europe without grasping the content of this identity. If the 
content of European identity is what determines its relation to attitudes towards foreigners, 
this is problematic. 
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Table 2: Measures of identification with Europe 
Eurobarometer (EB) 53.0, used by Citrin and Sides (2004) 
In the near future, do you see yourself as …? 
[NATIONALITY] only / [NATIONALITY] and European / European and [NATIONALITY] / European only 
Skrobanek (2004), Müller and Opp (2004) 
To what extent do you feel European?  
Fuß (2006): 3 item-factor model 
1. Now I would like to ask about the strength of how you feel about being different sorts of nationality? 
How do you feel about being ... European 
2. How would you rate the importance of the following in terms of who you are, that is, how you feel or think about 
yourself as a person?’ ... being a citizen of the European Union’ 
3. People may feel different degrees of attachment to their city, town, or village, to their region, to their country or to 
Europe. Thinking about your own attachment, please tell me how attached you feel, to ... Europe 
Licata and Klein (2002): 9-item scale 
1. I feel attached to the European ground. 
2. I would miss Europe if I had to leave it. 
3. My destiny is linked with that of other Europeans. 
4. I feel solidarity with all the other Europeans. 
5. I am proud to tell my friends that I am European. 
6. There is no reason to be proud to be European. 
7. Being European is something I rarely think about. 
8. I don’t have clear feelings about the fact that I am European. 
9. Most of the time I like to think about myself as a European. 
Addressing the problem: bringing content in 
Bruter (2004, 2005) has suggested distinguishing two types of European identity: civic and 
cultural. Civic European identity refers to the identification with the political structure of the 
EU. Cultural European identity refers to the identification with an imagined group of 
Europeans, its history, values, or way of life. Following a similar approach, Pichler (2008) 
distinguishes a political from a cultural dimension. 
While I do think that differentiating between different content of European identity is the right 
track, I doubt that this dichotomy of political and cultural will do the trick. It mirrors the 
classical distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation (Brubaker, 1994) and 
between patriotism and nationalism (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Schatz et al., 1999). 
While the distinction of a more inclusive and liberal patriotism and a more exclusive and 
hostile nationalism have proven useful in some research contexts (Blank and Schmidt, 2003), 
the validity of this dichotomy is not without its critics, who argue that nationalism and 
patriotism are too similar or too interrelated to separate them (Bauman, 2000; Heinrich, this 
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volume). The underlying civic–ethnic distinction is now regarded as too simplistic and 
normative itself (Brubaker, 1999).3, 4
Instead of imposing the theory of nationalism on European identity, I propose an exploratory, 
empirical approach. I will not limit the types of European identity content to any specific 
number a priori and then search for measures of these dimensions; instead I will start from the 
data and model the minimum number of dimensions necessary to represent the data. Given the 
diversity of pictures of Europeanness, I predict the degree of contestation over the content of 
European identity to be high. 
 
Data and measures 
The various Eurobarometer (EB) studies frequently include questions on the identification 
with Europe, on the meaning of the EU, and on attitudes towards foreigners. In 2009, EB 71.3 
(European Commission 2012) addressed these three topics in a body. I used the EU-citizen 
samples of the by-then EU27 member states, N=26,830.5
  
 The proportion of missings in the 
measures is small (<2%); therefore listwise deletion is acceptable (Graham, 2009). 
Proportions and other descriptive statistics were weighted according to the country’s 
population size. Table 3 shows the measures. 
                                               
3 Yack (1998: 203), paraphrasing Hobbes, coined the aphorism ‘Nationalism is patriotism misliked and 
patriotism, nationalism liked’ in a polemic against Maurizio Viroli, the author of For Love of Country: An Essay 
on Patriotism and Nationalism. 
4 Roccas and Berlin (this volume) provide an overview of various models of the dimensional structure of 
identification. 
5 Information on sampling and fieldwork are available at: http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-
service/survey-series/standard-special-eb/sampling-and-fieldwork/  
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Table 3: Variables and measures in EB 71.3 
Identification with Europe 
Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are European/ [nationality]? 
[1 ‘not at all’ – 2 ‘somewhat’ – 3 ‘not really’ – 4 ‘to a great extent’] 
Meaning of Europe 
What does the European Union mean to you personally? 
Peace; Economic prosperity; Democracy; Social protection; Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU; 
Cultural diversity; Stronger say in the world; Euro; Unemployment; Bureaucracy; Waste of money; Loss of our cultural 
identity; More crime; Not enough control at external borders 
[0 ‘no’, 1 ‘yes’] 
Attitudes towards foreigners  
Additive index, agreement with positive items/ disagreement with negative items coded 1, agreement to negative items/ 
disagreement with positive items coded –1, ‘it depends’ and ‘don’t know’ coded 0. The sum score was divided by the 
number of valid responses. This results in scaling attitudes from –1 ‘completely negative’ to 1 ‘completely positive.’ 
QH1_1 People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of >OUR COUNTRY<. + 
QH1_3 The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity. – 
QH1_4 The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in >OUR COUNTRY<. – 
QH1_6 We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy. + 
QH1_7 The arrival of immigrants in Europe can be effective in solving the problem of Europe’s ageing population. + 
QH1_8 Immigrants can play an important role in developing greater understanding and 
tolerance with the rest of the world. + 
QH1_9 Immigrants/legal Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services. + 
[‘Tend to agree’ – ‘tend to disagree’ – ‘it depends’ (SPONTANEOUS) – ‘don’t know’] 
I will address the content of European identity by studying what the European Union means 
to people. Surveys show that the EU is important for the conception of European identity. In 
EB 57.2 (European Commission 2012), fielded 2002, the most important reasons for feeling 
European were ‘free movement’ (80%) and ‘common currency’ (76%). Non-EU aspects 
received considerable but less support (‘common history’ 54%, ‘common ancestry’ 52%). 
Another survey asked young adults across Europe what Europe means to them (Jamieson et 
al., 2005). ‘The EU’ (53%) was chosen more often than ‘geographical location’ (46%) and 
‘certain values and traditions’ (47%). Concentrating on the meaning of the EU focuses on the 
political aspect of European identity and neglects other meanings. However, the focus is on an 
aspect people find very relevant. 
Method 
A simple plot of the dispersion of 14 items on the meaning of the EU will already give a 
picture of the degree of contestation, i.e., to what extent EU citizens agree or disagree. An 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was the first step to grasp the patterns of the meanings 
associated with the EU, which is to exploit the fact that some answers go together more often 
than others. The initial EFA results were used to test a much stricter model that allows 
distinguishing distinct groups: the latent class factor model (Magidson and Vermunt, 2001). 
As the term suggests, the latent class factor model bears resemblance to both factor analysis 
and latent class analysis. Latent factors explain the observed answer patterns; but unlike in a 
traditional factor analysis, the factors are ordered categorically. Therefore, the latent structure 
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can be used to cluster observations into segments as in standard latent class analysis. The 
conversion of categorical factors to clusters is straightforward. For example, consider a model 
with two dichotomous factors (F1, F2). In this case, the latent class factor model provides 
probability estimates for the membership of cases in four clusters: cluster 1= (low on F1, low 
on F2); cluster 2 = (low on F1, high on F2); cluster 3 = (high on F1, low on F2) and cluster 4 
= (high on F1, high on F2). Conceptually, this classification is a simple crosstab (though the 
assignment is probabilistic and not deterministic). Crossing three latent variables with two 
categories each results in eight clusters. The clustering was used to condition the correlation 
of identification with Europe and attitudes with foreigners on the meaning of the EU, i.e., to 
compare the relationships between identification with Europe and attitudes towards foreigners 
across different types of identity content. 
Descriptive results 
In the overall sample, the correlation of identification with Europe and attitudes towards 
foreigners is r=.19, which is in line with previous research in two respects: the sign of the 
association and the rather low size. This is the picture we get when we do not account for the 
content of European identity; it will serve as a benchmark for the interpretation of the results 
that do consider the meanings that the respondents attach to Europe.6
Figure 2 shows agreement and disagreement with 14 content items. Not a single item is 
shared by a majority. Equally important, not a single item is unequivocally rejected. Each 
meaning of the EU is at least endorsed by one out of ten European citizens. The most 
prevalent meanings are ‘freedom to travel, study, and work in any member state’ (42.0%) and 
the euro currency (33.3%). But again it is worth noting that even for these two items there is a 
larger group of citizens who do not think this way. As the case stands now, the degree of 
contestation is high. 
 
  
                                               
6 One could argue that the correlation is low because attitudes towards foreigners are multidimensional or not 
invariant across national contexts (e.g., people may have very different groups in mind when they think about 
‘foreigners’). The design of this study compares the low overall correlation with the correlations in subgroups. 
As long as the groups do not differ in the dimensional structure of attitudes towards foreigners (or the 
misspecification thereof) and as long as the groups are not highly confounded with national contexts, these 
concerns do not compromise the goal of this study. 
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Figure 2: Content and contestation of European identity: The meaning of the EU
Source: EB 71.3, EU27; the short labels used in the following are indicated by capital letters. 
Multivariate results 
Patterns of meaning and clusters of people 
An exploratory factor analysis reveals that three modestly correlated dimensions sufficiently 
fit the data (see table A1 in the appendix). The first dimension groups the items PEACE, 
ECO, DEMO, and SOCIAL (see figure 2 for item wording). As the items refer to the 
democratic state and social welfare, the factor is labeled social democracy. The second 
dimension groups the items FREE, DIV, and EURO. While the commonality of FREE and 
DIV is straightforward, the alignment of the common currency in this dimension might be 
puzzling. Apparently, the euro is perceived more in terms of its symbolic quality as a sign of 
openness or its practical usefulness as a single currency than in regard to its association with 
economy. The second dimension is labeled openness & freedom. Whereas social democracy 
‘looks inward’ and stresses collectively shared aspects of the EU as a democratic community, 
openness & freedom ‘looks outward’ and is about individually enjoyed liberties and the 
freedom to transgress national boundaries. The third dimension, labeled the negative, groups 
all items that express criticism or discontent, irrespective of their differing content. Models 
with two negative dimensions, e.g., those separating BUREAU and WASTE from the items 
that could be seen as representing ‘threat’ (LOSS, CRIME, BORDER), did not find empirical 
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support. The item SAY could not be assigned to any dimension and was excluded from 
further analysis. 
The latent class factor model builds on the EFA structure, but uses dichotomous factors. The 
essential model parameters are the response probabilities for the items that are allowed to 
differ between the two latent classes of each latent variable. A combination of the positions on 
the three latent variables should reproduce the response patterns of the individuals on the 13 
observed items. To illustrate what a tremendous task the model is supposed to accomplish, 
note that 13 dichotomous variables amount to 213=8,192 possible response patterns, 3,153 of 
which were actually used by respondents, whereas the latent variable pattern of the model has 
only 2x2x2=8 cells. This sparse model fits the data reasonably well, a likelihood ratio chi2-test 
cannot reject it (chi2
Table 4: Results of the latent class factor model, estimated probabilities 
=8334, df=8147, p=.07). The classification quality—i.e., how well the 
assignment to latent classes can reproduce the observed response patterns—is far from 
perfect, yet sufficient (relative entropy=.69, Clark, 2010; Ramaswamy et al., 1993). 
Latent 
dimension 
A priori 
prob. 
Item P1 (1-1-1) 
low salience: 
empty 
P2 (1-1-2) 
medium 
salience: 
the negative 
P3 (2-1-1) 
medium 
salience: 
social 
democracy 
P4 (2-2-2) 
high salience: 
all-embracing 
P5 (2-2-1) 
high salience: 
social democracy 
+ openness & 
freedom 
P6 (2-1-2) 
1 
Social 
democracy 
 
0.26 PEACE 0.12 0.12 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
0.18 ECOPROS 0.06 0.06 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
0.22 DEMO 0.06 0.06 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
0.12 SOCIAL 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
2 
Openness & 
freedom 
0.48 FREE 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.92 0.92 0.40 
0.18 DIV 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.65 0.65 0.10 
0.33 EURO 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.64 0.64 0.28 
3 
The negative 
 
0.14 UNEMPLOY 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.32 
0.19 BUREAU 0.09 0.39 0.09 0.39 0.09 0.39 
0.19 WASTE 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.47 
0.10 LOSSID 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.24 
0.15 CRIME 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.38 
0.14 BORDER 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 
Cluster size     29.7% 25.2% 34.1% 3.9% 6.8% 0.2% 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27; software: Mplus 6.11, estimator: robust ML;  
grey cells: probability >.25 or probability >1.50 times the a priori probability; dark grey cells: probabilities >.50; 
P2 (1-1-2) denotes response pattern 2: 1 = in the first latent class on dimension 1 (social democracy), 1 = in the first latent 
class on dimension 2 (openness & freedom), 2 = in the second latent class on dimension 3 (the negative). 
Latent class pattern 1-2-1 and 1-2-2 do not occur; 
cluster size: weighted by population size, assignment to classes based on most likely latent class pattern. 
For full item labels, see figure 2. 
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The numbers in table 4 are probabilities—the columns to the left of the items display the 
probabilities of agreement a priori, which are the observed frequencies of the items7
One cluster (P6) is so sparsely populated that statistical uncertainty forbids interpretation and 
two other cells in the latent variable cross classification are empty, i.e., no cases are assigned 
to them. For this reason, there remain five substantive types of meaning of the EU. To 
interpret what is characteristic of a latent class pattern, both the absolute size of the estimated 
response probability and the ratio of the a priori and the estimated response probability are 
important. For example, the entry of .92 for the item FREE in the response pattern P4 means 
that it is almost certain and roughly twice as likely as in the overall sample that someone in 
cluster 4 will agree that the EU means freedom to travel, study, and work. Therefore, the 
labeling of the clusters reflects two criteria. The first one is salience: To which extent do the 
respondents assign meaning to the EU? (That is, are there items with a fair chance of 
affirmative answers?) The second one is content: Which of the three content dimensions do 
they endorse? 
; the 
columns to the right of the items show estimated response probabilities within a latent class 
pattern. Each combination of latent classes corresponds to a cluster of cases, i.e., to a group of 
people with a distinct response pattern to the meaning of the EU items. The term ‘pattern’ 
stresses latent (class factor) variables and measurement; the terms ‘cluster’ or ‘cross 
classification’ stress types and groups. These are different perspectives on the same model: a 
certain pattern of latent class variables represents a cluster of cases. 
P1 groups those 29.7% whose response probabilities are below average on all dimensions. It 
is very likely that they answered ‘no’ to every item, except for some realistic chance of 
agreeing with FREE (0.40). To this group, the EU has no other meaning; its salience is low, 
the image almost empty. For that quarter of respondents in P2 (25.2%), the EU has a 
predominantly negative image. Apart from considerable (but below average) support for 
FREE and EURO, they blame and criticize the EU. P3, the largest group (34.1%), frames the 
EU positively as social democracy but does not see the EU as particularly standing for 
openness & freedom. In P2 and P3 the salience of the EU is higher than in P1 but lower than 
in the two remaining clusters. P4 is a minority (3.9%) that attributes meaning to the EU in all 
three dimensions (all-embracing); the EU is highly salient to them, and the picture is mixed. 
                                               
7 Differences to the percentages in figure 1 are due to weighting. 
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P5 (6.7%) comprises people with a salient, unambiguously positive view: the EU stands for 
social democracy and especially for openness & freedom. 
Who are they? Manifesting the latent classes 
Table 5: Characteristics of the latent classes 
Cluster Age: 
mean (sd) 
Education:  
% higher 
Political 
orientation: 
mean (sd) 
Identification 
with Europe: 
mean (sd) 
Attitudes 
towards 
foreigners 
P1low salience: empty 44.5 (19.1) 25.4 5.28 (2.06) 1.89 (.93)  –.09 (.57) 
P2 medium salience: the negative 50.0 (17.5) 21.7 5.36 (2.12) 1.64 (.99) –.24 (.55) 
P3 medium salience: social democracy 45.4 (18.8) 29.1 5.29 (2.14) 2.21 (.77) .02 (.56) 
P4 high salience: all-embracing 48.0 (17.1) 39.0 5.05 (1.95 2.24 (.77) .03 (.54) 
P5 high salience: social democracy + openness & freedom 42.7 (19.6) 45.2 4.90 (1.97) 2.46 (.64) .26 (.54) 
Total = EU27 citizens 46.2 (18.6) 27.5 5.26 (2.10) 2.00 (.91) –.06 (.57) 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27; higher education = left education at the age of 20+; political orientation: left=1, right=10, self-
placement; identification with Europe: 1=low, 4 =high; attitudes towards foreigners: –1 totally negative, 1= totally positive; 
see table 3 for full question wording and index construction. 
Table 5 compares the five clusters. The age structure is not very different between the 
clusters, though in P2, with a negative image of the EU, older people are slightly 
overrepresented, while they are underrepresented in P5 with a highly salient picture of the EU 
as social democracy and openness & freedom. The educational differences are greater: in P4 
and P5, the high salience groups, the higher-educated are overrepresented. The share of 
higher-educated is lowest in the negative cluster, P2, even though it is still one in five who 
continued education at the age of 20 in that cluster. Politically, all the clusters resemble the 
general population quite well: on average they are centrists, slightly to the left of the midpoint 
of the scale at 5.5. P5 is the most leftist cluster. The differences in identification with Europe 
are more pronounced: P2, the negative image cluster, is almost half a scale point below 
average; P4, the positive image cluster, is nearly half a scale point above average. This is 
quite significant on a 4-point scale. Similarly, attitudes towards foreigners are most negative 
in P2 (–.24) and most positive in P4 (.26). Again, the size of the differences is substantial, 
given that their scale is –1 to 1. The standard deviations, however, signal considerable 
variation in attitudes towards foreigners and in identification with Europe in all clusters. In 
each cluster, there are people with pro- and anti-foreigner sentiments, just as there are people 
who weakly and who strongly identify with Europe. Hence, there is enough variation within 
the clusters to merit investigating the relation between identification with Europe and attitudes 
towards foreigners for each cluster—for if the groups were heavily confounded with these two 
variables it would not make sense to look at their relation within groups. 
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Another aspect is the distribution of the clusters within countries. This aspect is interesting in 
itself, but could in extremis also jeopardize further analyses. 
Table 6: Proportions of clusters within countries 
Country 
P1 
low salience: 
empty 
P2 
medium 
salience: the 
negative 
P3 
medium 
salience: social 
democracy 
P4 
high salience: 
all-embracing 
P5 
high salience: 
social democracy + 
openness & freedom 
P6 
FRANCE 25.1 31.4 30.6 4.0 8.4 0.6 
GERMANY E 18.0 42.9 22.3 8.6 7.0 1.2 
GERMANY W 16.7 31.1 30.6 9.1 12.2 0.2 
GREAT BRITAIN 40.6 38.1 17.1 1.6 2.5 0.1 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27. 
Table 6 shows the proportions of the clusters in France, Germany, and Great Britain—this 
corresponds to the ‘national frames’ that Diez Medrano (2003) investigated.8
The relation of European identity and xenophobia: a closer look 
 In Great Britain, 
the indifferent cluster, P1, is much larger than in France and Germany. In Eastern Germany, 
criticism (P2) is much more common than in Western Germany or France. Highly salient 
images of social democracy or openness & freedom (P5) are five times more frequent in 
Western Germany than in Great Britain. We see that our classification also uncovers national 
differences. However, if we shift our focus away from dissimilarity, we see that the national 
borders are not identical with the boundaries of the clusters: the different types of meaning 
associated with the EU are present within each country. 
Finally, we are in a confident position to address the research question. We have found five 
types of meaning of the EU, i.e., five ways people relate to one of the main objects of 
European identity, and hence five different types of identity content. Recall that the 
hypothesis is that the relation of European identity and attitudes towards xenophobia depends 
on the content of European identity. Technically, this is an interaction model. We expect that 
the content of European identity will moderate the strengths of the association between 
identification with Europe and attitudes towards foreigners. 
To frame the EU as openness & freedom implies to endorse diversity and a positive stance on 
transgressing national borders and hence should increase tolerance. The effect of social 
democracy is less clear. On the one hand, democratic values can be framed as universal (and 
thus open to foreigners). On the other hand, social welfare can be seen as a good tied to 
                                               
8 A table of the cluster distribution in all EU27 countries can be found in the appendix, table A2. 
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membership in the nation state (and thus as exclusive). Given this ambiguity, we can, at best, 
formulate a tentative assumption: the association of identification with Europe and attitudes 
towards foreigners ought to be lower in P3, the cluster characterized by a modest approval of 
social democracy but not of openness & freedom, as compared to P4 and P5. At first sight, 
hypothesizing on the effect of the negative and the empty view poses a puzzle. The reasoning 
on an interaction effect of identification and identity content rests on the assumption that 
different people identify with Europe to a different degree within each type of identity 
content. Empirically, we do indeed observe this variation. But why should someone identify 
with Europe if she thinks that the EU is a bad thing or if he thinks that the EU is meaningless? 
Two explanations are plausible. One is criticism: stressing the negative aspects could express 
discontent with the EU as is and sympathy for change, but not the negation of European 
integration in general. The second is undercoverage of content: respondents can either have 
affirmative views of the EU that are not reflected in the items or envisage objects other than 
the EU for their European identity. While these arguments explain how someone in the empty 
or the negative cluster can still rank high on identification with Europe, they also reveal that 
the data remain silent about their reasons for identifying with Europe. Therefore, we have no 
good reason to speculate on the size of the interaction effect. This argument also suggests that 
both the empty and the negative cluster capture the ‘true’ meaning of the EU or the proper 
object of European identity only for those who do not identify with Europe (‘The EU is 
negative/meaningless, so I don’t identify with Europe’). As the negative items capture a threat 
to cultural identity and security, we can tentatively assume that those who have negative 
views of the EU and do not identify with Europe will have the most negative attitudes towards 
foreigners. This is a weak hypothesis in regard to xenophobia, not an interaction hypothesis.  
In sum, the expectations are these: (1) The association of identification with Europe and 
attitudes towards foreigners is stronger in the clusters P5 and P4 than in the clusters P1, P2, 
and P3. (2) Attitudes towards foreigners are most negative for the ‘non-identifiers’ with a 
negative view of the EU in P2 and P4. As the types of identity content are developed 
exploratively in this study, I could not a priori state hypotheses on their specific influence on 
the relationship of identification with Europe and attitudes towards foreigners—the expected 
ranking of the clusters capitalize on knowing the data. The main hypothesis, however, is 
theoretical: there are differences in these associations between clusters, and they are 
substantial. 
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Figure 3: The relationship of identification with Europe and attitudes towards 
foreigners within the clusters 
 
 
 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27; 
x-axis: identification with Europe; y-axis: attitudes towards immigrants, mean values, scale –1 to 1. 
There are several ways to describe what figure 3 displays. The description that comes closest 
to the data is from the perspective of conditional means. The dots in the graphs are the means 
of attitudes towards foreigners conditioned on identification with Europe and for each cluster. 
In other words, when moving from the lower left to the upper right of every graph, we can see 
how the mean values of attitudes towards foreigners change in each cluster in accordance with 
the respondent’s degree of identification with Europe. Another, equally appropriate way of 
looking at it is to speak of a regression of attitudes on identification, moderated by the identity 
content. Once we draw a line to connect the mean values, we are in a regression framework. 
Although the lines in figure 3 are not perfectly linear, they are reasonably close to compare 
the linear association, i.e., Pearson’s r, across clusters. In a regression framework the 
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differences between clusters correspond to an interaction term—the regression coefficient of 
identification with Europe is allowed to differ between clusters.9
The lower left values in the charts are the levels of xenophobia for those who do not identify 
with Europe. In line with expectations, the most negative attitudes of non-identifiers occur in 
P2, the negative cluster, and in P4, the all-embracing cluster of people who combine social 
democracy, openness & freedom, and negative views. Mean values of –.45 and –0.39 on a 
scale from –1 to 1 indicate a strongly negative attitude towards foreigners. Whereas negative 
attitudes are similarly pronounced for non-identifiers in P1 (–.30), the empty cluster, they are 
less severe in the social democracy and/or openness & freedom clusters P3 and P5 (–.12 and 
–.15 respectively). 
 
All regression lines go from the bottom left to the upper right. The association of attitudes 
towards foreigners and identification is positive in all clusters. What differs is the strength of 
the association. This pattern of differences supports our assumptions. The correlation is 
highest in P5 (.34) and second highest in P4 (.24), i.e., among the respondents who emphasize 
that the EU stands for openness & freedom. In the social democracy cluster, P3, the 
correlation is lower (.15). Following the argument that we do not know why people in the 
empty and in the negative cluster identify with Europe, the positive associations in P1 (.18) 
and P2 (.20) cannot be interpreted in terms of content—they are yet another hint at 
undercoverage of content. 
Ultimately, the correlations are positive across the board, so why make such a big fuss of it? 
The correlations range from 0.15 to 0.34—the highest number being roughly two times larger 
than the smallest number. Correlation coefficients are misleading if we look at them this way. 
A true-to-scale picture of association is the amount of shared variance, which is not r but r2 
                                               
9 I abstain from reporting and relying on statistical significance for the interaction effect and any other 
differences between clusters. High sample size leads to high power, i.e., test statistics detect very small 
deviations from traditional null hypotheses (for a thorough discussion of the assumptions and pitfalls of null 
hypothesis significance testing, see, e.g., Cohen, 1994). Were we to rely on p-values alone, we would find the 
difference between r=.18 in P1 and r=.15 P3 to be highly significant. All differences turn out statistically 
significant if the sample is large enough. From a substantive perspective, however, only some of them are 
interesting. If average standardized effects in previous research are around 0.10, I suggest that differences greater 
than .05 (i.e., half the size of the average effect) are noteworthy. 
. 
This changes the picture. 
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Figure 4: Variance overlap of identification with Europe and attitudes towards 
foreigners in the five clusters 
 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27. 
Figure 4 compares across clusters how much variance attitudes towards foreigners share with 
identification with Europe. In cluster P5, identification with Europe and attitudes towards 
foreigners share 12% of their variance, while in P3, it is only 2%. In terms of shared variance 
the ratio is not 1:2 but rather 1:6. This makes a difference.  
Limitations 
Though some limitations are specific to this study, the underlying issues—the selection of the 
object of identification and the selection of the items to tap its meaning—are generic to any 
quantitative study of identities. This study is restricted to the EU as the object of European 
identity—for good reasons: the EU is relevant to many people and it is clear what the EU is. 
Using the vague term ‘Europe’ instead could even be an asset if, and only if, a study could 
work with a larger set of items to explore the facets of its meaning. Other potential objects 
such as ‘(European) culture’ or ‘(European) values’ are less specific than they might seem, 
i.e., they demand larger sets of items as well.  
Even for the EU, the listing of meanings in the EB lacks some of the ‘usual suspects.’ There 
are no items on ‘social Europe’ in the sense of social justice and on social or ecological 
sustainability. A hint at omitted meanings are the people in the empty cluster who still identify 
with Europe. The most plausible interpretation here is that Europe has a meaning to them 
other then the meanings prompted. The better the range of potential meanings are grasped, the 
better interpretable and the more pronounced the differences in the correlations should be. 
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Had there been positively worded items on ‘euro-chauvinism’ or ‘a Europe of fatherlands’, 
we can assume that even a negative association of identification with Europe and attitudes 
towards foreigners could have been discovered for a subgroup. Granted, this is mere 
speculation.  
Apart from the specific issues in this study, any list of meanings will always be incomplete to 
someone. Incompleteness is a problem generic to surveys on meanings. Other data sources 
with other measures would more likely than not lead to somewhat different configurations of 
meanings—especially for very contested identities. 
Conclusions 
In a nutshell, the point is that content counts! Content counts for the study of European 
identity and for the study of any identity. 
European identity is associated with hopes—not the least of which is that European identity 
would do without the xenophobic drawbacks of national identity. So far, evidence whether or 
not European identity lives up to this ideal is inconclusive. I have argued that this is not 
surprising given how we try to measure European identity in surveys. Social theory of 
collective identities stresses content and contestation. But empirical social science usually 
treats European identity as a one-dimensional variable and uses measures of identification 
with Europe only. These measures include neither content nor contestation. Social scientists 
are not blind to this gap; they feel uneasy but short of any better alternative. Reflecting on the 
Eurobarometer, Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001, 757) called researchers ‘prisoners of the 
limitations of some of the indicators used in their source of data of choice.’ 
This dilemma cannot be resolved, but it can be addressed. The endeavor is to bring content in. 
While some researchers simply echo the problematic dichotomy of ‘good’ patriotism and 
‘bad’ nationalism, I have proposed an exploratory approach to tap an important aspect of the 
content of European identity: the meaning of the EU. A latent class factor model summarizes 
13 items into three dimensions of meaning that cluster the EU citizens into five groups. 
Although positive in all clusters, the strength of the relation of identification with Europe and 
attitudes towards foreigners differs substantially between the clusters. Therefore, the answer 
to the question whether or not European identity is a safeguard against xenophobia is: ‘It 
depends!’ —it depends on the content of European identity. If the image of the EU is 
openness & freedom, identification with Europe indeed comes with more tolerant attitudes. If 
the EU is mainly seen as social democracy or has a negative image, this relation is much 
weaker. 
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To sharpen the argument, if the content of European identity is tolerance, then the people who 
identify with Europe more strongly are more tolerant. This is close to tautological—and 
disappointing, but only if we think of it in causal terms. European identity does not lead to or 
cause anything automatically, rather its content can be affine to something or not. European 
identity is no fast lane to tolerance. Research should not treat European identity as a (single) 
variable, but shift the question from ‘Is there a European identity?’ to ‘Which European 
identities are there?’ For policy, the task is not to foster just any European identity but a 
specific one. European identity is no cure in itself, but a European identity that means 
openness and tolerance may act as remedy to xenophobia. European identity is a good 
example to demonstrate the importance of identity content because contestation is high, as 
there are very different opinions what Europe ought to be like. But if we buy into the 
argument that—in principle—all collective identities are about contested content, we cannot 
but agree that identities are socially constructed. Social constructivism is a red rag to many 
realist, empirical social scientists. For some variants of constructivism and some variants of 
realism, the gap may indeed be real and irreconcilable. This study wants to make a case that 
basic
For the study of identities, a basic social constructivist account—by which I mean a focus on 
meaning, construction, and contestation—seems more appropriate than any other, potentially 
essentialist theoretical orientation. Identities are about shared stories, and research cannot get 
at identities without reconstructing the different meanings people associate with these 
identities. In this endeavor, social constructivism prevents us from searching for the ‘true’ 
core of any identity and rather directs us towards alternative constructions. 
 constructivist thinking and quantitative analyses can go together. This is not an easy 
task, but in my view a necessary one and well worth taking up the challenge.  
That said, should I now be tempted to stop quantitative work on identities and defect to the 
qualitative camp with banners flying? While fieldwork and qualitative analyses are the tools 
of choice to reconstruct identity content and contestation, they are limited in scope and 
problematic in terms of selection. Quantitative science can summarize more information and 
weigh the information equally. Hence, there is no need to abandon one for the other but to (1) 
acknowledge the epistemological strengths and limits of either approach and (2) push hard to 
incorporate appropriate theory in our investigations. 
I, for my part, will stick to the camp that I know best: quantitative social research. Employing 
numbers, however, comes at a price. It is pointless to accuse survey analyses of loosing 
individual perspectives. We are not interested in rare cases. In the same vein, it is unfruitful to 
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argue that surveys fail to capture each and every meaning associated with the EU or Europe. 
They do not have to. Surveys provide an average picture. But a built-in neglect for 
individuality is no carte blanche that justifies getting the average picture completely wrong. 
Survey research does not have to grasp all meanings of an identity, but we should grasp the 
most important ones. This task is still tedious enough. We need to decide which meanings to 
survey, and it is obvious that fieldwork and pretesting are beneficial to make these decisions. 
We also need to allow for change of meaning, which is to say that we need to allow for 
change of measures as well. This is cumbersome because we may lose some of the neat 
characteristics of variables that we like in our models. We can neither theoretically assume 
nor should we empirically strive for constructs that remain the same across time and social 
contexts. The goal is to tap the meanings that are out there now (and not only the meanings 
we asked about last time). This does not render comparison impossible. Some identity content 
may be longstanding and wide-ranging and thus comparable, whereas other identity content 
may be cursory. This is exactly the empirical question of interest. Only if we can incorporate 
the meanings that constitute an identity into our models, can we meaningfully address the 
question of its association with other social phenomena.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Exploratory factor analysis, standardized factor loadings 
 Factor 1 
social democracy 
Factor 2 
openness & freedom 
Factor 3 
the negative 
PEACE 0.37 0.28 0.07 
ECOPROS 0.53 0.04 –0.07 
DEMO 0.47 0.25 0.00 
SOCIAL 0.67 –0.01 0.15 
FREE 0.00 0.57 –0.17 
DIV 0.19 0.57 0.01 
SAY 0.26 0.27 –0.07 
EURO 0.03 0.36 0.09 
UNEMPLOY 0.02 –0.21 0.64 
BUREAU –0.30 0.27 0.39 
WASTE –0.36 0.00 0.54 
LOSSID 0.14 –0.07 0.50 
CRIME 0.02 0.03 0.77 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27; 
Estimator: WLSMV, Geomin rotation (factor correlations: r12=0.23, r13=-0.20, r23=0.12); 
Model fit: chi2
  
=1263.4, df=52 , RMSEA=0.029, pclose=1, CFI=0.951. 
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Table A2: Proportions of clusters within all EU27 Countries 
Country Latent class pattern = cluster P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
AUSTRIA 14.3 43.6 20.0 16.2 4.9 1.1 
BELGIUM 23.1 27.7 33.8 6.1 9.2 0.2 
BULGARIA 27.9 9.7 52.0 1.1 9.2 0.0 
CYPRUS (REP.) 9.5 26.2 38.1 19.0 7.1 0.0 
CZECH REPUBLIC 29.6 30.5 31.5 4.5 3.7 0.2 
DENMARK 17.2 31.3 29.3 10.4 11.8 0.0 
ESTONIA 40.0 15.0 31.7 3.3 10.0 0.0 
FINLAND 30.6 30.2 27.1 3.4 8.6 0.0 
FRANCE 25.1 31.4 30.6 4.0 8.4 0.6 
GERMANY E 18.0 42.9 22.3 8.6 7.0 1.2 
GERMANY W 16.7 31.1 30.6 9.1 12.2 0.2 
GREAT BRITAIN 40.6 38.1 17.1 1.6 2.5 0.1 
GREECE 17.8 31.7 36.7 6.9 6.0 0.9 
HUNGARY 34.8 24.4 34.5 1.1 5.0 0.2 
IRELAND 31.4 16.8 43.8 1.8 6.2 0.0 
ITALY 37.1 18.5 39.0 0.7 4.6 0.0 
LATVIA 49.5 21.6 24.7 1.0 3.1 0.0 
LITUANIA 33.0 18.3 39.8 1.0 7.9 0.0 
LUXEMBOURG 18.5 18.5 37.0 11.1 14.8 0.0 
MALTA 30.4 13.0 43.5 4.3 8.7 0.0 
NETHERLANDS 27.1 20.7 40.3 4.7 7.1 0.1 
NORTHERN IRELAND 47.4 24.2 23.2 0.0 5.3 0.0 
POLAND 44.1 12.6 37.6 0.9 4.7 0.0 
PORTUGAL 39.2 20.0 32.2 3.7 5.0 0.0 
ROMANIA 21.3 11.8 57.8 2.0 7.1 0.0 
SLOVAKIA 23.6 21.9 39.9 6.3 8.0 0.3 
SLOVENIA 26.1 32.2 28.7 6.1 7.0 0.0 
SPAIN 34.2 10.3 46.6 1.2 7.6 0.1 
SWEDEN 15.0 34.8 35.0 7.1 8.1 0.0 
TOTAL 29.7 25.2 34.1 3.9 6.8 0.2 
Source: EB 71.3, EU27. 
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10/2001-12/2007  social worker in a drug counselling office in Vienna, 1–2 day per week 
07/1999-12/2002  pet shop, aquarium division, 1–2 days per week 
10/2000-09/2001  alternative civilian service in a drug counselling office in Vienna 
Academic teaching 
08/2014  Swiss Summer School, course “Structural Equation Modeling” 
(together with Prof. Eldad Davidov) 
fall 2014  Sociology of European Integration, “Die Gesellschaften Europas oder 
die Europäische Gesellschaft”, University of Zurich, BA Sociology 
2010-2014 Methods lab I, University of Zurich, BA Sociology 
(spring terms) 
fall 2013   Advanced quantitative methods, University of Zurich, MA Sociology 
(together with Vanita Matta, Daniel Seddig) 
06/2010   Course “Structural Equation Modeling with Mplus” 
(together with Prof. Peter Schmidt), University of Ljubljana 
02/2010   Workshop “Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS”, University of 
Konstanz, Department of Political Science 
11/2009   Course “Structural Equation Modeling with MPLUS” 
(together with Prof. Peter Schmidt, Prof. Eldad Davidov, Bart 
Meuleman), GESIS-Mannheim (ZUMA) 
09/2007-06/2009 Urban sociology, University of Vienna (together with Prof. Christoph 
Reinprecht) 
08/2009   Teaching assistant, ECPR Summer School in Methods and 
Techniques, Ljubljana, SEM course, Prof. Peter Schmidt, 
Prof. Eldad Davidov 
11/2009   Teaching assistant, 5th ESS Train on “Structural Equation Modeling 
for Cross-Cultural Research with the Program AMOS”, Mannheim, 
Prof. Peter Schmidt, Prof. Eldad Davidov 
08/2005, 08/2006, Teaching Fellow, Essex Summer School in Social Science Data 
07/2008, 07/2009 Analysis and Collection, Advanced Course in SEM (Longitudinal 
  Data, Cross-cultural comparisons), Prof. Peter Schmidt, 
  Prof. Eldad Davidov 
fall 2007   Introduction to sociology, University of Vienna 
09/2004-06/2005  Student assistant, course on data collection and data analysis, Prof. 
Wolfgang Schulz 
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Advanced methods and theory courses/workshops (participant) 
06/2010   QMSS II Seminar, “Multilevel Analysis and Multigroup 
 Comparisons in Cross-national Research”, Leuven 
011/2009    Problems of Rational Choice Theory, Prof. Siegwart Lindenberg,  
     ETH Zurich 
06/2009    QMSS II Seminar, “Quality and Comparability of Measures for 
Constructs in Comparative Research: Methods and Applications”, 
Bozen, 
05/2004    Multilevel Analysis, Prof. Tom Snijders, Institute for Advanced 
Studies, Vienna 
Languages 
German first language 
English good speaking, reading, and writing 
French  basic speaking, fair reading, basic writing 
Spanish  basic speaking and reading 
Software  
Advanced MS Office, AMOS, MPLUS, SPSS 
Basic   Atlas.ti, LISREL, R, SAS, Stata,  
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[Risk of poverty and housing] 
Wallace, Claire, Reingard Spannring, and Datler, Georg (2008) What Leads Young 
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Political Engagement on European Identity among Young Europeans (2008). Perspectives 
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Project reports (selection) 
Reinprecht, Christoph, Georg Datler, Carmen Keckeis, and Kurtev, Angelina (2009) 
Soziale Dynamik im Stadtraum. Sozialraumanalysen in 8 Wiener Wohnvierteln. 
Muncipality of Vienna, Vienna. 
[Social dynamics in Vienna. Social area analysis in 8 neighbourhoods] 
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2008–11. Statistik Austria, Vienna. 
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Arbeitsbehelf (2008) Statistik Austria, Vienna. 
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Datler, Georg (2006) EU-SILC 2005/2006: Ausschöpfung im Panel (2006) Statistik 
Austria, Vienna. 
[EU-SILC 2005/2006: Panel Attrition] 
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[New Communities—New Identities? A study of territorial identities of young people at 
the Austrian-Slovak border] 
European identity. A variable Variable (2014) University of Bern, Institute of Sociology, 
Research Colloquium. 
Conference Presentations (selection) 
What is Europe? Meanings of Europe in different social contexts (2014) Council of 
European Studies, 21st
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identity content (2011) 1
 International Conference of Europeanists, Washington. (together 
with Jörg Rössel and Julia Schroedter) 
st
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and dynamics (2011). ESA conference, Geneva. 
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